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* * * * * 
The Legislative Council, which is composed of five Senators, 
six Representatives, and the presiding officers of the two houses, 
serves as a continuing research agency for the legislature through 
the maintenance of a trained staff. Between sessions, research 
activities are concentrated on the study of relatively broad prob-
lems formally proposed by legislators, and the publication and 
distribution of factual reports to aid in their solution. 
Du~ing the sessions, the emphasis is on supplying legislators, 
on i idual request, with personal memoranda, providing them with 
information needed to handle their own legislative problems. Reports 
and memoranda both give pertinent data in the form of facts, figures, 
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December 9, 1960 
To Members of the Forty-third Colorado General Assembly: 
As directed by the terms of Senate Joint Resolution 
No. 16 (1959) and Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 (1960), the 
Legislative Council is submitting herewith its report and 
recommendations on judicial organization and administration. 
Also included is a report of the progress made in the exam-
inations of the Colorado criminal code and related matters, 
which were among the subjects enumerated for study in both 
Senate Joint Resolutions. This portion of the study was 
not completed because of the priority given judicial re-
organization and the great amount of work related to that 
subject. 
The committee appointed by the Legislative Council 
to complete this study submitted its report December 9, 
1960, at which time the report was adopted by the Legisla-
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December 9, 1960 
The Honorable Charles Conklin, Chairman 
Colorado Legislative Council 
State Cap:i:tol 
Denver 2, Colorado 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
MIEM■IERe 
LT, GOV, RO■IEIIT L, KNOUe 
e1EN. CHARLIEe IE, elENNIETI 
elEN. DAVID J. CLARKIE 
elEN, T, IEVIERIETI COOK 
e1EN. CARL W. l'ULGHUl\ol 
HN. f'AUL IE. WIENKIE 
ef'IEAICIER CHAIILIEe CONKLIN 
Rf'f', DIEWIEY CARNAHAN 
RIEf', JOIE DOLAN 
IIIEf', f'IETIER H, DOMINICK 
RIEf', GUY f'OIE 
IIIEf', RAYMOND H. e1Mf'90N 
IIIEf', ALelERT J. TOMelC 
Transmitted herewith is the report of the Legislative 
Council Committee on Administration of Justice appointed pur-
suant to Senate Joint Resolution No. 16 (1959) and continued 
by Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 (1960). This report covers 
the committee's study of judicial organization and administra-
tion and its recommendations thereon, including a proposed 
amendment of the judicial article of the Colorado Constitution. 
Aslo contain~d herein is a report of the committee's progress 
on the study of the criminal code. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ Senator Carl Fulghum 
Chairman 
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This study was authorizeq by Senate Joint Resolution No. 16. 
(1959) and continued by Senate Joint Resolution No. 9 (1960). These 
resolutions directed the Legislative Council to appoint a subcom-
mittee to make a study directed at improving the administration of 
justice, including the organization and jurisdiction of all courts 
and judicial services, the criminal code, and rules of criminal 
p;-ocedure. 
The Legislative Council committee appointed to make this 
study included: Senator Carl w. Fulghum, Glenwood Springs, chair-
man; Representative Albert Tomsic, Walsenburg, vice chairman; 
Senator Charles E. Bennett, Denver; Representative Edward J. Byrne, 
Denver; Senator David J. Clarke, Denver; Senator T. Everett Cook, 
Canon City; Representative Joe Dolan, Denver; Representative 
Peter Dominick, Englewood; Representative M. R. Douglass, Grand 
Junction; Representative Robert E. Holland, Denver; Representative 
John Kane, Thornton; Representative Roy McVicker, Wheatridge; 
Senator Ranger Rogers, Littleton; Representative Walter Stalker, 
Joes; and. Senator Paul E. Wenke, Fort Collins. 
Senate Joint Resolution No. 16 (1959) also directed the 
chairman of the Legislative Council to appoint an advisory com-
mittee to represent a cross section of knowledge and interest in 
the administration of justice, including the operation of all 
courts, judicial services, and criminal law. A sixteen-member 
advisory committee was appointed with the following members: 
Douglas McHendrLe, Colorado Bar Association, chairman; Judge Jean 
Jacobucci, Adams County Court, vice chairman; Justice O. Otto 
Moore, Colorado Supreme Court; Justice Frank Hall, Colorado Supreme 
Court; Judge James Noland, Sixth Judicial District; Judge Edward 
Pringle, Second Judicial District; Judge Marshall Quiat, First 
Judicial District; Judge David Brofman, Denver County Court; Judge 
Hal Chapman, Otero County Court; Judge Gerald McAuliffe, Denver 
Municipal Court; Judge Daniel Shannon, Jefferson County Justice 
Court; Donald Stubbs, Colorado Bar Association;l Matt Kikel, Tenth 
Judicial District Attorney; Max Melville, Assistant District Attor-
ney, Second Judicial District;2 Professor Homer Clark, University 
of Colorado Law School; an<l Professor Vance R. Dittman, University 
of Denver Law School. 
l. Replaced by Ben Stapleton, Jr. when Mr. Stapleton succeeded 
Mr. Stubbs as chairman of the Colorado Bar Association 
Judiciary Committee 
2. Deceased, replaced by Gregory Mueller, Deputy District Attor-
ney, Second Judicial District~ 
iii 
The staff work on this study was the primary responsibility 
of Harry O. Lawson, Legislative Council senior research analyst, 
assisted by Myran Schlechte and Charles B. Howe, Legislative Council 
research assistants. Professors Albert Menard and Austin W. Scott, 
University of Colorado Law School, served as legal consultants to 
the committee, Professor Menard with respect to judicial organiza-
tion and administration, and Professor Scott with respect to criminal 
law. 
~ The Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of 
Justice held 21 meetings between June 1959, and December 1960. Ten 
of these meetings were regional public hearings, which were held in 
Alamosa, Denver, Durango, Glenwood Springs, Grand Junction, Fort 
Collins, Fort Morgan, Golden, La Junta, and Pueblo. At these hear-
ings, judges and other court officials, legislators, other public 
officials, attorneys, and interested citizens met with the committee 
to discuss judicial problems and solutions. 
To provide basic data on court operations, the committee 
directed a docket analysis of cases filed in the supreme court and 
in all of the district and county courts. More than six months were 
needed by the Council staff to collect, compile, and evaluate the 
extensive court data included in this analysis. In addition, the 
committee studied court organization and related subjects in other 
states, focusing special attention on judicial studies and the 
resultant findings and recommendations. Considerable study was 
made of the many recommendations made for change in Colorado. The 
committee's final proposal for judicial reorganization was the 
product of a ser~es of workshop meetings extending over several 
months, at which the committee and the advisory committee pinpointed 
the problems in the present judicial system, evaluated various pro-
posals for change, and formulated a plan designed to improve judicial 
administration on all court levels and in all areas of the state --
urban, mountain, and rural. 
Judicial reorganization was considered by the committee to 
be its most important assignment. Because of the amount of work 
required on this subject, the committee was unable to complete its 
study of the criminal code. A good beginning was made on this 
subject, however, and the committee's progress on the criminal code 
is covered in the last chapter of this report. 
The committee wishes to express its deep appreciation to the 
members of the advisory committee, who spent many days at their own 
expense attending the regionctl hearings and the workshop sessions. 
The assistance ~ided by the advisory committee in exploring the 
many judicial problems and possible solutions was invaluable. The 
committee also wishes to thank all of the judges and attorneys for 
their help, both individually and through the various judges' 
associations and bar association committees. In particular the 
committee would like to thank the judges and members of their staffs 
for their cooperation and assistance in making the docket analysis, 
and Clyde O. Martz and James Carrigan, the former and present 









The committee's report is lengthy, because of the many 
facets to the administration of justice. The report sets the com-
mittee's findings within a background covering: the state's 
present judicial organization; "the history of Colorado's courts; 
previous studies and recommendations; present judicial problems; 
judicial organization, administration, and studies in other states; 
a summary of the regional hearings; and the results and implica-
tions of the docket anaiysis. 
December 10, 1960 
V 










TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL 
FOREWORD 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
COMMITTEE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(see green sheets) 
COLORADO JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION 
The Present Colorado Court System••••••••••••••••••• 
A Brief History of Court Organization in Colorado ••• 
Recent Colorado Studies Concerned with the Adminis-
tration of Justice••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Colorado Bar Association Studies•••••••••••••••••••• 
Colorado Judicial Council••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Legislative Studies••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
CONTINUING JUDICIAL PROBLEMS 
Supreme Court••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
District Courts •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
County Courts••••••·•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Justice Courts .................•.....•.............. 
Domestic Relations - Juvenile Cases••••••••••••••••• 
Judicial Selection•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
State-Local Jurisdiction•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION -- THEO~Y AND PRACTICE 
/ 
A Brief History •••••••• { •••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••• 
Approaches to Court Reorganization Since 1900 ••••••• 
Present Approaches to Judicial Reorganization ••••••• 
Judicial Selection•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Judicial Reform in Other States••••••••••••••••••••• 
A Fresh Approach•••••••••••••••·•••••••••••••••••••• 
Some Tools of Judicial Administration ••••••••••••••• 
JUDICIAL PROBLEMS IN COLORADO: EXAMINATION AND MEASUREMENT 
Organizaing the Study••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Judicial St~tistics ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Regional Meetings••••••••••••••••••••••·•••••••••••• 
Consolidation of District and County Courts ••••••••• 
Minor Court Review••••·••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Election or Selection of Judges••••••••••••~•••••••• 
Court Procedures and Internal Operation •••••••• ~ •••• 





































TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued: 
Supreme Court•••••••••••·••••••••••••••••••••••• 
District Courts •••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••• 
County Courts ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
CRIMINAL CODE STUDY -- COMMITTEE PROGRESS 
Sentencing· .....•................•............... 
Comparison of Crimes and Penalties in Selected 
States .................................... . 
Counsel for Indigent Defendants••••••••••••••••• 
Licensing and Regulation of Bail Bondsmen ••••••• 
APPENDIX A Judicial Article, Constitution of Alaska 
APPENDIX B Judicial Article, Constitution of Hawaii 
APPENDIX C Number of District and County Judges 
Required Under Proposed Amendment 
APPENDIX D Comparison of Judicial Article and Proposed 
Amendment 












LIST OF TABLES AND CHARTS 
The Judicial System.cif Colorado ••••• ~ •••• 
Judicial Districts of Colorado ••••••••••• 
Cases Before the Colorado Supreme Court 
1950-1959 .......................... . 
Number of Reversals, Cases Heard on Error, 
Colorado Supremr./Court, 1953-1959 ••• 
Source and Type of C/cises Docketed in. the 
Supreme Court During 1959 ••••••••••• 
Cases at Iisue Before the Colorado Supreme 
Court as of September 30, 1959 •••••• 
Cases at Issue Pending Before the Colorado 
Supreme Court by Type of Case, as of 
September 30, 1959 •••••••••••••••••• 
District Court Case Load and Population 
per Judge, by Judicial District, 
Cases Filed in 1958 ••••••••••••••••• 
Trend in District Court Case Loads, Cases 
Filed in 1950 and 1958 by Judicial 
District ........................... . 
Number of Cases by Major Category Filed in 
District Courts in 1958, by County 
and Judicial District ••••••••••••••• 
District Court Case Load by Type of Case 
Filed in 1950 and 1958, by Judicial 

























































Average Time Filing to Disposition, Cases 
Filed in 1958 by Judicial District •••• 
Type of Disposition, Civil Cases Filed in 
1958, by Judicial District •••••••••••• 
Type of Disposition, Domestic Relations 
Cases Filed in 1958, by Judicial 
District ............................. . 
Number of Civil Cases Filed in 1958 Under 
$2,000, by Judicial District •••·•••••• 
Cases Filed in County Courts in 1958 •••••• 
Comparison of Cases Filed in County Court 
1950 and 1958 ···••••···•·••••••••••••• 
Relationship Between County Court Case 
Loads, Judicial Salaries, and Total 
Court Expenditures, Cases Filed in 1958 
Small Estates and Other Probate Cases Filed 
in County Courts in 1958 •••••••••••••• 
Number of Civil Cases Under $300 Filed in 
. County Courts, 1958 ··•••··•··••••••••· 
~umber of Justice Court and Municipal 
' Court Appeals Filed in County Courts 
in 1958 .............................. . 
Distribution of Counties According to 
Number of Justice Courts Filed in 1957. 
Comparison of Crimes, Penalties and Related 
Provisions, Colorado and Selected States 
Court-Appointed Attorney Fees Paid, Denver 
District Court Criminal Divisions, 
for Selected Years •••••••••••••••••••• 
Fees Paid Court-Appointed Attorneys, 
Criminal Cases Filed in 1958 by 
Judicial District·••••··••••••••·•···• 
Defendants, Represented by Counael, 
Criminal Cases Filed in 1958 by 

















































COLORADO'S JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION 
Introduction 
Colorado's judicial structure today is very much the same 
~sit was when Colorado became a state in 1876, despite a sizable 
population increase, accompanied by an expanding and changing 
economy, and vast technological improvements in transportation and 
communications. With the exception of a few and, for the most 
part, minor ymendments, the judicial article of the Colorado 
Constitution has not been altered since its adoption. 
In part, there has been little change because the judicial 
article in the past has proven flexible enough to accommodate, 
within limitations, the changes described above. For this reason, 
legislation has been used as the primary method of solving partic-
ular judicial problems. As a result, much of the change in judicial 
organization and administration has been expedient and piecemeal, 
and little attention has been given to long-range planning to provide 
a judicial structure to meet the needs of the state 50 or 75 years 
in the future. In many instinces this legislation unintentionally 
has hampered long-range solutions because basic court organizational 
problems have been ignored, additional courts have been provided, 
and changed and overlapping jurisdictions have resulted in new 
obstacles to judicial reorganization.2 
The difficulty in amending the state constitution has also 
been a major factor in the increased reliance on legislation to 
correct court organizational problems, not only in Colorado, but in 
other states as well. The legislative approach to court problems 
was followed throughout the ~ountry in the last two decades of the 
19th century and the first 20 to 30 years of the present one. Often 
problems were so immediate that a legislative solution, which could 
be achieved in a short period of time, was preferable to the much 
slower process of constitutional amendment. As long as legislation 
could solve immediate court problems, there appeared to be l~ttle 
need for basic reorganization through constitutional change. 
Tradition also works against acceptance of change in 
judicial organization and procedures, often even against recognition 
1. Article VI, Colorado Constitution. 
2. Piecemeal, expedient approaches to judicial problems and their 
effects are explored more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
3. The judicial article of most state constitutions gives the 
legislature rather broad powers in adding to existing trial 
courts or in creating new ones. 
that perhaps change is needed. The American legal system has its 
roots in British common law and judicial organization. Through 
the years evolution at times has been slow, especially in the older 
states along the Atlantic seaboard. Members of bench and bar 
trained and accustomed to working within a particular organizational 
and procedural pattern often are slow to desire basic change until 
inefficiency, case backlog, and related problems become so serious 
that no less drastic remedy appears adequate. 
Even when a proposal for the basic overhaul of judicial 
administration has gained the acceptance of a majority of attorneys 
and judges, it will not be successful unless citizens in general see 
the need and feel the plan is sound. In every state where judicial 
reorganization has been successful, it has resulted from the con-
certed activity of informed civic groups and organizations. 
Unfortunately (from the standpoint of. judicial improvement), the 
average citizen has little contact with the day-to-day operation of 
the court system. Consequently, it is difficult for him to recognize 
the need for change, except with respect to justice courts, where 
over 90 per cent of the citizens who have any contact with the 
courts have their only experiences. 
A certain amount of flexibility in the judicial article, the 
difficulty of effecting constitutional change, .short run and piece-
meal improvements through le~islation, tradition, lack of public 
understanding, resistance to change, and general apathy have all 
helped to prevent any basic change in Colorado's court structure 
since 1876. To this list should be added disagreement among propo-
nents of different plans of judicial reorganization and the 
difficulty in developing a plan of judicial reorganization which 
would meet urban and rural needs in a state as widely diversified 
as Colorado. 
The need for judicial reorganization should be determined 
by an evaluation of the effectiveness of the present judicial 
system and_its ability to meet the demands of population growth and 
economic expansion in the future without constitutional change. 
This analysis includes: an inventory of the present court system, 
an evaluation of organizational, procedural, and personnel impediments 
to the just and speedy disposition of cases, an examination of changes 
made since 1876 and their effect, and a pinpointing of particular 
problem areas. 
The Present Colorado Court System 
Colorado's court system consists of four levels of courts: 
supreme court, district courts, county courts, and justice of the 
peace and municipal courts. The first three are constitutional 
courts and their jurisdiction is defined in the judicial article. 
The justice of the peace courts are referred to in the judicial 






























offices by virtue of another article of the Colorado Constitution; 4 
but justice of the peace courts are not constitutional in the same 
sense as the supreme, district, and county courts. Justice court 
jurisdiction is not defined in ~he constitution; rather, certain 
limit~tions are placed within which the General Assembly may 
choose to confer jurisdiction.S 
The justice of the peace, therefore, has no constitutional 
guarantee of jurisdiction and the General Assembly, if it wished, 
could strip him of all judicial authority, although he would still 
~emain a constitutional officer . 
Municipal courts in home rule cities also derive their status 
from the constitution,6 while municipal courts in general law cities 
and towns are provided for by statute. 
Colorado also has two other courts which are on the same 
judicial level as county courts. The Denver Superior Court was 
established by statute pursuant to the authority conferred upon the 
General Assembly by the judicial article to create courts other than 
those enumerated as constitutional courts. 1 The Denver Juvenile 
Court was also established by statute pursuant to the constitutional 
provision permitting the General Assembly to create a separate court 
in counties and cities and counties over 100,000 population, with 
exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving minors and persons 
whose offenses concern minors.8 An outline of the state judicial 
system is shown in Figure 1. 
Supreme Court 
The supreme court consists of seven justices elected at 
large for ten-year staggered terms. It has original jurisdiction to 
issue remedial writs and answer interrogatories from the governor 






Article XIV, Section 11, Colorado Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 25, Colorado Constitution provides that 
justices of the peace sh~ll have such jurisdiction as may be 
conferred by law, but they shall not have jurisdiction of any 
case wherein the value of property or the amount in controversy 
exceeds $300, nor where the boundaries or title to real property 
are in question • 
Article XX, Section 6, Colorado Constitution. The municipal court 
of the City and County of Denver also has justice of the peace 
jurisdiction as provided in Article XX, Section 2. 
Article VI, Section 1, Colorado Constitution. 
Ibid. 
- 3 -
diction to review decisions of all inferior courts, and writs of 
error lie from the supreme court to all county court final judgments.9 
Review of other cases is limited by statute and court rule.IO 
A supreme court candidate must be learned in the law, a 
citizen of the United Slates residing in Colorado, and must be at 
least 30 years of age.l Supreme Court justices receive an annual 
salary or $15,000, and the chief justice receives an additional $500. 
The justice not holding office py appointment or election to fill a 
vacancy and who has the shortest period yet}~ serve on the court 
is desJgnated as chief justice for one year. The'chief justice 
presides at all sessions of the court when it meets en~ and 
directs the work of the court in general. 
· The supreme court is authorized to sit in two or more depart-
ments (or divisions) as the court may determine, except that cases 
involving the construction of the United States or Colorado 
Constitutions shall be decided by the court en bane. When the court 
sits in departments, each department has thefull power and authority 
of the court authorized in the judicial article subject to court 
rules, except that no decision of any department shall become the 
judgment of the court unless concurred in by at least three judges.13 
The supreme court also has general superintending control 
over all inferior courts, and for this purpose the state is divided 
into six judicial departments, iach headed by one of the justices 
appointed by the chief justice. 4 The Office of Judicial Administrator 
is provided by statute and the administrator is appointed by the 
supreme court and performs certain statutory functions and other 
duties assigned him by the supreme court to assist it in its admin-
istration of the state judicial system.15 
District Courts 
The_district court is Colorado's major trial court of general 








Article VI, Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 23. 
37-2-33, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953 limits review of other 
cases to a writ of error procedure and such review is limited 
by court rule to final judgments, certain conditional water 
decrees, orders granting or denying temporary injunctions and 
orders appointing or denying the appointment of receivers. 
Article VI, Section 10, Colorado Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 8, Col~rado Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 5, Colorado Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 2, Colorado Constitution and Chapter 37, 
Article 10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended by 
Chapter 93 Session Laws of Colorado,1959. 
32-10-1 (2~, Colorado Revised Statutes,1953, as amended by 




















THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF COLORADO 
UPR ME OURT 
Seven Justices 
1. Limited original jurisdiction 
2. Appellat~ jurisdiction 




18 Districts -- 41 Judgesa 
Unlimited civil jurisdiction 
Unlimited criminal jurisdictio 
Trial de novo from county and 
superior courts 
4. Transfers from justice, county 
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1. Civil matters to $300 con-
current with county court 
2. Misdemeanors 
3. Forcible entry concurrent 
with county court 
Preliminary hearings in 
felon cases 
Ordinance violations if 
offense local in nature, 
except for Denver Municipal 
Court which has justice of 
~he eace jurisdiction 
a. Additional judges elected in November 1960 in 17th and 18th 
judicial districts, will assume office in January 1961, raising 
total to 41. 




four are one-county districts. The boundaries of the 18 judicial 
districts are shown in Figure 2. The district court has original 
jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters with the exception 
of probate matters and juvenile cases.16 Cases may be brought 
from the county court on appeal or transferred from county and 
justice of the peace courts for lack of jurisdiction in these 
lower courts, but no appeals may be taken to the district court 
from any judgment in a county court in cases previously appealed 
from a justice or municipal court. Cases appealed from county court 
are retried (trial de novo). The district court also has appellate 
jurisdiction to revfew findings and conclusions of administrative 
agencies and certiorari powers to review cases of any inferior 
tribunal. 
District judges are elected for six-year terms and are 
required to be learned in the law, at least 30 years of age, 
citizens of the United States, Colorado residents for at least two 
years preceding election, and electors within their judicial 
districts.17 All district judges are elected at the same time, 
even in multi-judge districts. As of January 1961, there will be 
41 district judges, with the 2nd Judicial District (Denver) having 
the largest number: 10. In multi-county districts, the judges ride 
circuit, holding court in the various counties at certain specified 
times, as provided for by the judicial article and by statute and 
determined by the extent and press of judicial business.18 District 
judges receive an annual salary of $12,000 from the state. Salaries 
of non-judicial personnel and other court expenses are borne by the 
county or counties composing each judicial district. On invitation 
or assignment district judges may sit for other district judges both 
within and outside t~9ir districts or preside in county, superior, and juvenile courts. Upon request of the supreme court, district 
judges may sit with that body and assist it in opinion writing.20 
County, ~upe~ior! and juvenile court judge~ who ~ie lawyers may also 
sit as district Judges as requested or assigned. 
The General Assembly has the authority to change the 
boundaries of judicial districts and to increase or decrease either 
the number of judicial districts or the number of district judges, 
except that no such change can result in the removal of any district 








Article VI, Section 11, Colorado Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 16, Colorado Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 17, Colorado Constitution, and Chapter 37, 
Article 3, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended. 
37-4-11 through 15, 37-5-14 through 16, 37-9-20 through 22, and 
37-11-11, Colorado Revised Statutes,1953, as amended by Chapter 
40, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960. . 
Chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960. 
Chapter 40, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960. 
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County Court 
The county court is a constitutional trial court of more 
limited jurisdiction than the district court. With the exception of 
probate, mental health, and juvenile cases and appeals from justice 
of the peace and municipal courts, its jurisdiction is concurrent 
with the -district court. This concurrent juri-sdiction is limited 
to misdemeanors and to civil cases involving claims of less than 
$2,000.L3 Cases appealed from justice of the peace and municipal 
courts are retried (in county court). Appeals from the county court 
lie to- the supreme court by writ of error or to the district court 
with certain exceptions as already indicated. 
Each county has a county court and is limited to one county 
judge. County judges are elected every four years and their salaries 
and other court expenses are borne by the counties. Salaries of 
county judges are set by statute according to county classification 
and currently ran~~ from $734 (Hinsdale and Mineral counties) to 
$12,500 (Denver). The judicial article does not require county 
judges to be lawyers, but there is such a statu;gry requirement for 
county judges in Class I and Class II counties. Prior to the 1960 
general election, only eight of the 51 county judges in Class III 
through VI counties were attorneys. Many of the judges in the 
smaller counties also serve as their own court clerks and a few 
serve in a similar capacity f6r the district court. Except in Class 
I and II counties, county judges who are attorneys are not restricted 
from the practice of law. 
Denver Juvenile ~ourt 
The Denver Juvenile Court has been in existence since 1903, 
when it was created by statute, presumably under the authority 
given the General Assembly by the judicial article to establish 
other courts in addition to those specified. Through a 1907 amend-
ment to the judicial article, the General Assembly was given the 
authority to create separate courts with exclusive original juris-
diction2~n cases involving minors and persons whose offenses concern 
minors. Included within the juvenile court's jurisdiction are 
such matters as juvenile delinquency, dependency and neglect, 





Article VI, Section 23, Colorado Constitution. 
56-2-3,Colorado Revised Statute~ 1953, as amended by Chapter 44, 
Section 4, Session Laws of Colorado, 1958, and ~6-2-18,Colorado 
Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended by Chapter 40, Section 11, 
Session Laws of Colorado, 1960. 
37-5-22,Colorado Revised Statutes,1953, _as amended. Denver is 
the only Class I county. The 11 Class II couhties include: 
Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, El Paso, Jefferson, Latimer, Las 
Animas, Mesa, Otero, Puebio, and Weld. 













and contributing to dependency. Not all of the juvenile court's 
jurisdiction is exclusive, however. It has concurrent jurisdiction 
with district and county courts in criminal cases involving or con-
cerning persons under 21 a~d in annulment cases where one of the 
parties is less than 21.27 · 
The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction in delinquency 
cases, but in such cases involving minors between 16 and 18, if the 
alleged offense also constitutes a felony, an action may be brought 
in district court rather than juvenile court. In these cases the 
~district attorney determines whether to file a petition of delinquency 
in juvenile court or an information on a felony charge in district 
court.£8 The juvenile court is excluded from jurisdiction of 
traffic offenses, and game and fish violations by minors. 29 There 
have been several supreme court cases which have involved an 
interpretation of the concurrent criminal jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court, particularly with reference to adults involved in offenses 
against minors. There have also been a number of supreme court 
decisions concerned with the relationship between the custody juris-
diction of the district court and the dependency jurisdiction of the 
county court. Appeals from juvenile court may be taken to the 
district or supreme court in the same manner as from county court. 
Prior to 1960, Denver was the only city and county or county 
which met the population requirement of 100,000 for the creation 
of a separate juvenile court as provided by statute pursuant to 
the judicial article.30 Preliminary 1960 census figures indicate 
that five counties, Adams, Arapahoe, El Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo, 
now exceed 100,000 population; however, during the 1960 legislative 
session, the General Assembly raised the population limit from 
100,000 to 250,000, for a number of reasons which will be discussed 
later in this report.31 As a result of this legislation, Denver 
remains the only city or county which can meet the population 
requirement for a separate juvenile court. In the other 62 counties, 
juvenile matters are heard in the county court. 
The juvenile court in Denver is financed entirely by the 
city and county. The court has only one judge, who must have the 
27. 37-9-2 (!),Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. 
28. The same relationship exists in other counties between the 
district court and the county courts, which also sit as 
juvenile courts. 
29. 22-8-15,Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953 as amended by Chapter 74, 
Session Law$ of Colorado, 1959, and 22-8-7,Colorado Revised 
Statutes, 1953 as amended by Chapter 36, Section 2, Session Laws 
of Colorado,1960. 
30. 37-9-1,Colorado Revised Statutes of 1953. 
31. 37-9-1,Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended by Chapter 41 
Session Laws of Colorad~ 1960. 
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same qualifications for office as a district judge and who.also 
receives the same salary as a district judge. The juvenile judge 
is elected for a four-year term, and his term of office expires 
at the same time as do those of the county judges. 
Denver Superior Court 
Superior courts were authorized by statute in 1954"in 
counties or cities and counties of more than 300,000 population. 32 
The Qxclusive jurisdiction of the superior court is limited to 
trials de !lQ.Y.Q. in matters appealed from justices of the peace and 
municipal courts. It has concurrent jurisdiction with the county 
and district courts in divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, 
and other civil actions where the amount involved does not exceed 
$2,00o.33 Appeals may be taken to the district or supreme court 
in the same manner as from county couits. The superior court was 
established to relieve some of the burden of the Denver County 
Court, which was finding it difficult to keep its docket current 
on the large number of probate and mental health matters filed in 
that court, because of the substantial increase in justice court 
and municipal court appeals. At the time this legislation was 
considered there was no great need expressed for a superior court 
in the large counties other than Denver. For this reason the popu-
lation limit was set at 300,000, which, even after the 1960 census, 
still excludes all other counties. There is only one judge of the 
superior court and his salary and all court expenses are financed 
by the City and County of Denver. Qualifications for superior court 
judge are similar to those of district judg~, and.he receives the 
same salary as a district judge. He is elected for a four-year 
term and stands for election at the same time as county judges and 
the juvenile judge. 
Justice of the Peace Courts 
Justice of the peace courts are the state trial courts of 
least jurisdiction. These courts are created by the constitution 
as are the offices of justice of the peace and constable, but the 
court's jurisdiction is limited by the constitution to misdemeanors 
and civil actions under $300, not involving real property disputes.34 
Justices of the peace have county-wide jurisdiction (as contrasted 
with county judges, who are considered state officers with state-
wide jurisdiction, even though elected and paid by a particular 
county) concurrent with the county and district courts within the 
32. Chapter 37, Article 11, Colorado Revised Statutes of 1953 as 
amended. · 
33. 32-11-2,Colorado Revised Statutes of 1953 as amended. 
34. Article VI, Section 25, and Article XIV, Section 11, Colorado 
Constitution. 
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limits specified above. Justices of the peace may hold preliminary 
hearings in felony cases, perform marriages, administer oaths, and 
take acknowledgments.35 
In the City and County of Denver, justice court jurisdiction 
is exercised by the Denver Municipal Court, which has separate 
justice of the peace civil and criminal divisions, in addition to its 
municipal c0urt divisions, for various categories of ordinance 
violations.36 Appeals from the justice court in the City and County 
of Denver lie to the superior court where they are tried de !:!QYQ.• 
fn the other 62 counties appeals lie to the county court where they 
are also heard de novo. ---
The qualifications which a justice of the peace must meet 
are relatively few, none of which pertain to his aptitude or experi~ 
ence for judicial office. He must be a qualified elector and must 
reside and have his office in the precinct for which he was elected. 
Beyond these requirements, there are no standards which a justice 
must meet to qualify for the office.37 Very few justices of the 
peace are attorneys or have had any legal training. 
Each county is entitled to two justices of the peace in each 
precinct. The board of county commissioners has statutory authority 
to create additional justice precincts or consolidate existing 
precincts.38 There has been no need in recent years for creating 
additional justice precincts, and, while consolidation would be 
helpful in reducing the number of justices of the peace, it has been 
accomplishe9 in very few counties -- notably Huerfano, Jefferson, and 
Pueblo. In several other counties there are often no candidates from 
some justice precincts and no one will accept appointment to these 
positions, with the result that the county may have as few justices 
as might be accomplished by precinct consolidation. 
Justices of the peace are compensated from the fees of their 
office within certain statutory limitations. Justices in precincts 
of more than 100,000 population may retain up to $7,500 in fees. 
Those in precincts between 70,000 and 100,000 population may retain 






For a full discussion of justice of the peace jurisdiction and 
duties see Justice Courts in Colorado, Colorado Legislative 
Council, Research Publication No. 24, December 1958, pp. 5-25. 
Denver's authority to combine justice of the peace and municipal 
jurisdiction in the same court is derived from an amendment to 
the Denver City Charter passed pursuant lo the provisions of 
Article Xv, Section 2, Colorado Constitution •. 
Justice Courts in Colorado, p. 13. 
79-1-1,Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. 
56-2-13,Colorado Revised Statutes, as amended by Chapter 42, 
Session Laws of Colorado,196O. For most civil cases, the J.P. 
receives a docket fee of $4; certain civil actions require a 
docket fee of $5 or $6. The docket fee is $4 for traffic cases 
and $5 in all other criminal cases. 
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Except in large counties, the justices of the peace have insufficient 
business to reach the statutory fee maximum. In 1958 there were 
approximately 275 justices of the peace in the state and there may 
be between 250 and 275 at the present.40 
Municipal Courts 
Municipal courts are not state courts, as their jurisdiction 
is limited to ordinance violations, which are of local concern. 
Muni~ipal courts in home rule cities derive their authority from 
the Home Rule Amendment to the Colorado Constitution.41 Municipal 
courts in general law cities and towns are provided for by statute. 42 
Appeals from municipal courts are taken to the county court and are 
tried de nova, except in the City and County of Denver where these 
appeals are tried de novo in superior court. 
The office of municipal judge is a full-time position only 
in Denver and perhaps a few other of the larger cities such as 
Pueblo and Boulder. In most of the larger municipalities the 
municipal judge is usually an attorney. The charters of several of 
these cities require that the position be filled by a lawyer. Usually 
municipal judges are appointed for a specified term by the city 
council. (In Denver these appointments are made by the mayor.) In 
several smaller cities and tdwns, the local justice of the peace has 
also been appointed police magistrate or municipal judge. With the 
exception of Denver, which has 10 municipal judges (four of whom 
preside over the justice court divisi0ns), no municipality has 
more than one judge who serves on a full-time basis, although some 
cities such as Boulder have a judge who serves on a standby basis 
when the regular judge is not available; and others (e.g., Grand 
Junction) may have more than one part-time judge. 
The salaries of municipal judges are set by the city 
council or town board of trustees and vary according to the size of 
the municipality and whether the position is full or part time. 
The practice in municipalities under 2,000 population is to com-
pensate the police magistrate or municipal judge from the fees of 
his office rather than by a fixed monthly or annual salary. 
40. It is very difficult even to estimate the number of justices 
of the peace with any accuracy. · The only official published 
list includes only those elected at the general election. A 
number of these don't take office, and an additional number 
resign. It is difficult to determine if any of these vacancies 
are filled by the county commissioners or if appointments are 
made to fill vacancies caused by the failure of candidates to 
stand for election. 
41. Article XX, Section 6P Colorado Constitution. 













Municipal ordinance violations were considered to be civil 
in nature prior to the supreme court decision in the Merris case 
in 1958,43 even though rather severe penalties, including large 
fines and jail sentences, are authorized in certain instances. 
Consequently, alleged violators did not have the usual due process 
protections expected in criminal proceedings, especially the right 
of trial by jury. Since the Merris decision, these cases are 
treated as criminal in nature, and defendants are given due process 
including jury trials if they so desire. Home rule cities have 
passed municipal jury ordinances under their constitutional and 
charter powers, and legislation was adopted giving statutory cities 
ana towns the authority to pass jury trial ordinances. 44 A further 
consequence of the Merris decision was the limitation placed on 
municipal court jurisdiction, through the court's ruling that the 
power of home rule cities to legislate on matters of local concern 
is limited to those areas in which the state has not enacted legislation. 
A Brief History of Court Organization in Colorado 
At the time Colorado became a state, its population was only 
194,100, more than 1.5 million less than the preliminary 1960 census 
total of 1,742,029. There were only 26 counties, and the judicial 
article originally provided for only four judicial districts, which 
spanned the entire state. Adjudication of water rights and mining 
claims were primary concerns,' since mining and cattle constituted 
the main economic activity in the state. The telegraph was the only 
means of rapid communication throughout the state and mountains were 
a very formidable barrier between isolated, sparsely-populated areas. 
Because of these conditions there was a real need for local courts 
to administer justice and settle minor disputes quickly and cheaply, 
and justice of the peace courts played a prominent judicial role; 
indeed, the justice of the peace during this period was exactly what 
his title implied. Besides settling minor civil matters, his major 
function was maintaining the peace with criminal jurisdiction over 
assaults, batteries, and affrays. 
Both justices of the peace and circuit judges were officially 
part of the judicial structure of Colorado prior to statehood. As 
early as 1856, wh~n Colorado was part of the Kansas Territory, dis-
trict judges rode circ~lt by authority of the territorial legislature. 45 
The short-lived territory of Jefferson passed an act e~tablishing a 
judicial system for the territory in 1859. fnis ~ct provided for 
the following courts: supreme court, district courts, county courts 
(which combined county commissioner~ functions with probate 
jurisdiction), justice courts, and miners' courts. The latter was 
a local court presided over by panels of miners, with jurisdiction 
limited to disputes of water rights and mining. 
43. Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colorado 169, 323 P. 2d. 614. 
44. Chapter 270, Session Laws of Colorado, 1959. 
45. The Case for Courts, League of Women Voters of Co.lorado, 
September, 1960~P• 15. 
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The government of the Territory of Jefferson faded away on 
the arrival of the first territorial governor of Colorado in June 
of 1861. The Organic Act of the Territory of Colorado, signed into 
law i~ February of 1861, provided that the judicial power of the 
territory shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts, pro-
bate courts, and justices of the peace. The Organic Act limited 
the jurisdiction of the two inferior courts to debts or sums of 
];.•ss than $100 and excluded these courts fr.om jurisdictign in any 
controversy involving the title and boundaries of land. 4 The 
court structure embodied in the Organic Act of 1861 was incorporated 
with-minor changes in the judicial article of the state constitution. 47 
In establishing a four-level court system in its judicial 
article, Colorado was following the pattern of many of the states 
which were admitted to statehood between the termination of the civil 
war and 189Q.48 The far western states, however, which achieved 
statehood after California's constitutional revision of 1879, for the 
most part followed California's lead in eliminating the county or 
probate court level and placing probate jurisdiction in the trial 
court of general j~Iisdiction, generally called either the district 
or superior court. ~ In general, the states (including Colorado) 
which adopted or modified judicial articles after the civil war 
avoided many of the jurisdictional problems of the older eastern 
states which had followed the English pattern of separate courts of 
law and equity.SO 
Colorado Supreme Court 
In 1876, when Colorado became a state, there were three 
supreme court justices -- each elected for a nine-year term. The 






Justice Courts in Colorado, p. 3. 
For example, the probate court became the county court was given 
civil jurisdiction up to $2,000, including property matters. 
The property controversy restriction still applied to justice 
courts but their civil jurisdiction was raised to $300 as pro-
vided by law. 
Nebraska, Oregon, Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota are 
cited as examples by Roscoe Pound, Organization of Courts, 
Little, Brown and Company, 1940, in Chapter V, "Development of 
Judicial Organization in the Newer States After the Civil War." 
According to Professor Pound, op. cit., some states already 
admitted also modified their judicial articles in accord with 
the California revision. Western states which followed California 
in this respect included Arizona, Montana, Utah, Washington, 
and Wyoming, and this step had already been taken by Nevada in 
1864. 
Pound, op. cit., Chapter V, pp. 161-193. 














court commission was created by legislative enactment. 51 The leg-
islation which established the commission authorized the governor 
to appoint three commissioners with senate approval. The commis-
sioners were to serve a four-year term, unless their services were 
no longer needed prior to the expiration of their terms. These 
commissioner$ were t,o h~ve the .$~me qualif i(:a.tions as supreme court 
justices, to take tht same oath of office, and:were subject to 
supreme court rules. The commissioners were 'to review and render 
written opini9ns in all cases referred to them by the supreme court. 
The supreme court w~s required to review all opinions written by 
the commission and could approve, modify, or reject such opinions . 
. l ,, 
The use of commissions to expedite app~llate review was 
tried by 19 states, includihg Colorado, duri~g the latter two 
decades of the 19th century, as there was a general condition of 
arrears in federal and state supreme courts, which became more and 
more acute in the last quarter of the century.52 While a number 
of states continued the use of commissions after Colorado had 
abandoned this approach, the commission plan did not prove to be a 
satisfactory permanent solution to increased appellate case loads. 
In Colorado the creation of the supreme court commission 
failed to bring about the expected reduction in the supreme court's 
docket, because the commission had no power to render final judgment. 
The supreme court had to review each case, arid then write another 
opinion if it disagreed with the commission, so that the commission's 
work amounted to no more than a finding of fact and law. 5~ 
Court of Appeals I. After terminating the supreme court 
commission, Colorado turned to another method, also popular at the 
time, of handling increased supreme court caseloads: the creation 
of an intermediate court of appeals. Intermediate appellate courts 
were established in a number of states -- some by statute and some 
by constitutional amendment. Only 13 states, however, all more 
populous than Colorado, presently have intermediate appellate 
tribunals. None of these states has less than three milligg 
residents and seven of the 13 have more than five million. 
51. Rocky Mountain Law Review. "The Trend - Appellate Courts and 
Procedure in Colorado," James Perchard, former Clerk, Colorado 
Supreme Court, November 1929, p. 60. 
52. Pound, oe~ cit ► ,P• 201. 
53. Perchard,'lo~. riit. . , 
54. State IntefmectTate Appellate Courts, Their Jurisdiction, Case 
Load and Expenditµres, !nstltute of Judicial Administration, 
New York, 1956 • 
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The Colorado Court of Appeals was created by legislation 
passed at the 1891 session.55 This legislation provided for three 
judges with the same qualifications as supreme court justices to 
be appointed by the governor, with senate approval. The first 
appointments were to be made for staggered terms of two, four, and 
six years. Subsequent appointments were to be made for six-year 
terms •. The three former supreme court commissioners were appointed 
as appellate judges. 
The court of appeals was given final jurisdiction in all 
case~ where the amount involved in the judgment or replevin was 
$2,500 or less. The court also had jurisdiction which was not final 
in criminal cases, in cases involving franchises or-freeholds, in 
cases involving constitutional provisions, and in cases heard on 
writ of error from the county court. Cases in these latter 
categories could be taken on appeal on writ of error to the supreme 
court. The court of appeals was given authority similar to that 
of the supreme court to issue all necessary and proper writs and 
other processes on causes within its jurisdiction. Court of appeals' 
opinions were to be delivered as required by the supreme court and 
published in a like manner. 
That the court of appeals did a vast amount of work was 
shown in the 20 volumes of its reports, and on the whole it proved 
quite satisfactory.56 Howev~r, the existence of two appellate 
courts created a certain degree of friction, so that in 1904, the 
court of appeals was abolished and a constitutional amendment was 
adopted increasing the number of supreme court justices from three 
to seven and terms from nine to ten years.57 
Court of Appeals II. From 1904 through 1910, the enlarged 
supreme court handled the entire appellate work load. Judging by 
Governor Shafroth's message to the 18th General Assembly in 1911, 
the supreme court's dockets again became overcrowded during this 
period. In his message, Governor Shafroth offered several recom-
mendations to limit "the ever increasing number of cases before 
the supreme court." First, he asked that an act be passed limiting 
the right of appeal from district court to the supreme court to 
only those cases where the amount in question was in excess of $1,000, 
except for cases concerning freeholds or franchises. Second, he 
recommended that an act be passed to give supreme court judges the 
right to affirm district court judgments without written opinion. 
Third, he called for a constitutional amendment to be presented to 
55. Prior to passage of the legislation creating the intermediate 
appeals court the senate submitted an interrogatory to the 
supreme court to find out: 1) if such a court could be created 
legally; 2) the jurisdiction both final and coordinate which 
could be conferred upon such court; and 3) further questions 
of constitutionality. 












the people by the General Assembly. This amendment would strike the 
clause "writ of error shall lie from the supreme court to every final 
judgment of the county court." In lieu thereof the following would 
be inserted ''that writ of error may lie from the supreme court to 
such final judgments of the county court and in such manner as may 
be prescribed by law." After passage of such amendment, he requested 
that the General Assembly pass an act limiting cougty court appeals 
in the same manner recommended for district court. 8 
Instead of acting in accord with Governor Shafroth's recom-
m~ndations, the General Assembly again created an intermediate court 
of appeals. This tribunal, also known as the court of appeals,was 
established for a four-year period. The number of judges was 
increased from three to five, not more than three of whom could 
belong to the same political party. These judges were to have the 
same qualifications as supreme court justices. In addition to 
appointing the judges (with senate approval), the act provided that 
the governor designate the presiding judge. 
The court of appeals was given the authority to review and 
determine all judgments in civil cases pending before the supreme 
court, except in those cases from county court on writs of error. 
The legislation provided that the supreme court should transfer as 
many cases to the court of appeals as it deemed advisable. The 
General Assembly did not re-enact the statute in 1915 at the 
expiration of the four-year period specified in the original act, 
nor was there any discussion of appellate problems in Governor 
Orman's message to the 20th General Assembly in 1915. Colorado has 
not had an intermediate court of appeals since that time, nor has 
the supreme court commission plan been re-adopted. Recent efforts 
to reduce the backlog of appellate cases have been concentrated on 
expediting the disposition of cases by the supreme court itself 
without resorting to additional appellate tribunals. The court 
itself has taken the lead in this respect and has had the assistance 
of the General Assembly, which provided funds for supplying each 
justice with a law clerk and also made an appropriation to the court 
so that retired supreme court justices, district judges, and 
qualified county judges called in to assist the court in opinion 
writing could be paid a small honorarium. 
There has been only one constitutional change affecting the 
jurisdiction of the supreme court. In 1912 an amendment to section 
3 of the judicial article was adopted, which enlarged the court's 
jurisdiction by the addition of the following:59 
and each judge of the supreme court shall 
have like power and authority as to writs 
of habeas corpus. The supreme court shall 
58. Senate Journal, 18th Legislative Session, 1911, p. 42. 
59. Article VI, Section 3, Colorado Constitution, as amended,1912. 
- 17 -
give its opinion upon important questions 
upon solemn occasions when required by the 
governor, the senate or the house of repre-
sentatives; and all such opinions shall be 
published in connection with the reported 
decisions of said court. 
District Courts 
, The Organic Act of the Colorado Territory (1861) provided 
for three judicial districts, with one judge each. This number was 
increased to four when the judicial article was adopted. These 
four districts, with one judge each, covered the entire state and 
its 26 counties then in existence. As the population and economic 
activity of the state increased, additional judicial districts were 
created. · 
In 1886 an amendment to section 12 of the judicial article 
was adopted to provide for one or more judges in each district, and 
section 14 of the judicial article was also amended to allow the 
General Assembly to increase or diminish the number of judges or 
judicial districts at any time, provided that no judge could .be 
deprived of his office by such action until completion of the term 
for which he was elected. · 
The addition of judges to existing judicial districts, the 
creation of new judicial districts, and the alteration of judicial 
district boundaries have made it possible for the district courts 
to keep pace generally with increased case loads, although in recent 
years the accelerated growth of metropolitan areas has resulted in 
a larger increase in judicial business than has been accommodated, 
as yet, through legislation. The last alteration in judicial district 
boundaries took place in 1958 when the 17th judicial district 
{Adams County) and the 18th judicial district {Arapahoe County) were 
created. These counties were formerly part of the 1st judicial 
district, which now consists of Clear Creek, Gilpin, and Jefferson 
counties. Additional judges also have been authorized recently 
in some of the metropolitan judicial districts; the 17th and 18th 
districts each elected a second judge at the 1960 general election; 
the number of judges in the 2nd district (Denver) was increased 
from nine to 10 by the General Assembly in 1959; and a fourth 
judge was provided in the 4th district {El Paso, Douglas, Elbert, 
Kit Carson, Lincoln, and Teller) by the General Assembly in 1960. 
County Courts 
The major function of the county court at the time the 
judicial article was adopted was probate jurisdiction. Following 
the trend in many midwestern states, this jurisdiction was vested 
























Colorado had 26 counties in 1876, and four more were created 
during the following four years. During the 1880's, 25 new counties 
were established by the General Assembly. Only two counties were 
added during the i890's (Mineral 1893 and Teller 1899). Six counties, 
including Adams and the City and County of Denver, were established 
during the early years of the 20th century; the last county to be 
created was Alamosa in 1913. · 
The expanding agricultural ~conomy of eastern Colorado, 
accompanied by railroad development and water diversion problems, gave 
impetus to the creation of new counties in that part of the state • 
In the mountain and west slope areas, population booms, usually 
related to mining development (Teller County is a good example), led. 
to the demand for a county government to serve these areas. Efforts 
were also made to straighten out some of the geographical inconsistencies 
resulting from the boundaries of the original 26 counties; for 
example, Archuleta County was carved out of Conejos County so that 
Conejos would be wholly east of the continental divide. La Plata 
County was also divided by the mountains of the same name, and 
Montezuma County established. 
The increase in the number of counties has greatly reduced 
the area served by each county court; improvements in transportation 
have made the county seat more accessible. The shift in population 
away from eastern rural and mountain mining areas has also left a 
number of county courts with very little judicial business. In 
addition, there has been a considerable change in the kind of case 
brought before the county court. Through the years since statehood, 
probate jurisdiction has continued to constitute the major portion 
of the court's case load, especially in the smaller counties. However, 
mental health cases and juvenile matters now constitute a very 
significant portion of the total case load. The civil jurisdiction 
of the county court is no longer as important as it once was. The 
$2,000 civil case limit was high enough in the latter quarter of 
the 19th century and the first two decades of the 20th to encompass 
a large proportion of civil actions. There was also greater 
inclination to file _these cases in county court when there were 
considerably fewer district judges, who covered a multi-county area, 
and might hold court in a particular county only for a few days in 
each six-month period. 
Present day price levels have greatly reduced the proportion 
of civil actions within the $2,000 limit, and a number of these 
cases are filed in district court rather than county court for two 
reasons: 1) to avoid the possibility of trial de novo upon appeal 
to the district court from county court; and 2) to assure that the 
action will be heard by a judge who is an attorney. District jµdges, 
even in sparsely-populated multi-county judicial districts, no 
longer hold court in a county only two or th~ee times a year. 
Consequently, even in these areas the district court may be almost 
as accessible as the county court for the speedy disposition of 
causes . 
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Very few original criminal actions are filed in county court; 
these are usually limited to the most serious misdemeanors, with the 
others tried in justice courts. As a result the county court exercises 
its criminal jurisdiction primarily as an appellate tribunal, retrying 
cases on appeal from justice and muni~ipal courts. 
There have been very few statutory changes and only one 
constitutional change affecting the judicial functions of county 
courts. In 1902 a constitutional amendment was approved which 
increased the county judge's term of office from three to four years. 
Legislation was also adopted at the same time which permitted both 
an assisting county judge and the resident county judge to sit con-
currently in Class I and II counties if the press of judicial business 
so warranted.60 In 1957, the General Assembly provided that county 
judges in Class I and II counties must be attorneys.61 
Superior and Juvenile Courts. The creation of the Denver 
Superior Court by legislation in 1954 to relieve some of the burden 
on the Denver County Court already has been discussed. The Denver 
Juvenile Court was one of the first in the country and was established 
during the period (first two decades of the 20th century) when 
nation-wide attention was focused on the judicial handling of juvenile 
offenders, and court organization and procedures were recommended 
incorporating social work concepts. While no other special juvenile 
courts were established, legislation was adopted providing for the 
special handling of delinquent and dependent juveniles, and county 
62 judges, except in Denver, were authorized to sit as juvenile courts. 
Justice of the Peace Courts 
Colorado's First Territorial Assembly provided for the 
election of two justices of the peace in every justice precinct and 
established procedures, fees, and specific criminal and civil 
jurisdiction for the justice courts. Little change in the statutory 
outline of justice court functions, asi?e from provisions increasing 
jurisdiction and compensation, have occurred since that date. The 
judicial article provided that justice court civil jurisdiction 
should not exceed $300, that provision being the major change from 
the provisions of the Organic Act of 1861 establishing justice 
courts. 
The criminal jurisdiction of Colorado's justice courts was 
increased gradually by the legislature in the years following the 
adoption of the state constitution. In 1923, the legislature gave 
the justice of the peace general jurisdiction over all misdemeanors 
committed in his county. Both the criminal and civil jurisdiction 
60. 37-5-15, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. 
61. 37-5-22, Colorado Revised Statutes, as amended. 
62. Chapter 22, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. 
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of the justice courts have changed little in the past 35 years. The 
composition of justice court case loads has changed considerably, 
however. The justice of the peace court has become largely a tra!~ic 
cour\, 70 per cent of the cases tried involve traffic violations. 
The organizational structure of the justice courts remains 
much the same as it was when Colorado became a state. Justices are 
county officers. The county commissioners may consolidate or add 
justice precincts and to a limited extent they have done so. 
In many counties the small number of justices indicates both 
a lack of interest in the office and the small case loads which are 
the lot of justices in remote and rural areas. Many justices continue 
to hold court in their homes or places of business and have very 
little. if any, training in the law, rules of evidence, and court 
procedure. Indeed, many do not even have copies of the Colorado 
statutes. 
Over the years the justice court has fallen from a respected 
position in the state judicial system. It played an important 
judicial role when the state was predominantly rural and sparsely 
populated, and t~avel difficult and time-consuming. Today the 
justice court is more or less ignored except for the constant com-
plaint of people who have be~n party to actions before justices of 
the peace. There is little ~espect for the justice court as a 
judicial institution as well as for the office of justice of the 
peace. The justice of the peace takes the blame for the failure of 
the public to be concerned over the years with the development of 
a modern, adequate lower court system .. The perpetuation of the 
justice court system in much the same way as it operated when 
Colorado became a state attests to that fact. 
Recent Colorado Studies Concerned with 
the Administration of Justice 
Since World War II considerable attention has been focused 
on the administration of justice in Colorado. Studies on various 
phases of court organization and procedure have been made by bar 
association committees, the various judges' associations, individual 
members of bench and bar, legislative committees, and lay organiza-
tions such as the League of Women Voters. The prime areas of concern 
have been the supreme court case backlog, selection of judges, non-
lawyer judges, justice courts and other minor courts with emphasis 
on traffic case jurisdiction, and juvenile and domestic relations 
jurisdiction, including auxiliary court services such as marriage 
counseling and probation. 
63. Justice Courts in Colorado, p. 37. 
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Colorado Sar Association 
In 1946 the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Associ-
ation formed a judiciary committee to study the Colorado and 
American court systems and to make'recommendations as to where and 
how the Colorado system could be improved.64 A chairman was 
selected for each judicial district, and they selected chairmen 
for each county. The committee had a total membership of 157 and 
was financed by $14,000 raised from the state bar association member-
ship and $1,000 from the Penrose Foundation. 05 Extensive studies 
were made by the committee and its recommendations were approved by 
more than a three to one vote at the Colorado Bar Association Con-
vention in 1947. 06 After discussing these recommendations throughout 
the state, they were submitted to the General Assembly in the form 
of five bills and one constitutional amendment. 
Legislation was proposed whicn: 1) provided for an 
integrated court system with the chief justice as the head; 2) 
created a judicial council; 3) provided for retirement benefits 
for judges after 10 or more years of service; 4) increased judicial 
salaries; and 5) increased the salaries of other court employees. 
The proposed amendment to the judicial article included the 
following changes: 
1) clarified the provision giving the supreme court general 
superintending control over all inferior courts by specifying that 
the court shall exercise this control through the chief justice; 
2) provided that the supreme court shall elect the chief 
justice instead of being bound by seniority; 
3) clarified the qualifications for supreme court justices 
and district court judges by replacing the phrase "be learned in 
the law" with "shall have been admitted to practice law in Colorado"; 
. 
4) provided that the salary of judges may be increased 
during their terms of office and that no judges, except county 
. judges in counties with less than 10,000 population~ shall practice 
law; 
5) provided that district judges could sit in county courts; 
6) required that county judges in counties with more than 
10,000 population be attorneys, and permitted additional county 
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It and Should It Be Improved", Philip S. Van Cise, Volume 22, 
No. 2, p. 14 2. 
Ibid. 






7) transferred justice court jurisdiction to the county 
court and provided for the appointment of magistrates and referees 
by county judges to assist in administering justice court 
juri~diction; and 
8) replaced the election of judges with a selection plan. 
In supporting these recommendations the Bar Association 
Judiciary Committee emphasized the need for an integrated court 
system administered by the supreme court through the chief justice. 
ThQ chief justice should be selected on the basis of administrative 
ability and not seniority. The bar committee also commented on the 
success of judicial councils in other states. These councils, com-
posed of judges, lawyers, and laymen, conduct a constant study of 
the judicial systems and make recommendations for improvement. The 
bar committee focus~d considerable attention on the county and 
justice of the peace courts and chara~terized justice courts as a 
sarvival of medieval days, inefficient, and unnecessary. While the 
lack of lawyer judges on the county bench was deplored, it was 
recognized that it would be extremely difficult and in some counties 
impossible to get lawyer judges. The consolidating of county courts 
and justice of the peace courts, providing adequate salaries for 
county judges, and requiring county judges to be attorneys in counties 
of more than 10,000 population was expected to improve greatly the 
administration of justice on:the lower court levels. 
Judicial Selection. The greatest emphasis was placed by 
the committee on changing the method of judicial selection. It 
contended that judges should be removed from the political arena 
and selected on the basis of qualification and experience. The method 
of judicial selection advocated by the committee followed the so-
called Missouri Plan. Judges on various levels would be selected 
from panels of three nominees made by commissions composed equally 
of lawyers and laymen. At the first general election after com-
pletion of one year in office, the nominee would run on his record. 
If returned to office, the judge would serve a complete term before 
again running on his record at a general election. Should a judge 
be defeated at a general election (a majority of negative votes on 
the question of retaining him in office), a new judge would be 
appointed and the process started again. It was recommended that 
this method of judicial selection apply to supreme court justices, 
district court judges, and county judges in counties with more than 
10,000 population.67 
The amendment to the judicial article was defeated in the 
General Assembly as were the bills providing for an integrated 
court system and a judicial council. The retirement bill and the 
~ 67. The forgoing synopsis of the bar association's recommendations 
is based on the Philip S. Van Cise article previously cited. 
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measures providing increased salaries for judges and court employees 
were passed, although the increases were less than had been recom-
mended. 
Further Study and Recommendations. Following its limited 
success in the 1949 session of the General Assembly, the Colorado 
Bar Association Judiciary Committee continued its efforts and brought 
several proposals before the 1951 session of the General Assembly. 
An amendment of the judicial article was again proposed, considerably 
more limited in scope than the 1949 proposal. The amendment con-
tainep three provisions: 1) The pay of judges may be increased or 
decreased during their terms of office. 2) Judges may be retired 
if age or mental or physical impairment prevents the performance of 
judicial duties, but only after investigation and determination by 
the supreme court. 3) Judges are to be restricted from running for 
office other than judicial unless they resign from their present 
judicial positions. 
This amendment was approved by the General Assembly for sub-
mission at the 1952 general election, when it was adopted by a 
majority vote of the electorate.68 Legislation to improve court 
administration, create a judicial councilA and consolidate county 
and justice courts was also recommended.6~ The proposal to improve 
court administration divided the inferior courts into departments, 
each to be presided over by a supreme court justice. Each depart-
mental justice would administer the courts in his department, assign 
judges on a temporary basis as necessary, and gather judicial 
statistics. While this measure did not pass, the General Assembly 
approved a bill in 1953 which had somewhat similar provisions.70 
The bill creating a judicial council was similar to the bar proposal 
in 1949 and was again defeated. Legislation to consolidate county 
and justice courts was offered as a substitute for the constitutional 
amendment provision which was defeated in 1949. Again this approach 
to county court and justice of the peace court problems was rejected 
by the General Assembly. 
During the past 10 years, the Colorado Bar Association 
Judiciary Committee has continued its efforts to improve the admin-
istration of justice and the bar has also appointed committees to 
study separate problems such as justice and traffic courts.71 
68. Article VI, Sections 18, 21, and 31,as amended,1952. 
69. Dicta, "Colorado and Minimum Judicial Standards", Peter H. 
Holmes, Jr., Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January, 1951, p. 1. 
70. Chapter 37, Article 10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. This 
legislation was revised in 1959 to implement the intent of the 
1953 measure and to provide for the office of judicial admin-
istrator. 
71. For a discussion of the recommendations of the Colorado Bar 
Association Committee on Justice and Traffic Courts see Justice 


















In 1957, a constitutional amendment pertaining to judicial 
selection was drafted by the judiciary committee and introduced at 
the 1957 session of the General Assembly. This proposal was very 
similar to the one which was rejected by the General Assembly in 
1949. Aside from printing, no a~tion was ta~en .. Instead of having 
this proposal introduced again .in 1958, the judiciary committee 
referred it to the Judicial Council. for con$1dijration. 
The bar association also participated· in the studies made 
by the Judicial Council 1957-1959 and has actively supported and 
p.articipated in the efforts of the Legislative Council Committee on 
the Administration of Justice. 
Colorado Judicial Council 
In September 1957, a request was made to the governor by 
Chief Justice O. Otto Moore of the Colorado Supreme Court that a 
Judicial Council be created to conduct a study concerning problems 
of the first magnitude in the administration of justice. 72 The 
governor responded by issuing an executive ordei creating the 
Colorado Judicial Council and appointing 29 ~embers including 
judges, legislators, attorneys, and lay citi~ens. · 
The 41st General Assembly, second regular session (1958), 
adopted legislation creating the Judicial Council and authorizing 
the governor to appoint the members thereof, and making an 
appropriation of $2,500.73 The governor appointed Chief Justice 
Moore as chairman and reappointed those named previously in his 
executive order.; Two appointments of county judges were made, to 
give the county court$ representation on the Council. 
In April 1958, the membership of the Judicial Council was 
divided into five sub-committees for consideration of the following 
topics: 
1) preparation of legislation to eliminate district court 
appellate review of actions taken by the Industrial Commission and 
other public agencies and for judicial review only by the supreme 
c.ourt and then only if the court feels there ii sufficient reason 
for review; 
2) preparation of legislation aboll:t.hi.ng trials ~ ~ in 
the district court from county court~ in tho•e tounties where a full 
trial is heard before a lawyer judge, and general consideration of 
county and justice of the peace court operation and jurisdiction and 
the problems related thereto; 
72. 
73. 
First Report on Proceedings of the J~dicial Council, State of 
Colorado, Denver, December 1958, p .. 
Chapter 33, Session Laws of Colorad~ 1958. 
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3) preparation of legislation abolishing writs of error 
based on the complete record as a matter of right in every case to 
the supreme court and requiring that in certain types of cases a 
petition of certiorari be filed upon which the supreme court would 
deter'mine whether to order a full rev,iew on the record; 
4) preparation of legislation patterned after the Pennsyl-
vania Arbitration Law under which all damage cases and money demands 
involving less than $3,000 must be submitted to arbitrators upon 
request of either party with provision for further legal action upon 
rejec~ion of the arbitration award by either party; and 
5) preparation of legislation or court rule making an 
adequate pretrial conference report a prerequisite to the right of 
review by the supreme court either by petition for certiorari or on 
writ of error, and preparation of a court rule making it necessary 
that in all trials (whether to the court or to a jury) a motion for 
a new trial be filed and determined by the trial court before a4re-view of the judgment will be entertained by the supreme court. 7 
The reports of the five sub-committees were reviewed by the 
Judicial Council en bane and then referred to the Colorado Bar 
Association for study and comment. 
Review of Administrative Agency Action. The sub-committee 
studying the elimination of district court review of state admin-
istrative agency actions reported that in its opinion " ..• before 
a procedure can be adopted eliminating review of board orders and 
decisions by the District Court and permitting original review by 
the Supreme Court, it will first be necessary to amend our Consti-
tution and grant to the Supreme Court such powers. 11 75 Some members 
of the sub-committee questioned the elimination of district court 
appeals because of the increased burden which would be placed on 
the supreme court, and the increased cost resulting from appeals 
directly to the supreme court. The sub-committee, however, pro-
posed a constitutional amendment which provided for direct appeals 
to the supreme court from the Public Utilities Commission and the 
Industrial Commission but not from other agencies. Further, the 
sub-committee recommended the employment of law clerks to assist 
supreme court justices, and proposed legislation on this subject. 
County and Justice Court Operation. The sub-committee on 
county and justice court organization and operation, which also 
had the specific assignment of preparing legislation to eliminate 
trials de !J.Q.Y.Q. from county to district court in certain instances, 
made the following recommendations: 
74. Ibid., pp. 2 and 3. 























1) Trials de novo on appeal from county court to district 
court should be aboITsfied":"' 
2) The office of district court family judge should be 
created in each judicial district except Denver. Such judges would 
have the same qualifications as other district judges and would 
have jurisdiction in all domestic relations and juvenile cases. 
This recommendation would deprive the county court of jurisdiction 
in these matters. 
3) County court jurisdiction in counties of less than 
5,000 population should be transferred to the district court. 
4) The present justice of the peace system should be 
abolished and replaced with the best minor court system which can 
be developed from the various proposals which have already been 
made. Whatever plan is developed, magistrates should be under the 
supervision of the county courts, should be salaried, and should 
possess necessary educational qualifications.76 
The sub-committee was of the opinion that a constitutional 
amendment would not be necessary to adopt the recommended family 
court system, but a constitutional amendment would be needed to 
transfer county court jurisdiction to district courts in the smaller 
counties. · 
Elimination of Writs of Error. The sub-committee studying 
the elimination of writs of error to the supreme court in certain 
categories of cases made the following recommendations: 
1) Legislation should be adopted to provide adequately 
compensated and experienced research assistants to the justices of 
the supreme court. 
2) The Judicial Council should make a continued study to 
determine the need for an intermediate court of appeals. 
3) Complete and detailed statistical information concerning 
case loads, nature of cases, and other pertinent matters relating 
to Colorado courts should be obtained to assist the Judicial Council 
in further study. 
4) As an immediate measure to help alleviate the backlog 
of cases in the supreme court, the supreme court should modify the 
rule of civil procedure applying to writs of error to allow it the 
76. The proposals reviewed by the Judicial Council included: the 
recommendations of the Colorado Bar Association Justice and 
Traffic Court Committee, circuit magistrate system proposed by 
Judge Mitchell Johns, and the proposal to consolidate justice 
court and county court jurisdiction • 
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discretion to reject writs of error in district court cases involv-
ing less than $3,00o.77 
Other Matters. The sub-committee studying the adoption of 
the Pennsylvania Arbitration Law recommended that such legislation 
not be adopted. The sub-committee studying rule changes pertaining 
to pre-trial conferences and new trial motions prepared amended 
rules o~ both these subjects.78 
Comments by Colorado Bar Association. The bar association 
referred the recommendations of the Judicial Council sub-committee 
to its judiciary committee, which in turn appointed sub-committees 
to study the Judicial Council proposals. 
As a result of this study, the Colorado Bar Association 
Board of Governors and the Judiciary Committee reported the follow-
ing findings on the Judicial Council recommendations.79 
1) Opposition was voiced to the recommendation that 
appeals from the Public Utilities Commission and the Industrial 
Commission be taken directly to the supreme court. 
2) Constitutional reform of the Colorado judicial system 
should be comprehensive and~ piecemeal approach should be avoided, 
since any change in one segment of the judicial system, such as the 
modification of the jurisdiction of any of the courts or the 
elimination of existing courts or creation of new courts, of necessity 
affects the entire system.BO 
3) The elimination of trials de nova from county court to 
district court was approved in principle, providing that any 
legisl•tion submitted to accomplish this objective contain proper 
safeguards to the litigants. 
4) The proposal for creation of a•district court family 
judge was referred to the bar association's domestic relations com-
mittee for further study, especially with reference to population 
and distance problems in some judicial districts and the availability 
. of qualified judges. 
5) Further study is needed with respect to eliminating 
county courts in small counties and provision of an intermediate 
court of appeals. The abolition of writs of error is opposed as 
77. Judicial Council Report op. cit. p. 14. 
78. Ibid.,p. 15. 
79. Ibid.,pp. 21-26. 
80. This comment was made with reference to the recommendations that 
county court jurisdiction be transferred to the district courts 
in counties of less than 5,000 population and a constitutional 
























long as the present court system is in effect. There was general 
agreement with the proposed rule changes relating to pretrial con-
ferences and new trial motions . 
Legislative Action 
The 42nd General Assembly, first session (1959~ passed 
legislation which provided a law clerk for ~ych supreme court justice 
and made an appropriation for this purpose. The most important 
legislative action concerning the administration of justice was 
the adoption of a measure which implemented the supreme court's 
general superintending control o~~r inferior courts. This leg-
islation provided the following: 
1) division of all courts of record in the state into 
judicial departments, not to exceed six in number, with a justice 
of the supreme court assigned to each department as departmental 
justice; 
2) creation of the position of judicial administrator to 
be appointed by the supreme court, such administrator to be respon-
sible to the supreme court for the performance of duties assigned 
by it or authorized by law; 
3) collection of judicial statistics from all courts of 
record; 
4) assignment of district court and qualified county court 
judges by departmental justices on temporary basis to other district 
courts as needed, with a similar provision assigning county judges 
to other county courts; 
5) provision for judi~ial conferences to be held at least 
once annually by all judges and the departmental justice in each 
department; 
6) appointment of a presiding judge in each multi-judge 
judicial district by the appropriate departmental justice; and 
7) definition of the administrative powers of the chief 
justice and departmental justices and the rule-making powers which 
may be exercised thereunder • 
None of the other Judicial Council recommendations which 
required legislative action or constitutional change were referred 
81. 37-2-10 (2),Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953,as amended by Chapter 
89, Colorado Session Law~ 1959 • 
82. Chapter 37, Article 10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as 
amended by Chapter 93, Colorado Session Laws, 1959. 
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to the General Assembly, although there was a large number of bills 
relating to justice courts introduced, as a result of various minor 
court studies. Instead of providing a new appropriation for the 
Judicial Council, the General Assembly passed a joint resolution 
establishing a two-year study of admfnistration of justice under 
the direction of the Legislative Council.83 
League of Women Voters 
~ The League of Women Voters has included various phases of 
court organization and operation on its study agenda for the last 
several years. In 1955, the league recommended the establishment 
of separate juvenile courts throughout the state, established with 
a broad enough tax base so that adequate salaries could be paid and 
essential services provided.84 
The League of Women Voters has also been interested in 
judicial selection and recently turned its attention to over-all 
judicial organization problems. In a recent publication the league 
outlined its findings on court problems and proposed solutions, but 
· did not make any definite recommendations.85 This report covered 
all court levels from the supreme court through justice courts and 
outlined personnel, organizational, and procedural problems. It 
is anticipated that the league will make some specific recommendations 
after further study. 
Legislative Studies 
Prior to the current Legislative Council administration of 
justice study, there were Legislative Council studies pertaining 
to juvenile courts and justice of the peace courts. The Legislative 
Council Children's Laws Committee focused attention on juvenile 
courts and juvenile court services in its studies from 1955 through 
1958. The committee considered the creation of separate juvenile 
courts, including the proposal to establish a district court family 
division, but made no definite recommendations. Instead the com-
mittee recommended the improvement of juvenile probation services 
through state aid. This recommendation resulted in legislation which 
was passed by the General Assembly in 1959, providing matching funds 
of $200 per month or one-half, whichever was less, of the salary of 
each juvenile probation officer who met the minimum qualifications 





Senate Joint Resolution No. 16, 42nd General Assembly, 1st 
session, 1959. It appears that the other Judicial Council 
recommendations requiring legislative action or constitutional 
change were not submitted, pending the results of the Legislative 
Council study and the data developed by the Judicial Administrator. 
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Justice Court Study. The Legislative Council justice court 
· study was made puijsuant to a joint resolution passed by the General 
Assembly in 1957. 7 The Legislative Council committee which made 
the justice court study held meetings throughout the state and 
directed an analysis of justice ·court dockets. In addition, this 
committee traced the historical development of justice courts in 
Colorado, examined minor court reform in other states, analyzed 
various proposals for eliminating or improving the justice court 
system, and conferred with the Colorado Justice of the Peace 
Association and the Colorado Bar Association Justice and Traffic 
Court Committee. 
There was no unanimous agreement among the committee members 
in favor of any specific proposal for improving Colorado's minor 
courts. The committee's report to the 42nd General Assembly covered 
the data developed in the course of the study along with several 
alternate recommendations.88 · 
In proposing these alternate recommendations for considera-
tion by the General Assembly, the Legislative Council Justice Court 
Committee commented, "The importance of lower courts and the many 
difficulties in administering justice efficiently and equitably in 
these courts warrant careful consideration by the General Assembly of 
all propositions placed before it for modification or abolition of 
justice courts, not just thos:e made by the committee. 11 89 
The committee then made the following recommendations:90 
1. Justice court jurisdiction in the 11 Class II counties 
should be repealed and superior courts treated in these counties. 
The judges of these superior courts should be attorneys licensed 
to practice law in Colorado. These courts should have jurisdiction 
in all misdemeanors and the same civil jurisdiction as county courts, 
except for probate and juvenile matters. The jurisdiction of the 
Denver Superior Court should be the same as for the proposed superior 
courts in Cla~s II counties. There should be a sufficient number of 
superior courts in each of the Class II counties and in Denver to 
handle each county's justice court case load. Consideration should 
be given to locating additional superior courts outside of the county 
seat, 
2. The General Assembly should consider alternate proposals 
for handling justice court cases in the 51 Class III through VI 
counties: a) repeal of all justice court jurisdiction with the 





House Joint Resolution 
session, 1957. 
No. 6, 41st General Assembly, first 
Justice Courts in Colorado, Chapter V, pp. 65-92. 
Ibid. , p. xvi. 
Ibid.,p. xvii. 
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b) limit of justice court criminal jurisdiction while continuing pre-
sent civil jurisdiction. Under the second proposal, the maximum 
fine which a justice of the peace could levy would be $100, and he 
could not impose a jail sentence. Certain offenses such as hit-and-
run ~ccidents, driving while intoxicated, and driving under revocation 
and suspension, would automatically be tried in county court. If 
this second proposal is considered favorably, each Class III through 
VI county should be limited to one justice precinct, and two justices 
of the peace. One of these justices might be located outside of the 
county seat at the discretion of the county commissioners. The 
county commissioner in these counties should be required to provide 
adequate court facilities or reimbursement for same, statutes, and 
other material necessary for proper court operation. 
3. A constitutional amendment providing long-range overhaul 
of the justice court system should be worked out in conjunction with 
the Colorado Judicial Council, because of the interrelationship of 
the v~rious levels of the state's judicial system.91 
Justice Court Legislation. Some 28 bills relating to 
justice court organization, jurisdiction, and procedures were intro-
duced during the first session of the 42nd General Assembly in 1959. 
Included among these measures were: 1) a bill providing for transfer 
of justice court jurisdiction to county courts; 2) a bill covering 
the proposal of the Colorado :Bar Association Justice and Traffic 
Court Committee; 3) several bills embodying the recommendations of 
the justices of the peace association; and 4) a bill which included 
some of the alternate suggestions of the justice court committee, 
such as consolidation of precincts, provision by county commissioners 
of necessary equipment and facilities for justice court operation. 
None of the measures to eliminate or modify and improve the 
justice court system was passed. After defeat of the justice court--
county court consolidation proposal on second reading in the house, 
a sub-committee of the House Judiciary Committee was appointed to 
consolidate the best features of the various proposals into one 
bill for consideration by the house. This consolidated measure 
included the following main features:92 
1) Compensation: Justices of the peace in counties with 
populations between 70,000 and 100,000 could retain up to $7,500 
in fees and would be barred from outside employment. All other 
justices could retain up to $5,000 in fees instead of the present 
$3,600 limit. 
91. At that time it was contemplated that the Colorado Judicial 
Council would continue in existence. 














2) Jurors: The fees for justice court jurors was set at 
$6 per day, the same as for courts of record and jury selection 
procedures were improved. 
3) Consolidation of Precincts: Each county would be 
reduced to one justice precinct with two justices of the peace, 
except that in counties over 50,000 population, the board of county 
commissioners could appoint an additional justice for each 20,000 
population . 
4) Qualifications: In Class I and II counties justices 
ot the peace would be required to be attorneys admitted to the 
practice of law in Colorado. In all other counties justices of the 
peace would be required to be high school graduates. All justices 
of the peace, except those already in office, would be required to 
be at least 25 years of age and not more than 70 years of age, and 
no justice of the peace could be a law enforcement officer during 
his term of office. 
5) Removal from Office: Justices of the peace could be 
removed from office upon petition to the county court by the 
attorney general or district attorney for any of the following 
reasons: adjudication as a mental incompetent, malfeasance or 
misfeasance in office, failure to reside in the county, conviction 
of a felony, or failure to pcist the required bond . 
6) Court Clerks: Provision of clerical assistance to 
justice courts by the county commissioners in all counties would 
be mandatory. 
7) Contempt: Any person found guilty of contempt in justice 
court would be subject to a maximum fine of $25 instead of $5. 
8) Facilities, Training, Supplies: The boards of county 
commissioners would be required to provide complete sets of 
statutes, other supplies, and adequate courtroom facilities for 
justice courts, and also pay the expenses for justices of the peace 
to attend meetings of the Justices of the Peace Association and other 
official conferences. 
9) Rules of Procedure: The supreme court would be requested 
to adopt a uniform manual of procedure for civil and criminal actions 
in justice of the peace courts, including basic rules on the 
admission of evidence. 
After considerable amendment on the floor, the bill was passed by 
the house in the closing days of the session and died in the senate. 
The senate also approved a bill which represented a con-
solidation of various proposals for justice court improvement and 
which differed from the house measure in the following respects.93 
93. S.B. 277, 42nd General Assembly, 1st session, 1959. 
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1) Compensation: Justices of the peace in counties between 
70,000 and 100,000 population could retain $7,500 in fees and could 
not be otherwise employed (similar to H.B. 112), but justices of the 
peace in all other counties could retain only $3,600 in fees (as 
compared with $5,000 in H.B. 112). · 
2) Jurors: No provision. 
3) Consolidation of Precincts: Each county would be reduced 
to one justice precinct as in H.B. 112, but additional justices could 
be appo--inted in any county by the board of county commissioners with-
out any restrictions. (This provision appeared to be in violation of 
Article XIV, Section 11, Colorado Constitution,which limits the number 
of justices of the peace in each justice precinct to two, except in 
precincts of 50,000 or more population). 
4) Qualifications: Justices 'of the peace would be required 
to be attorneys in Class I and II counties (similar to H.B. 112),. 
but in the other counties, justices would be required only to be 
under 72 years of age and not law enforcement officers. 
5) Removal from Office: No provision. 
6) Court Clerks: No provision. 
7) Contempt: No provision. 
8) Facilities, Training, Supplies: The provision that 
county commissioners be required to furnish sets of statutes, supplies, 
and adequate court facilities was similar to H.B. 112. There was no 
requirement that the county commissioners pay the expenses of justices 
of the peace to attend conferences. 
9) Rules of Procedure: No provision. 
The senate adopted this measure, also in the closing days of 
the session, and no action was taken in the house. The major 
obstacle to the passage of legislation to improve the justice court 
system was the lack of legislative agreement on any plan which would 
apply uniformly throughout th~ state. 
Summary of Previous Studies 
The judicial studies made since World War II achieved many 
positive results, even though many of the recommendations made 
were rejected or deferred for further study; possibly the most 
important contribution of these study efforts was the attention 
focused on judicial problems. The inadequacy of piecemeal improve-
ments in the administration of justice was demonstrated and, 










Concrete results of the previous studies include: 1) improve-
ment in judicial salaries and retirement benefits; 2) emphasis on 
a coordinated court system administered by the supreme court and the 
passage of legislation to implement the court's general supervisory 
contiol; 3) assistance to the supreme court through the provision 
of law clerks for each justice; 4) provision for removal of physically 
or ~entally incapacitated judges; 5) curtailment on the use of 
judicial office for political advancement; and 6) improvement in 
court services for juveniles. 
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8HAPTER II 
CONTINUING JUDICIAL PROBLEMS 
A number of varied and complex' problems relating to the 
organization and administration of justice led to the authorization 
of the Legislative Council study by the General Assembly, 
Supreme Court 
In 1950, 218 cases were filed in the Colorado Supreme Court. 
By the end of 1958, the annual filing rate had increased almost 90 
per cent, to 412 cases that year. On January 1, 1950, 167 cases 
were pending before the court. The number of cases pending had 
almost tripled by January 1, 1959, when 483 cases were before the 
courtr A large proportion of pending cases as of January 1, 1959 
were not at issue; however, the proportion of cases pending which 
were at issue increased steadily after 1956, when 90 of the 161 
cases pending, or almost 45 per cent, were at issue. As of January 
1, 1959, 295 of the 483 pending cases, or 61 per cent,were at issue. 
Not only was the increase in supreme court backlog a problem 
of utmost importance, but it was one which needed a fairly immediate 
solution, even if only on a stop-gap basis. The provision of a 
law clerk ,for each supreme court justice was expected to be of 
considerable help to the court in expediting its case load, but 
there was no expectation that this step alone would provide an 
adequate solution. 
Among suggested remedies were: 
1) creation at least on a temporary basis, of an intermediate 
court of appeals; 2J addition of two justices, increasing the size 
of the supreme court to nine members; 3) assistance to be provided · 
by retired supreme court justices and active and retired district 
court judges; 4) curtailment of the automatic right of appeal on 
writ of error, at least in minor civil matters; and 5) modification 
of the court's internal operating procedures, perhaps disposing of 
some matters by sitting in department and making greater use of oral 
argument. 
None of these suggested remedies was new, and all of them 
had both good and bad features. Further study was needed to 
determine which of these proposals (or any other) could provide a 
fairly immediate alleviation of the court's case backlog problems. 
Just as important but not as immediate was the need for long-range 
improvements in the judicial system to guard against backlog problems 
in the supreme court in future years and the development of a program 




















The district courts appeared to have fewer problems than 
the ~ther segments of the state court system. Increased case 
loads in metropolitan districts weLe causing concern, but the 
creation of the 17th and 18th judicial districts and the provision 
of additional judgeships in some of these districts were helping 
to alleviate the problem. There were indications, however, that 
still further additions to the district bench would be needed, as 
well as possible revision of judicial district boundaries more in 
accord with geographic barriers and recent populatin growth. The 
jud1cial department legislation provided machinery for the temporary 
assignment of ,district judges outside their districts. The only 
other matters relating to district courts suggested for further study 
were a change in the method of judicial selection and the elimination 
of trials de !12.Y.Q_ on appeals from cou.nty courts. 
County Courts 
There has been general agreement that trials de novo in 
district court on county court appeals should be eliminated, but it 
is doubtful that, given the existing situation in most county courts, 
all trials de novo could be eliminated without working a hardship on 
some litigants. With the exception of Class I and II counties, county 
judges are not required to be lawyers, and less than one-third of the 
county judges in the 51 smaller counties are lawyers. Often in these 
small counties, it is difficult to get a court reporter so that a case 
transcript can be prepared. The elimination of trials de novo in 
appeals from county courts in these small counties would deprive 
litigants of having a full trial before a lawyer judge; further, the 
difficulty in obtaining court reporters decreases the possibility 
that there would be an adequate transcript upon which to appeal on 
the record. For this reason, trials de novo have been viewed as 
necessary to insure each litigant an acfequate judicial hearing. 
Nevertheless, this process is susceptible to being taken advantage 
of by some attorneys who would use the county court trial as a 
"fishing expedition" to gather information which will be useful when 
the case is retried on appeal to the district court. A substantial 
number of civil cases within the county court's jurisdictional limit 
of $2,000 ar~ filed initially in district court, to avoid double trials. 
While there is a $2,000 limit on civil actions in county 
court, all probate matters are tried, regardless of the amount of the 
estate involved. Further, the county court hears all lunacy and 
juvenile matters. It is argued that to be tried properly, these 
matters should be heard by judges who are- lawyers. It would be 
extremely difficult, however, to require all county judges to be 
attorneys, considering the present organization and jurisdiction of 
county courts. The present level of county judges' salaries in the 
51 smaller counties ranging from $734 to $5,600, is too low to attract 
many attorneys, especially as they would be required to give up 
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probate practice (usually a major source of attorneys' income in 
small counties). On the basis of the case load in most of the 
smaller county courts, it would be difficult to justify much of an 
increase in judges' salaries; and many counties do not have the 
resources to finance increased expenditures for county courts. In 
at least five counties there are no resident attorneys. 
Possible Solutions 
. Several solutions to county court problems have been offered, 
all of which would alter the existing county court structure. These 
proposals have included: 1) consolidation of justice and county 
courtsJ 2) creation of a separate circuit court system; 3) elimi-
ation of county courts in smaller counties and transfer of jurisdiction 
to district courts; 4) consolidation of counties for judicial purposes; 
and 5) consolidation of county court jurisdiction in district courts. 
Despite the many criticisms of county court operations a~d 
personn~l, opposition has been expressed in several areas to the 
elimination of county courts. These objections have resulted from: 
1) a desire to keep governmental functions as local as possible; 
and 2) the accessibility of the county court the judge,is usually 
well known and his office is.usually open on an informal basis. 
Justice Courts 
Many of the criticisms made of the county court apply to 
justice courts a~ well. Very few -- about five per cent at the most 
-- of Colorado's justices of the peace are attorneys. Some have 
adequate quarters in which to hold court -- usually in a courthouse 
or municipal building, but the majority hold court in their own 
homes or places of business, in inadequate surroundings for the proper 
respect of the.judicial process. Not only are most of the justices 
of the peace without legal training, but many do.not even have copies 
of the statut~s. 
The justice court has been a stepchild of county government. 
Even though counties benefit financially from the fines collected 
in justice court actions, county commissioners for the most part have 
been reluctant to furnish justices of the peace with adequate court-
room facilities, copies of the statutes, and even necessary supplies. 
It is very difficult even to get qualified lay citizens to 
run for the position of justice of the peace. The low compensation 
involved and the.low esteem in which justice courts are generally 
held discourage qualified candidates. Justices of the peace are still 
paid from the fees of their office and very few justices in the small 
counties have enough business to realize more than $300 or $400 
annually. The replacement of the fee system by annual salaries 






















areas of the state, it would take the combined case load of several 
counties to justify a salary adequate for a full-time position.· 
Elimination of the fee system would, however, remove any motivation 
(conscious or unconscious) to find defendants guilty in order to 
insure that law enforcement officers would continue to bring cases. 
During the past 20 ye·ars, the justice court has become 
primarily a traffic court, and a large proportion of civil cases 
are small collection agency actions. Most people who come in 
contact with the courts do so through justice court appearances • 
Tbeir unsatisfactory experiences in justice courts color their 
attitudes toward other levels of the court system and to the judicial 
process. 
The dockets of both county courts and district courts reflect 
a surprisingly large number of civil cases which are within the $300 
justice court jurisdictional limit, One of the original functions 
Gf the justice court was to provide an easily accessible tribunal to 
hear limited civil actions without need for an attorney or costly 
pleadings, keeping these minor cases out of the higher level trial 
courts, 
Even with all of their shortcomings, there has been a 
surprising resistance in the past to elimination of justice courts. 
Reasons for this resistance include: 1) accessibility of justice 
courts, especially in traffic cases; 2) need for a court where 
actions on small claims can be brought cheaply and simply and with-
out attorneys; and 3) tradition -- justice courts have been firmly 
entrenched in our judicial system since frontier days. 
Domestic Relations - Juvenile Cases 
In recent years there has been an increase in juvenile 
delinquency and dependency actions and in domestic relations cases 
(divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, custody). While it is 
commonly assumed tha~ the highest rate of delinquency is found in 
urban areas, this is not necessarily the case, as was shown by the 
juvenile case analysis made by the Colorado Legislative Council 
Children's Laws Committee. In its report to the 42nd General Assembly, 
195~ the committee stated:! 
These data on juvenile delinquency cases 
in Colorado courts in 1957 show that 
delinquency is not a problem limited 
mainly to Denver and the other metropolitan 
area~. Denver and the Class II counties 
had the greatest number of cases; however, 
1. Juveniles in Trouble, Probation-Parole-Mental Health, Colorado 
Legislative Council, Research Publication No. 25, December 
1958, pp. 5 and 6. 
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many of the smaller counites had a 
higher incidence of delinquency than 
the larger ones when compared with 
estimated county population and with 
school population in the 1956-57 year. 
Sixteen counties had a higher incidence 
of delinquency in 1957 in relation to 
population than did Denver: Adams, El 
Paso, Las Animas, Mesa, and Pueblo were 
the only Class II counties in this group. 
The others were Chaffee, Fremont, Gilpin, 
Huerfano, Jackson, Moffat, Montezuma, 
Ouray, Park, Saguache, and Teller. 
District and county courts in the more populous areas are 
usually better able to handle juvenile and domestic relations matters 
than are the courts in the rural areas, which have fewer of these 
cases~ In some of the larger judicial districts, one judge is 
assigned to domestic relations cases, although he may preside in 
other matters as well. In the 2nd Judicial District (Denver), a 
marriage counseling service is operated as an adjunct of the court. 
There is no specialization in domestic relations in the smaller 
judicial districts. 
The larger county coJrts and the Denver Juvenile Court have 
judges who are lawyers and probation departments staffed by qualified 
full-time officers. For the most part, these counties have taken 
advantage of the state aid program for juvenile probation to augment 
their staffs. The smaller counties do not have adequate probation 
services. All of the 51 counties with less than 25,000 population 
had part-time, and usually untrained, probation officers in 1957. 2 
These counties do not have enough juvenile cases to justify 
a full-time probation officer, but in most areas of the state, two 
to four adjacent counties could group together to employ one. In 
the state aid legislation passed in 1959, permission was given 
counties to group together in any combination which would result in 
a population of 25,000 to be eligible for state aid in the hiring 
of a full-time probation officer meeting the standards set forth in 
the act.3 None of the 51 smaller counties has acted to take advantage 
of the state aid provisions, even though one of the major purposes of 
this legislation was to improve probation services in these counties. 
2. Ibid.,p. 7. The current probation situation in the smaller 
counties i~ very much the same as in 1957, according to the 
data collected during the docket analysis made for this study. 
3. 22-8-9, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended by Chapter 
















Considerable concern has been expressed by the Children's 
Laws Committee, the League of Women Voters, and others interested 
in juvenile problems in the ability of judges in these small counties 
to handle juvenile cases adequately and to work with schools, social 
agencies, and other community resources in solving juvenile problems. 
For this reason, there has been considerable interest in the creation 
of specialized courts throughout the state with jurisdiction in 
juvenile cases. 
The relationship of domestic and juvenile problems, and in 
soIDe instances overlapping court jurisdiction, has led to the 
recommendation that these specialized courts be given jurisdiction 
over domestic relations as well. Jurisdiction over both juvenile 
and domestic relations cases was also advocated to assure a sufficient 
case load in less populous areas to justify a full-time, specialized 
judge, without encompassing too many counties to make the plan 
feasible. Sentiment has been divided as to whether these courts 
should be part of either the district or county courts, or be entirely 
separate. 
There are three major objections to establishing a completely 
separate court system to handle juvenile and domestic relations cases: 
1) It would add another court system and thereby compound the 
difficulties in achieving integrated judicial administration. 2) In 
some areas there would still be an insufficient number of juvenile· 
and domestic relationscases to justify a full-time judge, so that 
even if one judge heard all these cases, he should still have other 
assignments to utilize judicial time fully. 3) Complete separation 
would result in a system of courts which might lose sight of the 
judicial function for which they were created and take on social 
agency attributes, to the detriment of proper administration of justice. 
Opposition to any change has also been voiced in some rural 
areas, where it is felt that the advantage of close relationship 
between the judge, law enforcement officials, and members of the 
community are greater than the provision of a more qualified judge 
and other court personnel who would be less accessible and not as 
well known locally. 
Judicial Selection 
Selection of judges by some method other than partisan 
election has been advocated by the Colorado Bar Association and 
others for several reasons: 1) Judges should be removed from 
political pressures. 2) Judges running for office on a partisan 
ticket can often be defeated because of a general sweep by either 
major party, regardless of their fitness for and performance in 
judicial office. 3) The general electorate usually knows nothing 
of the qualifications and ability of the men runn1ng for judicial 
office; often not even their names are known. 4) The development 
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of a qualified judiciary depends on good initial selection, adequate 
salaries, and tenure in office based on performance; partisan election 
often results in the best-qualified candidates being defeated. 
Elimination of judicial select1on by partisan election has 
been opposed for the following reasons: 1) The people should have 
the right-to elect judges in the same way as they do members of the 
executive and legislative branches. 2) Tenure offers protection 
to inadequate members of the judiciary .. 3) Most methods of selection 
are as political in nature as partisan elections, except that the 
contro~ is taken away from the people. 
As stated previously, one plan for changing the method of 
judicial selection was offered as part of an over-all amendment to 
the Judicial Article by the Colorado Bar Association in 1949. This 
proposal outlined on page 23· above was defeated by the General Assembly 
along with the other provisions of the proposed amendment. 
Unofficial Selection Plaqs. In some Colorado judicial 
districts a sort ~f unofficial appointment plan is in operation. In 
the 6th.and 7th judicial districts, which have two judges each, the 
district bar associations and the two political parties have had a 
tacit agreement that each party will c~ntrol one judgeship, and the 
candidates are recommended by the bar. In the 13th Judicial District, 
which is a one-party area, the bar association and the predominant 
political party agree on the candidates for the two positions.5 
Prior to the 1960 general election, 27 of the 39 district 
judges (69.2 per cent) then holding office had been appointed ini-
tially by the governor to fill a vacancy. Of these 27, 20 had stood 
for election at least once (prior to 1960). Ten of these 20 had never 
had election opposition. Two had had opposition two of the three times 
they stood for election. One had had opposition in two of four general 
elections. The remaining seven all had had election opposition, with 
four of this seven from Denver. With almost 70 per cent of the dis-
trict bench appointed in the first instance and election opposition 
concentrated in Denver and urban area counties, the selection of dis-
trict judges by partisan election has been modified considerably in 
recent years. The situation is somewhat the same for county judges, 
4. 
5. 
The 6th District includes ftrchuleta, Dolores, La Plata, Montezuma, 
and San Juan counties; the 7th includes Delta, Gunnison, Hinsdale, 
Mesa, Montrose, Ouray, and San Miguel. That this sort of arrange-
ment exists was borne out by comments made by judges and attorneys 
in the areas at the regional meetings held by the Legislative 
Council Committee on the Administration of Justice. This balance 
was upset in the 6th District in the 1960 general election, how-
ever, when the Democrats had two candidates and the Republicans 
one for the two judgeships. 
The ~3th District includes Logan, Morgan; Phillips, Sedgwick, 
Washington, and Yuma counties. This method of selecting judges 
was discussed at the Fort Morgan meeting of the Legislative 















as there is very little opposition except in the 12 largest counties, 
even though very few county judges are appointed in the first in-
stance. On the other hand, there have been relatively few supreme 
court appointments, and each supreme court judgeship is strongly 
contested at the general elections . . 
There is a difference of opinion as to whether a change in 
the method of judicial selection or court reorganization should be 
the first step in improving the administration of justice, even 
though there may be general qgreement that both are needed. 
The: argument is made that a judicial system is no better than 
the caliber of its judicial personnel and good judges can improve the 
operation of any court system. In reply, it is stated that improved 
judicial selection can be meaningful only when such selection is made 
to a well-designed court organization. In general, in other states 
it has proven disastrous to judicial 'reform measures to combine a 
~ew method of judicial selection and court reorganization in the same 
proposal . 
State-Local Jurisdiction 
Prior to the Merris decision by the Colorado Supreme Court, 6 
the peace and order of Colorado's towns and cities were maintained 
by local ordinances, which often included jail sentences as penalties 
for violations, as well as fines. As the result of a long series of 
Colorado court interpretations, ordinance violations were considered 
civil in nature and were tried as civil cases without the constitu-
tional protections given a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Con-
sequently, it was the accepted practice for municipalities to try 
ordinance violators without providing such rights as protection 
against double jeopardy, trial by jury, presumption of innocence, 
and the requirement for the establishment of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
It was also common practice for municipal ordinances to 
regulate matters which were already made criminal by state statute. 
This was particularly. true with respect to home rule cities, which 
exercised their power pursuant to Article XX of the Constitution; it 
was thought that this provision gave home rule jurisdictions more 
extensive rights of self-government and enabled them to regulate 
matters concurrently with the state. Because this interpretation 
had never ieally been tested in the courts, Colorado home rule cities 
passed numerous regulatory ordinances covering traffic violations 
and a multitude of other criminal acts already prohibited by state 
law. 
Both of these municipal practices were affected drastically 
by the Merris decision. 
6. Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colorado 169, 323 P. 2d. 614. 
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The Merris Decision 
On March 17, 1958 the Colorado Supreme Court decided the 
case of Canon City v. Merris. The court affirmed the judgment of 
the Fremont County Court, dismissing the prosecution's complaint 
for violating a Canon City ordinance pertaining to driving while 
intoxicated. The supreme court based its decision on two separate 
grounds:· 1) Violation of ,municipal ordinances which have a counter-
part state criminal statute punishing the same conduct must conform 
to the constitutional requirements of criminal procedure. 2) Since 
the or~inance in question was one of "state-wide concern" and con-
sequently one which home rule cities have no power to regulate, it 
was invalid; the power of home rule cities to regulate is limited 
to local or municipal matters only. 
It was the second finding st~ted above, as well as sub-
sequent court decisions involving the same point, which has caused 
concekn over what constitutes state and local jurisdiction. The 
first finding of the court has been complied with in subsequent 
municipal court actions; these actions are now treated as criminal 
in nature and defendants receive their constitutional protections, 
including the right to trial by jury. 
State-Wide Vs. Local Concern. The majority opinion in the 
Merris case made only slight reference to the distinction between 
matters of state-wide and local concern, but it was quite clear 
that the court considered this reason a sufficient one for holding 
the Canon City ordinance invalid. Justice Albert Frantz, speaking 
for the majority of the court, asserted that Article XX, Section 6 
of the Colorado Constitution did not permit home rule cities to 
supersede state law where the matter involved was one of state-wide 
concern. "Applications of state law or municipal ordinance, which-
ever pertains, is mutually exclusive," according to Justice Frantz. 
He went on to say that while it is difficult to determine what is 
of local and municipal concern, the operation of a vehicle by one 
who is unde·r the influence of intoxicating liquor is of state-wide 
concern. Justice O. Otto Moore, in his special concurring opinion, 
added, "the home rule cities. have not been ·del~gated the power to 
legislate in this matter of state-wide concern." But neither opinion 
offered much more in explanation as to what matters are of state-
wide concern. 
City attorneys advised their authorities that many existing 
city ordinances regulated in the area of state-wide concern and were 
therefore invalid by reason of the Merris case. However, since 
the real meaning of the term "state-wide concern" wa.il..d have to await 
subsequent court interpretations -- probably on the case by case 
basis -- most municipalities were advised to continue prosecutions 
under existing ordinances until they were declared invalid by court 
decision. 
By reversing long-standing legal precedents, the court altered 























disturbing problem to municipal governments was the determination 
of the extent of their power to enact penal ordinances. The subtle 
legal problems that arose in this connection were defined by 
Professor Austin Scott of the University of Colorado Law s7hool. The problems observed by Professor Scott are listed below: 
1) What types of conduct, other than drunken 




as to which the state may have exclusive 
jurisdiction (at least if it wishes to exercise 
it) to regulate by statute; and what types of 
conduct are of "local or municipal concern" 
over which a home rule city may have 
exclusive jurisdiction (if it wishes to 
exercise it) to regulate by penal ordinance? 
Does a home rule city have power to regulate, 
by penal ordinance, a matter of state-wide 
concern (which is regulated by the state) as 
to which the legislature has specifically 
granted ordinance power to towns and cities? 
Does a home rule city have power to regulate, 
by penal ordinance, a matter of state-wide 
concern if the state itself has not chosen 
to regulate the matter? 
Although home rule cities have no power to 
regulate, by penal ordinance, state-wide 
matters which the state has regulated, do 
non-home rule municipalities have this power? 
1959 Legislative Action. Following the Merris decision, the 
Colorado Municipal League through its counsel submitted a request to 
the supreme court. In its request, the league submitted a list of 
offenses concerning which the court was asked to determine which 
were of state and which were of local concern. The court refused 
this request, stating that these matters would have to be determined 
as they arose on a case-by-case basis. The municipal league then 
appointed a committee of city attorneys and municipal judges to make 
a study and seek a solution to the problems raised by the Merris case. 
It was the hope of city officials that some way could be found to 
obtain court recognition that some matters are of both state concern 
and local importance, and therefore subject to concurrent jurisdiction • 
Their study was directed toward possible legislative action in the 
1959 session of the General Assembly.8 
7. Rocky Mountain Law Review, "Municipal Penal Ordinances in 
Colorado," Austin W. Scott, Vol. 30, p. 268. 
8. Senate Bill 72, 42nd General Assembly, 1st session, (1959). 
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Senate Bill No. 72. In essence, the resulting proposed leg-
islation provided that if the subject matter of a municipal ordinance 
is of both municipal and state-wide concern, the existence of state 
legislation thereon should not pre-empt the field, unless the statute 
expressly declares that only the stat~ has such power. The bill also 
provided that there could be no double jeopardy -- if a defendant was 
tried by ordinance, he could not be tried by statute and vice versa. 
This bill did not disturb that portion of the Merris holding which 
required that defendants in ordinance violation cases be afforded 
their constitutional rights when imprisonment could be imposed or 
when a_state criminal statute was a counterpart of the ordinance. 
The bill passed both houses with only minor amendments. Since 
there was some question about its constitutionality, the governor 
submitted interrogatories to the supreme court before signing it into 
law. 
The 6upreme court was confronted with several legal interroga-
tories by the governor -- many of which related to the constitutionality 
of minor provisions of the bill. The most significant question, how-
ever, concerned whether the bill was an unconstitutional delegation 
of the legislative power in contravention of Article V, Section 1 of 
the Colorado Constitution. With very little explanation, the supreme 
court s~ated_that Senate Bil~ No. 72 was an_unl~wful delegation of 
the leg1slat1ve power and therefore unconst1tut1ona1.9 
It is significant to note that the opinion of the court 
In Re Senate Bill No. 72 was written by Justice Frantz, who was 
also the author of the majority opinion in the Merris case. The 
conclusion reached in the interrogatory opinion was consistent with 
his Merris case opinion. In the earlier Merris decision, he found 
the area of local concern and the area of state-wide concern to be 
mutually exclusive. In speaking for the majority in the interrogatory 
opinion, he apparently concluded that if these areas are mutually 
exclusive, it is impossible for the legislature to delegate a part 
of its regulatory power so that municipalities can act concurrently 
with the state in matters of state-wide concern. Justice Frantz 
indicated that the court would not allow legislative expression to 
delineate the areas of state-wide concern. 
Subsequent Court Decisions. On July 20, 195~ the supreme 
court decioed three cases which greatly modified the Merris decision.10 
These decisions are particularly important since they seem to indicate 
9. In Re Senate Bill No. 72, 339 P. 2d. 501. 
10. City and County of Denverv. Pike, 342 P. 2d. 688; Davis v. 
City and County of Denver, 342 P. 2d. 674; City and County of 
Denver V. Palmer, 342 P. 2d .. 687. All these cases may be 


















a departure from the legal reasoning used in Canon City v. Merris 
and In Re Senate Bill No. 72. Of special significance is the fact 
that all three cases were decided by a vote of~ to 2, with Justice 
William Doyle writing the majority opinions and Justices Frantz and 
Frank Hall dissenting in all ins~ances. 
Denver v. Pike: The city of Denver was held to have powP-r 
to regulate speed upon that portion of the Valley Highway within 
the city limits, because the state (through the state highway 
engineer) had contracted with the city to this effect. The court 
seemed to recognize the right of the state to contract away its 
power over matters of state-wide concern with the following words: 11 
Under the circumstances here presented, formal 
approval of the City's regulations was unnecessary. 
The State had given its consent beforehand to the 
regulation by the City subject to the limitations 
set forth in the agreement. The right of the 
City to regulate speed had been in fact recognized 
by the State by allowing the City to post the 
highway and enforce its ordinances. The City, 
acting with the consent and approval of the 
State, had the requisite jurisdiction in the 
premises and it was error for the court to 
dismiss the complaint. 
Davis v. City and County of Denver: This case held void a 
Denver municipal ordinance which punished driving under license 
suspension, because of the state criminal statute on the subject. 
However, the court indicated its changing view on the power of 
municipalities to regulate matters which are of state-wide concern 
as well as municipal concern. In t~e majority opinion, Justice 
Doyle made the following comments· 
To hold that matters which are general are 
the exclusive preserve of the state, just 
as matters local and municipal can be 
regulated only by the city (once the city 
has acted), would create a highly inflexible 
system and would require the state or city 
to obtain a continuous stream of rulings from 
this Court as to whether a subject is local 
or state-wide. This kind of "straight-jacket" 
rule is inappropriate to the changing society 
in which we live and (the Merris case) ,should 
not be construed as so holding. 
In this opinion, it was also held that municipalities could 
be delegated the authority to regulate any matter which, although 
ll. Denver v. Pike, op. cit. 
12. Davis~. Denver, op. cit. 
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predominantly general, is one in which the municipality has sufficient 
interest to warrant the delegation of power. As pointed out in the 
opinion, this would bring Colorado in line with the majority of 
states, which recognize that municipalities may possess concurrent 
power with the state to punish harmful conduct which is of both 
state-wide and local concern, a$ long as the city ordinance does not 
conflict with the state statute. 
The Davis decision also brought to light a new and different 
problem for Colorado municipalities. The court found that there 
exist~d independent grounds for holding the ordinance in question 
to be void. In this connection, the court said:13 
Another and independent reason for holding 
that the ordinance in question is ultra vires 
is the conflict in penalty which has been 
pointed out. The ordinance imposes a jail 
sentence of 90 days, whereas the statute 
imposes a jail sentence of 6 months. This 
reaso~, apart from the failure of the gen-
eral assembly to manifest a consent to the 
exercise of authority, furnishes a basis 
for declaring the ordinance to be void. 
Many attorneys wonder~d. if this meant that a municipal 
ordinance was void if the penalty was not the same as that which 
could be imposed under a counterpart criminal statute. The penalties 
for ordinance violations are generally limited by statute (for gen-
eral law cities and towns) or home rule charter to 90 days in jail 
and/or a $300 fine. But most statutory criminal proceedings do not 
have these same limitations. If this is the meaning of the Davis 
case, then none of the city ordinances would be valid. In addition, 
none of the penalties could be changed until new legislation was 
adopted by the legislature or until charter amendments are secured 
by a vote of the people. If this is the case, it would seem that 
the decision in the Pike case might have been different since the 
statutory penalty for speeding was quite different from the ordinance 
penalty. 
The Court's Most Recent Views. On March jB, 1960 in Retallack 
v. Police Cburt of the City of Colorado Springs,l the supreme court 
deviated further from its holding in the Merris case. The court 
upheld a municipal ordinance which punished reckless driving where 
the violator exceeded the speed of 55 miles per·hour in the city 
limits, in spite of the state statute covering reckless driving. 
The opinion in this case was written by Justice Edward Day with a 
special concurring opinion by Justice Doyl~, and dissents by Justices 
13. Ibid. 
14. Retallack v. Colorado Springs, Colorado Bar Association Advance 










Frantz and Hall. This reflection of court sentiment included the 
following statement:15 
It is to be noted that although the Merris 
case did establish ~he offense of drunken 
driving to be of state-wide concern and 
governed by state statute, the most sig-
nificant contribution to law in this state 
which arose out of that case was a guaranty 
to all citizens that trials for municipal 
violations in municipal courts would be in 
accordance with criminal process. That 
being the case, no person charged under a 
municipal ordinance can be prejudiced by 
leaving as much of local law intact as can 
be done without violating individual rights 
or undermining state sovereignty. 
Less than three months later, the court ruled in Gazotti 
v. City and County of Denver that the subject of larceny was not a 
matter of local or municipal concern over which the City and County 
of Denver can exercise jurisdiction by virtue of provisions of 
Article XX of the Colorado Constitution.16 The question arose over 
a Denver. ordinance providing that: It shall·be unlawful for any 
person to take and carry away or attempt to take and carry away, 
with intent to steal or purloin or convert to his own use or 
possession, anything of value to the owner. 
In his majority opinion, Justice Moore cited Colorado 
statutes on larceny and referred to the Merris case and the sub-
sequent decisions (cited above) except Retallack v. Colorado 
Springs, and stated that these cases pointed "inescapably to the 
conclusion that the subject of the ordinance involves a matter of 
state-wide concern covered by a state statute as distinguished from 
a matter of local and municipal concern."17 
Justice Hall in a special concurring opinion referred to 
the Retallack case in which. the court determined reckless and 
careless driving to be matters of local concern. He stated that 
the Retallack case and the Gazotti case were parallel and the same 
arguments applied to both. He added that if there are substantial 
grounds for distinguishing between the two cases, those reasons 





Gazotti v. City and County of Denver, Colorado Bar Association 
Advance Sheet, June 13, 1960, Vol. 12, No. 20, p. 561. 
Ibid. 
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In another concurring opinion, Justice Doyle discussed the 
difference between the Retallack and Gazotti cases. He stated that 
the proper question in the Gazotti case is: "whether larceny is a 
matter of exclusively local concern (i.e., where the interests of 
municipalities so• outweigh the intsres1:S of the state as to preclude 
any state control of the activity within the municipality); and'if 
it is not, whether on balance the interest of the state as a whole 
are so ~reat as to require that it retain sole legislative juris-
diction over this matter of 'state-wide concern.'"18 
He pointed out that the City and County of Denver had 
sougnt to define an offense which has been recognized from earliest 
common law as a part of the inherent sovereignty of the state and 
that the seriousness of the crime requires: 1) a uniform definition 
of the penalty; and 2) larceny be included among those crimes which 
are exclusively within the power of the state. He added that these 
features are not present in the Retallack case, wherein local interests 
justify a holding that reckless driving is susceptible to local 
legislative jurisdiction. 
The Status of Municipal Jurisdiction. The present status 
of municipal jurisdiction is difficult -- perhaps impossible --
to determine. It should be emphasized that many questions raised 
by the Merris decision still remain for court interpretation, and it 
may be a long time before the extent of the power of municipalities 
to enact penal ordinances can be delineated with the same certainty 
as before the Merris case. Analysis of the cases already decided 
leads to the following alternative possibilities: 
1. The Areas of State-Wide Concern and Local Concern are 
Mutually Exclusive; the State Cannot Delegate its Power to Regulate 
over Matters of State-Wide Concern. This is the view expressed in 
the Merris case and appears to be the present view of a minority 
of the court -- Justices Hall and Frantz. This view appears to 
allow little, if any, room for concurrent state and municipal juris-
diction. Furthermore, it would appear that there can be no exercise 
of aut~ority in matters of stat~-wide concern by municipalities --
even where such authority is. delegated to municipalities by the 
state through the legislature. What is of state-wide concern and 
what is of local concern can only be determined by the particular 
characteristics of the matter regulated and a careful application 
of the state constitution. Under this theory, the regulation of 
drivers' licenses and related driving offenses are exclusively 
reserved for the state; but the regulation of speed limits within 






















2. Authorit to Reoulate Matters Predominant! of As O osed 
to Exclusive Statr-Wide Concern but Also of Local and Munici al 
Importance may be Delegated to Municipalities. This view, expressed 
by Justice Doyle in the Davis case, is a recognition that areas of 
both state-wide und local concerm may be regulated by municipalities 
if the state consents to such local regulation. But where the 
delegation has not been specifically made, such as i& the case in the 
parking of vehicles, flow of traffic through control signals, creation 
of one-way streets, and regulating speed and traffic intersections, 
it must be concluded that this auLhority has been pre-empted by the 
state and has been withheld from the municipalities. 
3. Municipal Ordinances Regulating Matters of State-Wide 
Concern Concurrentl with the State and Valid Unless Such Provisions 
Re ulate in those Areas of Exclusive State-Wide Concern and or 
yndermine State Sovereignty. The mo~t recent opinion of the court 
suggests that municipalities can regulate concurrently with the state 
in matters of state-wide concern -- even without the consent of the 
state. However, in no event can local authorities regulate in matters 
of exclusive state-wide concern (such as the regulation of driver 
licensing and larceny), nor may local ordinances interfere with state 
sovereignty. In those areas regulated by the state, which also have 
features of local concern, municipalities may pass valid ordinances 
consistent with state law. 
Conclusion: As previously indicated, the present status of 
municipal jurisdiction may be contingent on any one or a combination 
of the above theories. However, the three views described above 
reflect chronologically the changing position of the court majority. 
A study of all cases arising from the Merris case seems to 
indicate that the court has changed from its original holding, that 
matters of state-wide concern and matters of local concern are 
mutually exclusive. The court has taken a more moderate position 
regarding the power of municipalities to enact penal ordinances • 
There is a recognition that _the state has the power to delegate the 
necessary authority to regulate matters of both state-wide and local 
concern to municipalities. It is also possible that the most recent 
view implies the validity of penal ordinances which do not regulate 
in the field of exclusive state interest and do not conflict with 
the exercise of state sovereignty, regardless of legislative 
delegation by the state. 
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CHAPTER III 
JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION -- THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A Brief History 
Court organization and efficiency have been matters of great 
concern since the Civil War. Eastern states found that their court 
systems (based closely on British judicial organization), with a 
multi~ude of courts, overlapping jurisdictions, and (in some states) 
separate courts of law and equity, resulted in a costly and time-
consuming judicial process and the inefficient use of judicial man-
power. The problems were somewhat different in the newer states of 
the mid and far west. Even though these states established simpler 
and more functional court systems than the eastern states, they found 
the efficient administration of justice hampered first, by wide 
expanses of area, limited population, and poor transportation and 
communications systems, causing the creation of a variety of minor 
courts to serve local areas, and later by rapid increases in pop-
ulation and economic expansion, which overburdened their judicial 
systems. 
During the period from 1860 to 1900, efforts at improving 
the administration of justice were concentrated on meeting problems 
as they arose as expediently as possible, and little thought was 
given to overhauling the basic judicial structure to anticipate 
future needs. Under the authority to set up inferior courts usually 
conferred on state legislatures following the precedent of the 
federal constitution, arrears in the courts of general jurisdiction 
could be dealt with by setting up new courts, by creating ne! 
circuits or districts, or by adding to the number of judges. 
The states were usually more restricted in approaches to 
reducing appellate case backlogs, because for the most part their 
constitutions had somewhat detailed and rigid provisions as to the 
ultimate courts of review. 2 Remedies either required constitutional 
amendment or were lim1ted to whatever arrangements could be made by 
the legislatures within the constitutional limitations. -For this 
reason, the supreme court commlssion plan and the creation of inter-
mediate courts of appeal proved the most widely used methods of 
relieving the burden of the final court of appeal, although con-
stitutional amendment was required in a number of states before an 
intermediate court could b~ created. 
As a consequence of the piecemeal appraoch taken to solve 
judicial problems,_ most states, regardless of the court organization 
with which they began, faced the 20th century with a non-integrated, 
multi-level court system with overlapping jurtsdiction, presenting 
1. 
2. 
























numerous possibilities for multiple trials and appeals. That this 
situation still exist~ is illustrated by the following comment on the 
Alabama court system. 
Stemming from the legtslative power to 
create courts "inferior to the supreme 
court," there ha~ bloomed a plant of 
marvelous variety and profusion. Com-
bine law and equity, civil and criminal 
jurisdiction in any reasonable proportions; 
engraft at random rules of procedure from 
circuit courts: probate courts, and justice 
of the peace courts; add a few special 
rules of procedure not to be found in 
any other Alabama court. Such a court 
would be at home in Alabama for there 
are many such creations ... in existence 
today. 
The conspicuous defects of most state court systems at the 
end of. the last century have been defined as :4 
... was-tt.e of judicial manpower, waste of 
time and money of litigants and public 
time and money because of hard and fast 
jurisdictional lines ill defined and 
frequently changed before judicial 
decision could draw clear bounds, hard 
and fast terms raising unnecessary 
techhical questions and wasting the time 
of the courts, piecemeal handling of 
single controversies simultaneously in 
different courts and general want of 
cooperation between court and court and 
judge and judge in the same court for 
want of any real administrative head • 
Approaches to Court Reorganization Since 1900 
While many states (especially those with populations still 
predominantly rural) created additional minor courts or altered the 
jurisdiction of those already in existence during the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, a different approach to efficient 
administration of justice and elimination of court congestion was 
being considered. Court unification with judicial administrative 
control and the elimination of unnecessary minor courts with over-
lapping jurisdiction was looked upon as the best way to handle 
3. 
4, 
Alabama Law Review, "Reorganization of Court Structure," Phillip 
Smith and Neil H. Graham, Fall and Spring 1958, Vol. 10, p. 189. 
Pound, op. cit., p. 252. 
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judicial business. In part, support for this approach resulted from 
the success of the federal court system reorganization which took 
place in the latter part of the nineteenth century and from the 
consolidation of English General Courts in 1875 • . 
Improvement in the means of transportation, increased pop-
ulation,. and the population shift from rural to urban in many states 
eliminated much of the need for the minor courts which had been 
created during the previous twenty to thirty years. As these minor 
courts became less important there was a marked drop in the quality 
of aspirants for these judicial positions, with an equal reduction 
in the quality of justice dispensed in these courts. 
Unfortunately, the changing conditions which reduced the 
need for these courts did not result in elimination of these courts 
or curtailment of their jurisdiction .. In fact, as the more important 
courts of original jurisdiction became overburdened because of 
incr~ased litigation, these minor courts in many instances were given 
increased jurisdiction (a good example is the conversion of justice 
courts into traffic courts), without any change in the judicial 
framework to accommodate a greater case load, and without central 
administrative organization and control.5 
The heavily-populated states of the east, with more separate 
specialized courts than states in the midwest and west, felt strongly 
the effects of separate overlapping jurisdictions. The work of 
courts of review was greatly increased by appeals concerning which 
lower court had proper jurisdiction.6 
Recognition of the inadequacies of the minor courts led to 
the right of appeal through trials de novo in higher courts of 
original jurisdiction. In most instances these courts had con-
current jurisdiction with the minor courts from which appeals were 
made. Substantial increases in the number of trials de novo also 




Both Dean Pound in the work P.reviouslv cited and Judge Harvey 
Uhlenhopp, Iowa Law Review, 'Judicial Reorganization in Iowa," 
Fall, 1958, Vol. 44, No. 1, and other writers on the subject 
make much of this point. Examples are cited of overworked judges 
and court congestion in growing metropolitan areas while rural 
judges at the same court level had much smaller case loads. In 
most states there was no expeditious method to effect transfer 
and assignment of judges according to work-load needs. 
This was especially the case in New Jersey where prior to court 
reorganization in 1948, there were separate courts of law and 
equity. See Rutgers Law Review, "New Jersey's Court System," 






















As was indicated earlier, not all states felt the impact of 
these changes on their court systems at the same time. Court 
structures in the states which were experiencing relatively slow 
growth in population and urbanization were, of course, able to 
function within the existing framework for a longer period of time. 
Even these states have had con$iderable court congestion and delay 
sin~e the second world war, and in many the problem became complicated 
further by the rapid development of one or two metropolitan areas 
while the remainder of the state retained its rural character. 
. As court congestion multiplied in state after state, members 
of the bench and bax, legislative committees, and interested lay 
groups made studies which led to recommendations designed to improve 
court efficiency. While these studies and recommendations varied 
according to local conditions and the time at which the study was 
made, in general they had the following as primary goals: 
1) elimination of at least some inferior courts of specialized 
jurisdiction and removal of concurrent jurisdiction wherever possible; 
2) administrative control of the judicial system through the 
chief justice of the highest state court with the help of an adequate 
administrative staff; 
3) streamlining of the judicial system to effect the concept 
of one trial and one appeal; and 
4) better judicial selection. 
Judge Laurance M. Hyde, Missouri Supreme Court, made the 
following comment on the shift in emphasis from a number of separate 
courts to a more unified court system.? 
LPreviously ... courts and judges were isolated 
from each other and most state judicial depart-
ments were composed of a group of completely 
separate courts. Court systems lacked unity and 
flexibility; There was no real responsible head 
to the system, and provisions for transfer of 
judges were lacking or inadequate. If some courts 
were unable to keep up their dockets while others 
had insufficient work, there was neither responsibility 
nor authority to do anything about it. The usual 
remedy was to add more local or specialized courts 
but this only added to the inefficiencies and 
inequalities of a hodgepodge of s~parated courts . 
These coDditions were the principal cause of many 
ca.ses being decided on technicalities of juris-
7. Notre Dame Lawyer, "Essentials of a Modern State Judicial System", 
Judge Laurance M. Hyde, Vol. 30, 1954-55, pp. 228 and 229. 
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diction, venue and trial and appellate procedure, 
instead of on the merits. In many states, at 
least until very recently, courts have continued 
to operate almost as completely separated and un-
related as in pioneer times; and this has usually 
resulted in congestion of do~kets causing unneces-
sary expense and delay to litigants. Modern con-
ditions require a flexible, unified system and 
that is the real remedy. Our courts should no 
longer be handicapped in efforts to maintain 
public respect for the law by being forced to 
_ attempt to keep up with the pace of modern 
business and industry without the organization 
and facilities to do so. 
l"his trend of proposing unified trial courts with special 
divisions where needed rather than se,parate special trial courts 
has been accompanied by the premise that the reduction in the 
numbez of trial courts with overlapping jurisdiction and in trials 
de .lli2.Y.Q. would obviate the need for intermediate courts of appeal 
in all but the most populous states. 
Present Approaches to Judicial Reorganization 
The administration of justice in a democratic 
society -- and democratic government generally 
is a dynamic thing, constantly responding to 
changed conditions and to the changed demands 
of the people. A court system embodying the 
latest principles of judicial organization and 
management today may become outmoded within a 
generation and oQerate to defeat justice rather 
than promote it.8 
Recommendations for court reorganization have had as a common 
goal an efficient, flexible judicial system manned by qualified 
judges and other court personnel, with speedy and competent litigation 
as the end product. This hap been the case even though the recom-
mendations have varied according to state economic, population, and 
political conditions, constitutional limitations, and the time at 
which the recommendations were made. 
General Principles 
Perhaps Dean Pound has enumerated general principles which 
should govern court reorganization:9 
8. 
9. 
Administration of Justice in Connecticut, David Marr and Fred 
Kort, Institute of Public Service, University of Connecticut, 
April 1917, p. 14. 












••. The controlling ideas should be unification, 
flexibility, conservation of judicial power, and 
responsibility. Unification is called for in 
order to concentrate the machinery of justice 
upon its task, flexiQility in order to enable 
it to meet speedily and efficiently the 
continually varying demands made upon it, 
responsibility in order that some one may 
always be held and easily stand out as the 
official to be held if the judicial organization 
is not fuctioning the most efficiently that the 
law and the nature of its tasks permit. Con-
servation of judicial power is a sine~ non 
of efficiency under the circumstan'c'es of tne 
time. There are so many demands pressing upon 
the government for expenditure of public money 
that so costly a mechanism as the system of 
courts cannot justify needless and expensive 
duplications and archaic business methods. 
Moreover, waste of judicial power impairs the 
ability of courts to give individual cases the 
thorough going consideration which every case 
ought to have at their hands. Administrative 
organization of the entire system ••. and 
responsible superintending control of the 
whole is as important as the reform of pro-
cedure upon which the profession and the 
public have concentrated their attention for 
a generation. 
As indicated above, studies and recommendations made during 
the past twenty to thirty years have revolved around a unified 
court system as the means of achieving the desired goal; but a 
unified court system has meant different things in different states. 
For example, in New York it took the form of a six-layer court 
system with two courts of appeal and four court levels of original 
jurisdiction. In Iowa and Wisconsin it has mean a two or three-
level judicial system with one court of appeals, and in both of these 
states reorganization plans have been modified to retain at least 
a portion of the existing minor court system. In Alaska, it has 
meant a two-level court system, with the possibility of additional 
minor courts as needed. The New Jersey court system, considered a 
model for reorganization, has four levels of courts • 
Judicial Selection 
In most of the recent court reorganization studies, the 
assurance of a well-qualified judiciary as free as possible from 
external pressures has been considered a goal equal to that of 
providing a unified, flexible court system. The election of judges 
has received continued criticism from advocates of judicial reform, 
whose objections may be summarized as follows: The election or 
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defeat of a judicial candidate usually has nothing to do with his 
judicial qualifications or experience, because the electorate is 
usually unaware of his fitness for judicial office. The elective 
proce~s subjects a judge to unnecessary political pressure and results 
in his spending an inordinate amount of time trying to retain his 
office. A well qualified judiciary depends on careful initial 
s~lection and tenure based on competent performance of judicial 
duties; neither can be assured when judges are elected. 
No recommendation for judicial reform meets as much opposition 
as proposals to do away with the election of judges. In some states, 
such proposals have either been deleted or postponed in order not to 
jeopardize court reorganization. The election of judges is stoutly 
defended as being as integral a part of the democratic process as 
the election of executive officials and legislators. 
Amerrcan Bar Association (Missouri Plan) 
Considerable study has been given to the development of a 
judicial selection plan which would combine the best ingredients of 
an appointive system with some sort of review by the electorate. The 
American Bar Association Plan, adopted in 1937, represents one such 
approach.~O Judicial vacancies would be filled by appointment by the 
governor or other elected official or officials, but from a list 
submitted by a committee composed of high judicial officers and of 
other citizens who hold no other public office. If further check 
upon the appointment is desired, such check may be supplied by the 
requirement of confirmation of appointments by the state senate or 
both houses of the legislature. The appointee, after a period of 
service, should be eligible for reappointment periodically, or 
periodically go before the people on his record with no opposing 
candidate, the people voting upon the question, "Shall Judge ___ _ 
be retained in office?" A number of objections have been raised 
to this proposal, the most significant of which are: 1) While the 
power of selection is placed on an official responsible to the 
people, his choice is limited to_those candidates suggested by a 
committee which is not publi.cly responsible. 2) If voters do nqt 
have sufficient knowledge to determine the best-qualified judge 
~hen offered two choices, they cannot be expe~ted to have sufficient 
knowledge to evaluate properly a judge's performance in office. 
3) The absence of an alternate choice in such referrals to the 
electorate will result in little voter interest, with the result 
that a judge's retention .. in office will depend on the opinion of a 
v~ry small number of people, which defeats the purpose of this pro-
vision. 
10. This plan is now commonly known as the Missouri Plan since the 
general provisions were incorporated in the Missouri Constitution 











Present Methods of Judicial Selection 
There are four methods used by the 50 states for the selection 
of judges of appellate and major trial courts: partisan election · 
non-partisal election, election•of legislature, and appointment.ll 
. Partisan Election. Nineteen states: Alabama, Arkansas, 
COLORADO, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. 
~ 
Nonpartisan Election •.. Eighteen states: Arizona, California 
(trial courts only), Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Election by Lefislature. Four states: Rhode Island (supreme 
-court only~ South Caro ina, Vermont, and Virginia. 
Appointment. Twelve states: Alaska, California (appellate 
judges only), Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas (supreme court 
only), Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Rhode Island (trial courts only). 
The twelve states with appointed judg~, may be divided into 
three categories: 
1. Appointment by Governor with Senate approval: Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.' 
2. Appointment by Governor with approval of Special Council 
or Commission: California, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. 
3. Mis 2ouri Plan: Alaska, Kansas, and Missouri. 
The operation of judicial appointment plans by the states 
within each category_ is discussed in detail below. 
Appointment by Governor -- Senate approval: 
11. Three states use different methods of selection for appellate 
and trial court judges. California's appellate judges are 
appointed and its trial court judges elected by non-partisan 
ballot. Rhode Island's supreme court is elected by the leg-
islature and its trial court judges appointed. Kansas supreme 
court judges. are appointed under the Missouri plan and trial 
court judges are elected on partisan ballots. 
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Connecticut. There are no statutory restrictions on the sub-
mission of nominations by the governor, nor is he required to consult 
any other group or council prior to placing judicial nominations 
before the senate. Court of common pleas judges are appointed for 
four~year terms and superior court judges and justices of the supreme 
court of error are appointed for terms of eight years. There is 
mandatory retirement for all judges at age 70. 
Delaware. Supreme, superior court, and orphan's court judges 
are appointed for 12-year terms. There are only two restrictions on 
judicial nominations placed before the senate. First, judges must be 
citizens and learned in the law. Second, there are political 
restrictions. No more than two of the three supreme court justices 
shall be of the same major party; at least one shall be of the other 
major party. No more than three of the five superior court and 
orphan's court judges shall be of the same major party; at least 
two of the five shall be of the other major party. 
Hawaii. The new constitution provides that the supreme and 
circuit court judges shall be nominated and appointed by the governor 
with the advice and consent of the senate. Supreme court justices 
are appointed for seven-year terms and circuit court judges for six-
year terms. Retirement is mandatory at age 70. 
New Jersey. Supreme :court, intermediate appellate court, and 
superior court judges are appointed initially for seven-year terms. 
Upon reappointment they serve until retirement at age 70 contingent 
upon good behavior. As a matter of tradition, confirmation of 
judicial nominations is initiated by the senator from the nominee's 
home district. If confirmation is initiated in this way, it is 
almost always confirmed as senatorial courtesy. If the home district 
senator does not make the motion for acceptance, the nomination usually 
is not confirmed. In order to be eligible for judicial appointment, 
the following qualifications must be met: U.S. citizenship, ten 
years' New Jersey residence, learned in the law with ten years' legal 
experience, good character, and bar membership. 
Rhode Island. This appointive system is similar to that 
used for federal courts. Superior court judges are appointed for 
life terms by the governor with senate confirmation. Although supreme 
court judges are elected by the legislature, they also have life 
terms. 
Appointment by Governor -- Special Council or Commission 
Approval: 
California. This plan actually is a hybrid, because it incor-
porates one of the main features of the Missouri Plan -- namely, that 
appointed judges are required to run for re-election on their records. 
Supreme court and district court of appeals judges are appointed 
initially by the governor with approval of the Commission on Quali-
fications. Initial appointment is for 12 years. The California 
Commission on Qualifications is presently composed of the chief 


























Maine. Supreme and superior court judges are appointed for 
seven-year terms by the governor, with consent of the executive 
council. The council consists of seven members who are chosen 
biennially by a joint ballot of senators and representatives. The 
only·qu~lifications for serving ~n the council are U.S. citizenship 
and Maine residency. 
Massachusetts. Supreme, superior, and district court judges 
are appointed by the governor with consent of the executive council 
for life terms, subject to good behavior. The council consists of 
e.ight members in additio~ to the lieutenant governor. These eight 
members are elected by district on a partisan ballot for two-year 
terms. The only requirement for council eligibility is Massachusetts 
residency f~r five years • 
New Hampshire. This state follows the same procedure• as its 
neighboring states, Maine and Massachusetts. Appointment is also for 
a life term, as in Massachusetts. The council consists of five 
members who must meet the same qualifications as members of the 
New Hampshire senate. These council members are elected biennially. 
Judges may be removed by action of the legislature, but it cannot 
initiate such action. The governor must bring the matter before the 
legislature, and he must gain council approval to take such ittion . 
Missouri Plan: 
Alaska. The three supreme court justices are appointed by 
the governor from a list submitted by the judicial council. Each 
supreme court justice is subject to approval or rejection on a non-
partisan ballot at the first general election held more than three 
years after his appointment. Thereafter each supreme court justice 
is subject to approval or rejection every tenth year. Superior 
court judges are appointed and stand initial election in the same 
manner. Subsequent election or rejection is at six-year intervals . 
Kansas. Supreme court judges are appointed by the governor 
from nominations submitted by a non-partisan supreme court nominating 
commission. The commission submits three nominations for each 
vacancy. Each supreme court justice so appointed holds office until 
the first general election at least 12 months after his appointment. 
Each judge runs on his record on a non-partisan ballot. If approved 
by a majority of those voting, he serves a six-year term, when once 
again he is placed on the general election ballot for confirmation. 
The nominating commission is composed of 13 members. The chairman 
is selected at large from the Kansas bar by its members. One member 
of the bar is elected by the bar membership in each of the six 
congressional districts. One non-lawyer is appointed from each 
congressional district by the governor. 
Missouri. Supreme court justices, court of appeal judges, 
and circuit court judges from Jackson (Kansas City) and St. Louis 
counties are all appointed initially by the governor from nominations 
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submitted by special commissions. After one year in office, they run 
for re-election on their records. Upon re-election supreme court 
justices serve for 12 years and the other judges for six years. The 
selection commission for the appellate courts is composed of the chief 
justice of the supreme court (chairman), three lawyers elected by the 
bar, and three laymen appointed by the governor. The members other 
than the chief justice have staggered six-year terms and are not 
eligible to succeed themselves. 
The selection commissions for the two circuit courts have 
five ~embers each. They are the presiding judge of the court of 
appeals in the county where the court is located, two laymen appointed 
by the governor and two attorneys elected by the bar. The legal and 
lay members serve six-year staggered terms and are not eligible to 
serve again. 
Judicial Reform in Other States 
In many states in which court studies have been made, it has 
taken a number of years to put the resultant recommendations into 
~ffect. Often these changes when adopted were not as extensive as 
had been proposed, and in some states, court reorganization proposals 
are yet to be acted upon favorably, even after years of study. 
Court studies in other states have taken two different 
approaches. Either study is made of the entire court system and its 
administratipn, or a portion is studied, such as minor courts, admin-
istration and procedure within the existing court structure, or 
judicial selectioh and tenure. Experience in most states has shown 
that fractional improvements may not be too successful unless con-
sidered in respect to the system as a whole. Often further problems 
are created which were not anticipated at the time limited improve-
ments were adopted: 
It is perhaps fallacious to attempt to remedy 
one particular area of the judicial system 
when it is the whole creature that needs 
treatment. Ideally, for reform purposes, the 
system should be considered as a whole. Only 
in this manner can the most efficient system 
be evolved. It is rare, however, that such 
a sweeping reform has been instituted. Mostly 
improvement has come in bits and pieces, in 
one area or another, without consideration of 
the effects of that improvement in light of 
remaining defects. 2 













Court Reorganization in Other States 
Connecticut. Court reorganization has been under study in 
Connecticut for over thirty years, beginning with the formation of 
that state's judicial council i~ 1927.13 Since that time the court 
system has been the subject of study by a series of bar association 
committees, legislative committees, and little Hoover commissions, 
in addition to the judicial council. From 1950 until the present 
time, several proposals for reorganizing and unifying the court 
system have been before the Connecticut General Assembly~ Portions 
oj these proposals have been adopted, but no reo~gan~zation plan has 
gained complete acceptance. In 1953, the chief Justice was ~ade 
head of the judicial department, and the supreme court was given 
rule-making powers. In the 1959 legislative tession, a minor court 
reorganization plan was adopted. Under the new law which will take 
effect January l, 1961, the 66 municipal courts and the 102 justice 
courts will be abolished and replaced by a new 44-judge state-
-Operated circuit court.14 · 
As noteworthy as these changes appear to be, the_y are_ 
only a small segment of all the reorganization plans which have been 
before' the legislature in various forms since 1950. After court re-
organization had failed to pass in 1953, the Connecticut Legislative 
Council was given the two proposals then before the legislature for 
further study. During 1954-55, the Council held a series of meetings 
around the state on these two proposals a~g found that the public had 
little concern with court reorganization. From 1956 through the 
present time, judges, members of the bar, and interested legislators 
have attempted to stimulate public concern and support. This was done 
through the joint efforts of the League of Women Voters and the forma-
tion of a citizens' committee which was headed by a retired $Upreme 
court judge, who directed the 1943 Connecticut court study.lb 
Wisconsin. In Wisconsin, court reorganization has been 
under study since 1913. The Wisconsin Judicial Council made its 
first proposal for complete reorganization in 1955. It recommended 
a constitutional amendment providing a judicial system organized 
on a tw?-court basis -- a supreme court as the court of appeals, 
and a circuit court with complete original jurisdiction to handle 
all matters then heard by circuit and statutdry courts and justices 
of the peace.17 This proposal, with a modification which reinstated 
the justices of the peace, was approved by the legislature in 1955, 






Journal of American Judicature Society, "Court Reorganization 
in Connecticut", David Marra,Vol. 4l, No. 1, June 1957, p. 6. 
Journal of American Judicature Society, Vol. 42, No. 6, April 
1959, p. 199. 
Marrs, op cit., p. 13. 
Ibid. 
Approval of a proposed constitutional amendment at two successive 
legislative sessions is required before it c~n be placed on the 
ballot. 
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second approva1.l8 The problem was then referred back to the Judicial 
Council for further study, with instructions to submit a new plan to 
the 1959 legislature. 
The new plan which was adopted by the legislature in 1959 
provided a court organization consisting of the supreme court, cir-
cuit courts, county courts, and justices of the peace. Specialized 
statutory courts were abolished and their functions taken over by 
the expanded county court system. Jurisdiction of justices of the 
peace would be restricted and greater administrative control would 
be placed with the supreme court and chief justice.19 
At the same legislative session, preliminary approval was 
given to two proposed constitutional amendments affecting the courts. 
The first would restrict any person over 70 years of age from becom-
ing a judge of a court of record and would require mandatory retirement 
for any judge of a court of record who had attained that age. 20 At 
prese~t this restriction and retirement provision applies only to 
supreme court justices. Also included was authorization for the 
supreme court to assign former supreme court justices and other 
former judges of courts of record on a temporary basis to serve as 
.judges of any court of record. The second proposed constitutional 
amendment would give the legislature the authority to provide by 
law for the specialization of judges in certain types of judicial 
matters in multi-judge circuit courts.21 
New Jersey. The New Jersey court reorganization program 
which was adopted by constitutional change in 1947 has been con-
sidered a model for other states, as have the study and the campaign 
for public support which preceded its adoption. Yet, the peculiar 
nature of New Jersey's court system prior to reorganization and the 
population density and geographic compactness of that state have 
little resemblance to conditions in the midwest and Rocky Mountain 
areas. What is relevant about New Jersey's achievement is not the 
exact nature of the results, but the thoroughness of the reorgan-
ization plan and the means by which it was achieved. 
The court reorganization of 1947 was the end product of a 
sustained effort of 16 years, and this effect was just the la21 in a series of attempted judicial reforms dating back 100 years. 
Governors, members of the judiciary, and lawyers of renown were 
associated with these earlier attempts, but their efforts were 
thwarted by the lethargy of those in sympathy and by the intense 
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Prior to reorganization, the New Jersey court system was 
closely patterned after British judicial organization, with separate 
courts of chancery and law and a multitude of minor courts with over-
lapping jurisdiction. There was a significant volume of appellate 
cases whose disposition turned ~~lely on the jurisdictional cleavage 
between law and equity courts. 24 Many times litigants were forced 
to resort to several courts before their controversy could be fully 
adjudicated. In one case (involving $2,500 on an insurance policy} 
the litigants had to go through nine trials and appeals lasting eight 
years to settle the question. In another, the litigants were compelled 
to go through five separate hearings in various courts and then found 
tnemselves back where they started.25 
The reorganization plan was designed to reduce the number 
of courts, eliminate the barrier between law and equity, simplify 
appellate procedure, and provide centralized administrative control • 
There were three basic principle$ which guided the committee 




First: Unification of Courts. By this 
means, the judicial system is simplified 
and the condition for economical and 
efficient administration established. 
It is the sole known technique for 
abolishing jurisdictional controversies 
which delay justice and waste the time 
and money of litigants and courts. 
Second: Flexibility of the Court System. 
By assignment of judges according to 
ability, experience and need, and appor-
tionment of judicial business among courts, 
divisions, and parts according to the 
volume and type of cases, judicial resources 
can be fully utilized and litigation 
promptly decided. 
Third: Control Over Administration, 
Practice and Procedure by Rules of Court. 
Exclusive authority over administration, 
and primary responsibility for establish-
ing rules of practical procedure, secures 
businesslike management of the courts as a 
whole and promotes simplified and more 
economical judicial procedure. 
Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
Rutgers University Law Review, "Progress in New Jersey Judicial 
Administration," Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1949, p. 161. 
"New Jersey's New Court System," pp. 75-76 . 
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The New Jersey judicial article now provides for a supreme 
court, superior courts, county courts, and inferior courts of limited 
jurisdiction. Inferior courts and their jurisdiction may be. 
established, altered or abolished by law.· The sup,reme court is 
given the authority to make rules g6verning the administration of 
all courts and, subject to law, .the practice and procedure in all 
such courts.27 - · 
The superior court· is the court of original general juris-
diction and also has a~ appellate division. The county courts' _ 
juri~dittion includes the jurisdiction formerly exercised by five 
other courts. Each county court may have more than one judge.28 
Pursuant to the inferior court authority given it by the judiciar 
article, the New Jersey legislature established a state-wide ~ystem 
of municipal courts to .handle'pdlice, traffic, and small claims 
matters. · 
I ' 
Appeals ·from the·cQunty:and ~uni6ipal couits lie to the 
appellate ·division of the'sup~rio~ court. App~als which mai be ~aken 
to the supreme court are limited to the follow~ng: l) cases determined 
by the appell,te divisioh of the superior court involving~ cbn-
stitutional question (either state or federal); 2) casei in which 
there was~ disse~t in the _appellate division of the superior court; 
3) capital cases; 4) ·on certif_ication by the supI'eme court to tl)e 
superior court, and where provided by rule of the supreme court to 
county ~ourts and other inferior courts; and 5) sue~ causes as may 
be provided by law.29 · -
Judges are not appointed for a specific superior or county 
court and may be ~ssigned anywhere in the state. A judge may receive 
a permanent assignment~ but may be called upon to assist temporarily 
in another court. To assist in the assignment of judges, th~ . 
compilation and. analysis of judicial statistics, and in administ~ative 
matters,_ the judicial administrator's office was established •. · · 
Within two ·years the new court system:had _enabied a smalle~. 
number of judges to dispose ,'of more _than 5'0 per cent more cases 
i~ the same pe~bod _than di~ the old system and in a much smalle~ '· 





The Judici~l Articles of the. Forty-Nine States, Compiled for 
Commi.ttee on a Model Judicial .Article Section of Judicial 
Administra~ion, A~erican Bar Association, 1959, unpaged. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
"Progress in .l'~ew Jersey Judicial Administration," p. 178. Com-
parative. figures·_showed appeals were being disposed of in 21 
days as compared with 134 under the old system and in similar 
time periods 3,741 cases were disposed of under the new system 






















Iowa. The Iowa court reorganization plan was based on a 
study which originated in 1955. Iowa's judicial system originally 
was extremely simple with only two general courts: the supreme 
court for appellate review and the district court as the trial court 
of general jurisdiction. In addition~ two minor .tribunals mayors' 
coutts and justice of the peace courts -- were establi~~ed to keep 
the peace and settle minor disputes in outlying areas. 
Had the Iowa court structure remained basically a two-level 
system and had improvements been made in the minor courts to meet 
changing conditions, there would have been no need for a major over-
haul of the judicial structure; instead, additional courts were 
added, and nothing was done to improve the ju$tice of the peace courts. 
The urban shift in population and a change in litigation habits 
resulted in disproportionate case loads in the different judicial 
districts. Litigants settled a greater proportion of cases out of 
court, and, as a result, in most places there were fewer trials . 
some localities had become so populous, however, that in spite of 
the reduction in trials, the district court could not meet the 
demand~32 But the district court was not expanded or contracted to 
meet the changing conditions in each particular area. In places where 
litigation lessened, the court was left at its same size. Where 
population became dense, the .state fell into the error that the 
framers of the judicial article had avoided: separate independent 
trial courts were created.33 As a result, Iowa's trial courts 
eventually consisted of the following: district courts, superior 
courts, municipal courts, police courts, justice of the peace courts, 
and mayors' courts. No improvements were made in the minor courts, 
which gradually tell into disrespect even though traffic cases 
increased the need for an adequate minor court system. 
The Iowa reorganization plan was designed to produce a unified 
court system and in effect is a return with some modification to the 
two-level judicial system originally written into the Iowa con-
stitution. All trial courts would be abolished except the district 
court, which would become a two-level court. One level of the 
district court would handle felonies, probate matters, and civil 
cases over $2,000. The second level (presided over by associate 
district judges) would handle all minor court cases and misdemeanors 
including traffic offenses. Both sets of judges, however, could 
preside on either court level as needed~ 
A simplified small claims procedure was recommended for all 
civil cases not exceeding $100. Appellate review of minor cases 
where no constitutional or legal questions are involved would be 
made by one supreme court justice rather than by the supreme court 
sitting in department or en bane. The Missouri plan was recommended 
for the selection of judges.-
31. Uhlenhopp, op. cit., p. 7 . 
32. Ibid., p. 8. 
33. Ibid.· 
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The reorganization recommendations met with considerable 
success in the 1959 Iowa legislative session. All of the proposals 
were adopted except the creation of the new minor court system 
(district court, second level) which would have abolished the 1,400 
courts of limited jurisdiction. 
Three recommendations were put into effect through legislation, 
but the bulk of the changes could not be effected without con-
stitutional amendment. Such an amendment was approved during the 
1959 legislative session and must again be approved in 1961 before 
placement on the ballot at the 1962 general election. Of the leg-
islation passed, one act authorizes the chief justice to call 
judicial conferences. Another empowers the supreme court to adopt 
rules for the adninistration of all inferior courts in the state. 
The third abolishes Iowa's rotating chief justiceship and provides 
that the supreme court shall select (rom among its members a chief 
justice to serve for the remainder of his term on the court. 
The proposed constitutional amendment as approved by the 
legislature would bring about a number of changes. It would give 
the supreme court administrative control of inferior courts and 
permit the legislature to set salaries and qualifications for judges. 
The legislature would establish a mandatory retirement system for 
all judges. Finally, the amendment would provide that supreme 
court justices and district judges be appointed by the governor 
from lists submitted by nominating commissions.34 
Idaho. The proposed judicial reorganization in Idaho 1s 
of special significance to Colorado, because the present court 
system is very similar to that of Colorado. Idaho has a supreme 
court, district courts, probate courts (which are located in each 
county and have similar jurisdiction to Colorado county courts), and 
justices of the peace. In June of this year, the Idaho Bar Associ-
ation Committee on Reform of Inferior CQurts made the following 




1) Justice of the Peace Courts: These courts should be 4 
made courts of record with no change of jurisdiction and be renamed 
county courts. These county courts would have as many judges as 
each county desired to provide. The judges of these courts should • 
receive salaries adequate enough to attract lawyers to the position, 
or in those counties where lawyers are not available, the best-
qualified lay judges. :s 
2) Probate Courts: These courts should be abolished and 
their jurisdiction transferred to the district courts, with the • 
provision of additional district judges where necessary. This juris-
diction includes probate, ~ental health, and juvenile matters. 
34. State Government News, Council of State Governments, Vol. 2, 
No. 5, May 1959, p. 6. 
35. The Advocate, "Reform of Inferior Courts, Second Amended Reports," 









District court clerks would be given surrogate powers to handle 
uncontested probate matters. Transfer of this jurisdiction to the 
district court would insure that all matters would be heard by lawyer 
judg~s, would eliminate trials de D.Q.Y.Q., and would provide a better 
solution on a district basis for many practical problems relating to 
mental health and juvenile delinquency. Detention facilities for 
delinquents and court investigation and probation services provided 
on a district basis would result in greater efficiency and economy. 
3) Constitutional Amendment: A proposal to amend the 
judicial article should be submitted at the 1961 session of the Idaho 
Legislature, so that it can be referred to the voters in 1962. The 
present constitution inhibits any substantial judicial reform. The 
proposed amendment, patterned after the Hawaii and Alaska constitutions, 
would allow by legislation such reforms of courts inferior to the 
supreme court as might be desirable, ,while at the same time preserving 
the district courts. Presently, justice of the peace courts, pro-
b-ate courts, and municipal courts are, in a sense, constitutional 
courts, and nothing substantial can be done until this situation 
has been changed. This is especially true with respect to probate 
courts, because most probate court jurisdiction cannot be transferred 
to district courts until the constitution is amended. 
The committee also recommended that: 1) further study be given 
to the family court act and proposed rules of procedure for traffic 
cases; 2) the legislature be requested to employ attorneys and 
research personnel to draft the necessary legislation to accomplish 
the recommended reforms and to make a detailed study of court case 
load data and finances; and 3) a new bar association study committee 
on judicial reform be created to carry on the work of the present 
committee, with such committee not limited to inferior courts.36 
Other States. Judicial reorganization studies have been made 
recently or are currently being made in several other states including: 
California, Florida, Kentucky, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and 
Rhode Island. All of these studies are aimed at: 1) simplifying 
the existing court structure; 2) providing coordinated administrative 
control under the supreme court through the chief justice; 3) 
eliminating trial delay and unnecessary expense; and 4) assuring a 
better-qualified judiciary through improvements in selection, salary, 
and tenure. 
In Florida, a five-year study by the Judicial Council has 
resulted in a recommended constitutional amendment which would 
overhaul the judicial article. This proposal is designed to simplif~ 
the court system and provide for greater flexibility and efficiency. 7 
36. Ibid. 
37. The Florida Bar Journal, ''A Proposal for Trial Court Revision," 
March 1959, pp. 1-50. 
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A special committee of the North Carolina Bar Association 
made a three-year study of that state's courts, at the request of 
the governor. This committee made several recommendations and has 
drafted the constitutional revision of the judicial article necessary 
to put these changes into effect. Abolition of all minor courts and 
replacement by a new district cqurt system were recommended. The 
judicial system would consist of three court levels, all part of a 
unified court system with central administrative control residing 
in the supreme court. The superior court would be the trial court 
of general jurisdiction and the new district court system would have 
the jurisdiction currently exercised by the justice of the peace 
courts, juvenile and domestic relations courts, and an assortment of 
other minor tribunals. Magistrates would be appointed by the district 
court to assure prompt hearing of minor civil matters and traffic 
offenses, with the proviso that upon request of litigants or 
defendants, cases would be heard by a district judge rather than a 
magistrate.38 
The Oregon Interim Committee on Judicial Administration has 
made several recommendations designed to improve court administration 
and to reorganize and improve trial courts. These include the trans-
fer of county court functions to the circuit court, the addition of 
circuit judges, changes in some judicial district boundaries, and 
abolition of justice of the peace courts. Jurisdiction of the 
justice of the peace courts would be exercised by new district courts 
which would be courts of record. The judges of this new court would 
be assisted by commissioners having the authority of m~ijistrates 
regarding preliminary hearings and the taking of bail. The interim 
committee also recommended increased judicial salaries, mandatory 40 retirement for judges, and judicial selection by the Missouri plan. 
In Ohio, the state bar association has been studying court 
problems for a number of years. In 1959, the legislature authorized 
. 
< .. . • 
the Ohio Legislative Service Commission to make an extensive court ~ 
study. The authorization of this study followed by two years a 
study made by the Ohio Legislative Service Commislion of minor court 
problems, which resulted in the replacement of justices of the peace ~ 
by a new minor county court system. The Kentucky Legislative Council 
is also making a study in that state. Both New York and California 
have had legislative interim committees studying judicial organization, ~ 
administration, and procedure. 4 1 
38. Report of the Committee on Improvin9 and Expediting the Admin-
istration of Justice in North Carolina, North Carolina Bar 
Association, December, 1958. 
39. Third Annual Report, Oregon Judicial Council, 1958. 
40. Ibid. 
41. The work of these committees is not reported upon here because 
the population and complex court problems of these states 
severely limit the application of recommendations of these com-


















Minor Court Reform. In addition to Ohio, several states have 
studied and replaced or modified their courts of limited jurisdiction 
in recent years. California placed its justice courts on a judicial 
district basis and required all justices of the peace to be attorneys. 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island se-veiely limited the powers of justices 
of the peace by transf•iring mqst of their authority and jurisdiction 
to other courts. Maine, Tennessee, and Virginia took steps to 
strengthen justice of the peace courts by reducing the number of 
justices, eliminating the fee system, and making certain changes in 
jurisdiction. Minor court studies have also been made or are still 
i~ process in Arizona, Illinois, Montana, Utah, and Washington. The 
Illinois study resulted in a constitutional amendment to reorganize 
the minor court system. This amendment was defeated narrowly at the 
1958 general election.42 
Summary 
There has been a general pattern in the recent judicial 
reorganization studies made by some 15 states, regardless of special 
problems and the existing court structure. In all of these studies, 
attention·has been directed toward the consolidation and simplification 
of the judicial structure. The proliferation of trial courts resulted 
largely from the creation of statutory courts over the years to meet 
specific needs of the time. Improvement .in judicial administration 
has been a major concern, as has been the problem of securing a 
qualified judiciary. With respect to the latter, judicial selection, 
salaries, tenure, and retirement have been given considerable study. 
In some states, it was found that minor court revision could 
not be made witho~considering changes in other levels of the court 
system as well, e.g., in Idaho and North Carolin~. Generally, the 
problems on the supreme court level were large appellate case loads 
and lack of administrative control of the over-all court system. 
Generally, few ·problems were found with respect to the highest state 
courts of original jurisdiction. In most states, recommended changes 
were confined to the provision of additional judges, modification of 
judicial district boundaries, and administrative coordination. In 
states with large, sparsely-populated areas, it was found that minor 
courts could be upgraded satisfactorily only by adding to the juris-
diction of the highest trial couri and by abolishing the various 
courts of least jurisdiction and replacing them with a new minor 
court system. 
A Fresh Appro~ch 
The recent admission of Alaska and Hawaii to the union has 
given these states several advantages in drafting their judicial 
42. This summary of minor court changes is taken from. Justice Courts 
in Colorado, Chapter III, pp. 55-64. 
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articles. The experiences in other states with problems resulting 
from complex and restrictive constitutional judicial provisions 
indicated what to avoid. Recent judicial studies and theories of 
judicial administration have pointed to the types of court structures 
and judicial articles which are most•desirable. Hawaii and Alaska 
took advantage of this experience and information; the judicial 
articles of both states and their court systems are models of 
simplicity and flexibility. 
The Alaska judicial article created a two-level court system 
consisting of the supreme court and the superior court, which is the 
trial court of general jurisdiction. While the article sets the 
~number of judges for both the appellate and trial divisions, it pro-
vides that the number of supreme court justices may be increased by 
law Ypon the request of the supreme court. The number of superior 
court judges may be changed by the legislature without supreme 
court request.43 
In addition, section one of the judicial article provides 
that the legislature may establish courts other than those expressly 
authorized in the constitution. This section also gives the leg-
islature the authority to prescribe court jurisdiction. There has 
been some disagreement over the language in this section with some 
fear that these provisions may subordinate the judicial branch to 
the legislature. The opinion has been expressed that the sections 
which provide that the supreme court shall have final appellate 
jurisdiction and the superior court shall be the trial court of 
general jurisdiction may be held to limit legislative restrictions 
on jurisdiction.44 
While this section gives the legislature authority to 
establish additional courts, it also contains a provision to insure 
against the creation of fragmentary minor courts over which no 
control can be exercised by the supreme court. It does this by 
providing that the co~rts shall constitute a unified judicial 
system for operation and administration. Further, section 15 gives 
the supreme court rule-making power governing the administration 
of all courts as well as practice and procedure in all civil and 
criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be changed, however, 
by a two-thirds vote of both legislative houses. 
Section 16 provides that the chief justice shall be the 
administrative head of all courts, with poY-er to transfer judges 
from one court or~ division thereof to another for temporary service. 
The chief justice shall also appoint an administrative director with 
43. The complete Alaska judicial article is contained in Appendix A. 
44. Journal of the American Judicature Society, "A-Model Judiciary 
















the approval of the supreme court. The Missouri plan for the appoint-
ment of judges is also incorporated in the judicial article, as is 
the establishment of the Alaskan j 11dicial council. 
The Alaska judicial arti~le ls claimed by its supporters to 
incorporate the principles of judiciJl organization proposed and 
backed by the American:Bar Association, the American Judicature 
Society, the Institute of Judicial Administration, and other profes-
sional and civic groups.45 
During the 1960 session, the Alaska legislature; acting pur-
suant to its power to create inferior courts and define the juris-
diction thereof, established a system of magistrate courts to handle 
minor civil matters and misdemeanors. The magistrate courts are under 
the administrative supervision of the superior court and the superior 
court judge or judges in each judici~l district appoint the magistrates. 
Hawaii 
Hawaii's judicial article also establishes a basically two-
level court system, by providing that the judicial power of the state 
shall be vested in one supreme court, circuit courts, and such 
inferior courts as the legislature may from time to time establish. 46 
These courts have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be 
provided by law. 
The Hawaii supreme court has five members, as compared with 
Alaska's three. Authority is not contained in the judicial article 
to increase the number of supreme court justices; rather, the chief 
justice is given the power to assign circuit court judges to serve 
temporarily on the supreme court when necessary . 
Judges are appointed rather than elected, but instead of 
the Missouri plan, the judicial article follows the New Jersey system 
of selection. Judges are appointed by the governor with consent 
of the senate. Supreme court justices are appointed for seven-year 
terms and circuit judges for six-year terms. The age of mandatory 
retirement is set at 70 years . 
The chief justice is designated as administrative head of 
the courts and he is given the authority to assign judges from one 
circuit court to another for temporary service. The chief justice 
is required to appoint a judicial administrator, with the approval 
of the other supreme court justices. The judicial article also 
• confers upon the supreme court the power to promulgate rules and 
regulations in all civil and criminal cases for all courts, relating 
45. Ibid. 





to process, practice, procedure and appeals, which shall have the. 
force and effect of law. These and a few closely related provisions 
comprise the whole of the Hawaii judicial article. 
The relative lack of rigid r~strictions in the judicial articles 
of Alaska and Hawaii and the wide latitude given the legislature make 
it possible to meet changing demands on the judicial system without 
constitutional change. While it is always possible that the leg-
islatures of the two states might use this authority to create a 
multitude of trial courts, it seems highly unlikely in light of pre-
sent thinking on judicial organization. With the exception of small 
civil matters and misdemeanors which can be handled by a closely 
supervised minor court system, there should be no need for additional 
courts. The creation of additional judgeships and the relocation of 
judicial district boundaries as needed should provide adequately for 
increased case loads in the court of general trial jurisdiction. 
Some Tools of Judicial Administration 
Office of Judicial Administrator47 
Even after judicial reorganization is accomplished• and a 
simplified court structure established with administrative control 
placed in the supreme court, proper steps must be taken to keep the 
modernized judicial machinery in working order. Provision of 
additional judg~s on a permanent basis or on temporary assignment, 
changes in rules and procedures, and recommendations for legislation 
should be based on a continuing accurate analysis of prevailing 
conditions on all 1 levels of the court system. That the chief 
justice needs staff assistance to administer the court system 
adequately is demonstrated by the constitutional and/or statutory 
provisions in 24 states for the office of judicial administrator, 
who is appointed either by the chief justice or the supreme court 
en bane and serves at the court's pleasure.48 
It is usually the responsibility of the court administrator 
to collect and analyz~ the judicial statistics necessary to provide 
the chief justice with current information on how the system is 
functioning, and to indicate problem areas. In addition, the judicial 
administrator conducts special studies, such as the use and advantages 
of pre-trial conferences, various techniques of docket coordination 







47. The work of the Colorado judicial administrator's office was ' 
cre;ited in 1959. 
48. Alaska, Cali{o.1·nia, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
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Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 




























In states such as New Jersey or Alaska which have a unified 
court system with appointed judges, the judicial administrator may 
prepare the budget for the whole judicial system and be responsible 
for the hiring of clerical personnel throughout the system as well 
as for the operation of their offices, In other states where local 
funds provide a portion of the trial court's budget and clerks and 
similar personnel are appointed by the trial court judge and are 
responsible to him, the functions of the judicial administrator 
are more limited. 
Besides the functions for which he is responsible to the 
chief justice and the supreme court, the judicial administrator also 
assists the trial c6urts and their staffs and provides consultation 
and research upon their request. His office should be not only 
the source of information on the operation of the court system in 
his state, but also a clearing house for material on court operation, 
administration, procedures, and studies in other states as well, 
Judicial Statistics 
One of the most necessary adjuncts to good judicial admin-
istration is the collection and analysis of judicial statistics. 
These statistics, of course, do not present a complete picture of 
how the courts are operating; measurements of quantity do not reflect 
judicial quality, nor all productive use of judicial time. Within 
limitations, however, judicial statistics show trends in case loads, 
for example, point to conditions which may need further study, and 
indicate where temporary assignment of judges may be needed or where 
the permanent addition of judges might be desirable. 
The Ohio State Bar Association in its report on the admin-
istration of justice in that state made the following comment on the 
use of judicial statistics:49 
49 .• 
The ultimate function of judicial statistics 
is to make available information that is 
necessary to an understanding of the work of 
the courts and the promotion of efficiency. 
Properly collected and compiled statistics 
can be used by those with administrative 
responsibility to see that court business 
is being properly executed, and in apportion-
ing judicial work and assigning judges; and 
by legislatures in considering appropriations 
and the need for additional judges. Statistics 
are also of value in measuring the need for and 
The Ohio Judicial System and the Administration of Justice, 
Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal 
Reform, Ohio State Bar Association, May 1951, p~ 40, 
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effect of procedural reforms, and in assist-
ing the effectiveness of both criminal and 
civil justice; the statistics must be properly 
collected and compiled. Good statistics are 
invaluable; misleading a~d false statistics 
are worse than none at all. The heart of the 
whole proble~ of the accuracy and reliability 
of judicial statistics is the manner in which 
information is kept and reported by individual 
courts. 
As indicated by the above comments, the validity and use-
fulness of judicial statistics depend on an accurate standardized 
court record system and uniform reporting by court clerks. To 
achieve this result, a standard record-keeping system should be 
designed to meet the needs of each le_vel of courts and the statistical 
rep9rts should be a by-product of this system. It is not unusual 
for courts of the same level to have different methods of record-
keeping and statistical compilation. The problem of achieving 
uniformity in this instance is further complicated if the 
statistical information requested cannot be compiled easily from the 
records normally kept by the court. This problem can be avoided 
by assisting court clerks in developing a more efficient record-
keeping system which will also provide easily the information desired 
by the judicial administrator's office. 
Judicial Councils and Judicial Conferences 
The establishment, on a permanent and continuing basis, of 
an agency representing the courts, the bar, and the lay public, or 
a conference of representative judges of all the courts, is a highly 
valuable means to insure continuing surveillance and improvement of 
judicial administration.50 The state of Ohio is generally credited 
with being the first to establish a judicial council by statute 
in ·1923. Judicial councils have since been created in a majority 
of states.51 In some states, judicial councils have accomplished 
little, but in others the studies and recommendations of judicial 
councils have made a significant contribution. For example, court 
reorganization proposals in Florida, OregQn, and Wisconsin resulted 
from extensive judicial council studies.52 In addition to studies 
and recommendations for court reorganization, judicial councils 
make studies with respect to court rules and procedures and statutory 
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Elliott, Institute of Judicial Administration, New York 
University, April 20, 1956, p. 6. 
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responsibility of making nominations to the governor from which he 
makes judicial appointments.53 Judicial councils also serve useful 
functions in the dissemination of information concerning the admin-
istration of justice and in providing liaison between the courts, 
attorneys, the legislative and eve(.utive branches of government, 
and the general public. 
In a number of states, including Colorado, judicial conferences 
have been authorized either by statute or by supreme court rule. All 
of the judges of one level of courts meet at least once annually with 
the supreme court to discuss administrative and procedural problems, 
to-make recommendations for improvement, and to consider proposals 
advanced by other groups, such as special studies committees and bar 
associations, also concerned with judicial administration. 
These judicial conferences provide a means of considering 
mutual judicial problems and of coordinating efforts for improvement 
io the administration of justice. In some states, Colorado included, 
annual conferences are held for court clerks as well. At these 
meetings, standardized procedures can be considered and adopted and 
clerks given assistance and consultation on the problems involved 
in running their offices. 
53. Article IV, Section 5, Alaska Constitution. 
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IV 
JUDICIAL PROBLEMS IN COLORAOO: 
EXAMINATION AND MEASUREMENT 
Organizing the Study 
At its organizational meeting, the Legislative Council Com-
mittee on the Administration of Justice decided that the first phase 
of its study should be an examination of court conditions and problems 
throughout the state. The information gathered and compiled as the 
result of such an examination would provide a basis for evaluating 
previous proposals for improving the courts and perhaps might lead to 
the formulation of an entirely new approach to Colorado's judicial 
problems. 
Judicial Statistics 
A major problem confronting the committee as it began its 
study was the lack of reliable and complete judicial statistics. 
(The offlce of judicial administrator had been created, but the posi-
tion was not filled until September 1959, three months after the com-
mittee began its work, and it was an additional six months before that 
office's statistical program was in full operation.) The committee, 
therefore, directed the Legislative Council staff to make a complete 
docket analysis of the supreme court and all district and county 
courts. Statistical data on justice of the peace courts had already 
been compiled as a result of a docket analysis made in connection with 
the Legislative Council justice court study. Three Council staff 
members spent almo~t six months in the field on a full-time basis, 
visiting every district and county court in the state and compiling 
statistics on court activity. As a result, for the first time an 
over-all statistic~! analysis was compiled on the operation of 
Colorado's courts. 
Docket Analtsis. The docket analysis was designed to produce 
several kinds of da a for evaluation and use by the committee. These 
data included: 1) case load by court and type of case; 2) number of 
appeals; 3) number of jury trials; 4) number of contested matters; 
5) number of cases settled out of court; 6) number of cases filed in 
a higher court in which a lower court has concurrent jurisdiction; 
7) case disposition, including time from filing to disposition and 
time from issue to disposition; 8) case load trends in proportion to 
population and number of judges; and 9) continuances, use of pre-
trial conferences, and related matters. · 
1. For a detailed statistical presentation on the operation of 
Colorado's justice of the peace courts, see Justice Courts in 
Colorado, Chapter III, pp. 32-54. 
2. A continuing statistical program has been established by the 
judicial administrator for the district and county courts, and 





In addition, specific information on criminal cases was in-
cluded, such as sentencing, use of probation, court appointed attor-
neys, guilty pleas, pre-sentence investigations, and elapsed time 
from filing and arraignment to disposition. All cases filed in the 
calendar year 1958 were included in the analysis; in addition, cer-
tain summary data w3re compiled for 1950, 1954, 1957, and the first .six. months of 1959. 
Regional Meetings 
In conjunction with the docket analysis, the committee held a 
series of regional meetings around the state, to which judges, other 
court officials, legislators, lawyers, and interested citizens were 
invited. These meetings were held in Glenwood Springs, Alamosa, 
Grand Junction, Durango, La Junta, Pueblo, Fort Collins, Fort Morgan, 
Golden, and Denver. The docket analysis was coordinated with the 
regional meeting schedule, so that the preliminary results of the 
---docket analysis for the area in which the meeting was held were 
available to the committee immediately prior to the meeting . 
. The major topics discussed at these regional meetings in-
. eluded the following: 
A. Court Organization Proposals - Trial Courts 
1. Elimination of county courts in 29 smallest 
counties, jurisdiction to be transferred to 
the district court 
2. State-wide consolidation of county and district 
courts 
3. Establishment of a system of family courts as 
a division of district court to handle all 
juvenile and domestic relations matters 
4. Solution to the justice court situation: 
a. consolidate with county courts 
b. reduce number of J.P.'s, set qualifications, 
etc. 
c. direct supervision by a court of record 
d. other 
5. Election or selection of judges, tenure, retirement 
6. If present district - county court structure is 
retained, possibilities for closer coordination 
between courts 
7. Lawyer and/or non-lawyers judges with respect to county, 
justice and municipal courts 
8. Judicial district consolidation or boundary changes 
B. Court Organization Proposals - Appellate Courts 
I. Present supreme court backlog 
a. temporary solutions 
b. long run-solutions 
3. July 30, 1959 was used as a cutoff date to provide uniformity 
of information. The field work on the docket analysis began 
in July 1959 and was terminated in January 1960. 
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2. Appeal procedure generally 
a. appeal as a matter of right 
b. supreme court certiorari power 
c. one trial - one appeal 
d. trials de~ oh appeal in trial courts 
3. Appeal court organization 
a. intermediate court if needed - number of judges· 
department or en bane 
b. supreme court - number of judges - department 
or en bane 
c. trial courts - appeals from justice and county 
courts 
C. Court Procedures - Trial Courts 
l. Case backlog 
a. existence of same 
b. method (and/or rules) for clearing docket of 
dormant cases 
c. handling of continuances 
2. Use of pre-trial conferences 
3. Statutory court terms 
a. satisfactory or should be changed 
b. followed or ignored 
c. established by court rule (supreme or district 
court) or set by statute 
4. Standardized court rules 
a. need for same 
b. who should promulgate 
5. Judicial time spent in chambers 
a. informal matters 
b. formal matters (kinds of cases which require 
such treatment) 
6. Judicial time spent on water adjudications, other 
difficult cases 
D. Court Administration - Trial Courts 
1. Need for a standardized reporting and record system 
2. Court personnel 
a. desirability of combining clerical functions 
of county and district courts with one clerk 
to serve both courts-
b. use of court clerks for minor judicial matters 
A number of subjects which related to the handling of criminal 
cases were also covered at the regional meetings. These topics 
included: sentencing, present practices and need for change; uniform 
rules of criminal procedures; legal definition of insanity; preliminary 

















by counsel, court appointed attorneys and need for public defender 
system; and detention and court services for juveniles.4 
Regional Meetings: Comments and Recommendations 
. Approximately 400 persons attended the ten regional meetings 
held by the committee. These included: supreme court justices; 
district judges; county judges; municipal judges; justices of the 
peace; other court personnel, such as clerks, reporters, and pro-
·bation officers; district attorneys and members of their staffs; 
personnel of the state adult parole department; legislators; attorneys, 
many of whom were officials or members of bar association committees 
studying related matters; members of the League of Women Voters 
Committee on Courts; representatives of the press; and interested 
citizens. The following summary is a digest of the most pertinent 
discussions which took place at these meetings and the recommendations 
which were made to the committee. This summary is organizad by major 
topic and reference is made to each regional meeting. 
Consolidation of District and County Courts 
Glenwood Springs. 5 District judges were either opposed or 
neutral on this proposal. Opinion was expressed that an additional 
district judge would be needed to handle the increased case load in 
the 9th Judicial District (Garfield, Rio Blanco, and Pitkin counties). 
The consolidated case load in the 14th Judicial District (Grand, 
Moffat, and Routt counties) might be handled without the addition of 
a second district judge. County judges (none of whom present were 
attorneys) were generally opposed to consolidation. It was stressed· 
that small case loads do not reflect the amount of work done by 
county judges. A considerable amount of time is spent on informal 
matters -- counseling in domestic relations and juvenile cases and 
in helping attorneys and others in checking files and records. The 
opinion was expressed that the county court was more accessible to 
the people than the district court and for this reason the county 
court performed a needed local service. Consolidation would require 
additional district judges, although court clerks with surrogate 
powers could probably handle most probate matters expeditiously in 
one-judge, multi-county districts with small case loads. 
Attorneys were generally neutral toward the proposal while 
stressing the necessity of avoiding the opposite extreme; the 
creation or continuation of more courts than are necessary, expecially 
in the small counties. An alternate recommendation was made for ! 
4. Some of these matters, along with the docket analysis infoirmatfion 
.compiled on criminal cases, are included in the last sect on o 
this report which covers the criminal code and re~ated matters • 
5. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
Meeting of July 24, 1959. 
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counties under 10,000 population. 
there be only one court to handle 
county, justice of the peace, and 
a lawyer judge. 
In these counties, it was proposed 
the business of the district, 
municipal courts, presided over by 
Alamosa.6 District judges were in disagreement on the suit-
ability of consolidation in the 12th Judicial District (Alamosa, 
Conejos, Costilla, Mineral, Rio Grande, and Saguache counties). 
Opposition was expressed by one district judge because additional 
judges would be needed to handle the increase in case load. The other 
distri~t judge was of the opinion that consolidation would be 
successful, if the district court clerk in each county could handle 
tre administrative and clerical work involved in probate matters. 
He pointed out that almost all trials in the 12th District counties 
are heard in district court anyway at the present time. Four of the 
six county judges present (none of whom were attorneys) opposed 
consolidation for the same reasons expressed at the Glenwood Springs 
meeting. One of the four agreed that one judge could handle both 
courts with sufficient clerical help, but doubted that the quality of 
justice would be improved as a result. Two countV judges felt there 
was considerable merit in the proposal, especially in small counties. 
The consensus of o~inion of attorneys present was that the 
public favored retention of a minor court system, but that the 
inadequacy of both the county and justice of the peace courts had . 
caused loss of public respect. The·real question, therefore, was 
whether it was possible to improve t'he personne1 and procedures while 
retaining the present system or whether reorganization was the only 
possible solution. Two possible approaches to reorganization w~re 
suggested. The first followed along the lines suggested by the 
committee: consolidation of district·and county court jurisdiction. 
With such consolidation a third judge would be needed in the district 
and.it was suggested that this judge specialize in domestic relations, 
juveniles, and probate matters. At the same time that consolidation 
took place, a new minor court system should be created to handle 
small civil matters and misdemeanors such as traffic violations; 
perhaps this court could be under the supervision of the district 
court. The second suggestion was the creation of circuit county 
courts or the consolidation of county courts in the San Luis Valley. 
Under such a proposal only two judges would be needed to handle the 
county court business in the six counties and perhaps dispose 
of most justice court cases as well. 
Grand Junction. 7 Generally the judges and attorneys present 
either were noncommittal on the consolidation proposal or expressed 
some opposition. One of the two district judges present, who favored 
6. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
Meeting of August 10, 1959. 
7. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 





















consolidation, stated that even though the 7th Judicial District 
covered seven counties (Delta, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Mesa, Montrose, 
Ouray and San Miguel), he did not consider travel in the district 
excessive and the consolidated case load could be handled with the 
addition of a third district judge. If county courts were retained 
with their present jurisdiction, he recommended that trials de !22.Y.Q_ 
to the district court be eliminated and a bottom dollar limit be 
placed on civil cases which could be filed in district court. 
Of the four county judges present, three of whom were attorneys, 
twp were neutral toward the proposal and two were opposed, generally 
because of the reasons cited at the Glenwood Springs meeting and 
because they felt that the district court would not be able to handle 
juvenile cases adequately. 
The lawyers present felt that the matter deserved further 
study, but pointed out that the area and geographic barriers within 
the 7th District posed some problems. They felt that there hadn't 
been any particular problems in county courts with lawyer judges, but 
that in the other four counties of the district, many cases were filed 
in district court rather than county court so that trial would be 
before a lawyer judge. Even in those counties with lawyer judges, 
cases were often filed in district court to avoid trials de novo 
on appeal from the county court. - --· 
Durango. 8 Both district judges (6th Judicial District: 
Archuleta, Dolores, La Plata, Montezuma, and San Juan counties) were 
in accord with consolidation if an additional judge were added to 
take care of ~he increased case load. One of the two district judges 
proposed that consolidation be accompanied by the creation of a 
family court division of the district court to try all domestic 
relations and juvenile matters. Some of the attorneys present were 
in agreement with the consolidation and family court division pro-
posals. One went even further and recommended that the state undertake 
the total financing of a consolidated court system, in order to insure 
a sufficient number of adequately-trained probation officers and 
clerical employees. A suggestion was made that all juvenile and 
domestic relations matters be transferred to the district court and 
that justice courts be consolidated with county courts, which would 
retain the remainder of their present jurisdiction. Of the three 
county judges present (two of whom were attorneys), one favored 
consolidation, pointing out that the county court business in Archuleta 
county could be handled by a district judge one day a month. The 
other county judges emphasized the specialized nature of the county 
court's jurisdiction and recommended that the county courts be 
upgraded and judicial salaries increased. 
8. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
Meeting of September 11, 1959 . 
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Pueblo.9 The district judges were neither stongly in 
f~vor of nor opposed to the proposal. As an alternative one district 
judge proposed that a minimum limit of $1,000 be placed on civil 
actions which could be brought in district court and that county 
judges be required to be attorneys. ,Many of the attorneys present 
stressed the difficulty in finding lawyers willing to take a county 
judgeship in small counties. 
In contrast, most of the county judges present (especially 
those who were from more populous areas and who were attorneys) 
favored consolidation. It was pointed out that one judge could 
handl~ the combined case load in the 3rd Judicial District (Huerfano 
and Las Animas counties) and that it was a waste of judicial manpower 
to have both a district judge and two county judges. If consolidation 
is not considered favorably, then attention should be directed to 
changing judicial district boundaries. One county judge felt that a 
separate court with probate jurisdiction was needed for accessibility, 
but agreed that the district judge could handle these matters in 
smalf counties one day a week. 
One county judge felt there was no need for two courts, even 
in heavily-populated areas, especially if there were a family court 
division of the district court and a judge could be selected or 
elected specifically for that division. Another county judge 
favored consolidation, but as a~ alternative suggested that counties 
be consolidated for judicial purposes. In El Paso county, an 
additional county judge or a superior court similar to Denver's is 
needed because of the increase in judicial business. Because of the 
large area included within the 4th Judicial District (Douglas, El 
Paso, Elbert, Kit ~arson, Lincoln, and Teller counties) six judges 
would be needed if the courts were consolidated and district 
boundaries unchanged.10 
Most of the attorneys present from the Colorado Springs area 
and the 11th Judicial District (Chaffee, Custer, Fremont and Park 
counties) favored consolidation. While some of the Pueblo attorneys 
favored the proposal, others preferred the retention of both county 
and district courts, with the possibility that all juvenile and· 
domestic relations jurisdiction be exercised by the district court. 
La Junta. 11 Generally, district and county courts con-
solidation was opposed by the judges and attorneys present at the 
La Junta meeting. Stress was placed on the specialized nature of 
probate cases and the need to have a county judge readily available 
to expedite the handling of probate matters. Again the counseling 
9. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
Meeting of October 13, 1959. 
10. As compared with three district judges at that time, and four at 
pr·esent. 
11. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 



















f1mction of county judges was mentioned and the alternate suggestion 
made that county courts be upgraded and judicial salaries increased. 
One district judge favored the creation of a family court division 
of the district court, but the other contended that there was an 
insufficient number of juvenile.and domestic relations cases in the 
two judicial districts in the Arkansas Valley to justify a separate 
district court division (15th Judicial District: Baca, Cheyenne, 
Kiowa and Prowers counties; 16th Judicial District: Bent, Crowley, 
and Otero). The four county judges (two of whom were attorneys), 
were equally divided as to consolidation. One county judge favored 
the proposal if clerks could be empowered to handle routine probate 
matters and there would be a sufficient number of district judges to 
handle the case load and give people adequate service. 
Fort Collins. 12 Only one of the three district and three 
county judges,all of whom were attorneys, present from the 8th 
Judicial District (Boulder, Jackson, Larimer, and Weld), strongly 
-opposed consolidation. Two county judges were very much in favor 
of the proposal; two district judges supported the idea, but less 
enthusiastically; and one district judge had no objections. The 
elimin_ation of trials de .!lQ.Y.Q. was cited as a positive advantage of 
consolidation. It was felt that the. addition of one judge in each 
of the three major counties in the district could accommodate the 
increased case load. While there was no desire expressed to break 
up the 8th Judicial District if the courts were not consolidated, 
some of the judges and attorneys present felt they would at least 
consider such a proposal more favorably if the courts were consolidated 
and each of the large counties had two judges. The increased expense 
resulting from having two additional district attorneys was cited, 
but this expense would be offset, at least somewhat, by a reduction 
in the judges' travel expenses. The attorneys reacted favorably 
to the idea, indicating a willingness to consider ~ny prQposat which· 
embodied the principles of one trial and one appeal and that Judges 
be attorneys. 
Fort Morgan. 13 There was general opposition to consolidation 
from both judges and attorneys. The opinion was expressed that the 
retention of county courts was necessary, and that even in those 
counties in the 13th Judicial District (Logan, Morgan, Phillips, 
Sedgwick, Washington, and Yuma) without lawyer judges, the county 
court was doing a good job. The county judges are well known in 
their home communities, and their courts are easily accessible. 
Lawyer judges are not necessary except in the two largest counties 
Logan and Morgan, because all contested and technical matters are 
filed in the district court. 
12. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
Meeting of November 13, 1959. 
13.· Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
Meeting of November 30, 1959. 
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Golden.14 Two of the three district judges present favored 
consolidation, as did two of the four county judges (all attorneys). 
One of the district judges felt that the county courts had become 
accepted by the people over the yea~s and they would oppose its 
elimination. He felt that the proposal needed further consideration. 
The other two district judges felt that abolition of county courts 
as prese~tly constituted, especially in the smaller counties, was 
desirable. The clerk of the district court could be empowered to 
handle probate and other administrative matters. One of the two 
county judges favoring consolidation supported the creation of a 
distri~t court family division. Both of the county judges opposing 
consolidation stressed the strong relationship between the county 
judge and the community, but one stated that the time had perhaps come 
when the efficient administration of justice required consolidation. 
While some of the attorneys present favored consolidation, they had 
no fault to find with the present operation of county courts in the 
metropolitan area (1st Judicial District: Clear Creek, Gilpin, and 
Jeffe-rson counties; 17th Judicial District: Adams county; 18th 
Judicial District: Arapahoe crunty). The creation of superior 
courts in metropolitan counties was mentioned as a possible means of 
relieving the growing burden on the county courts, if the present 
court structure is retained. The· alternative of establishing 
separate juvenile courts was proposed as being more necessary in 
these counties under the present court organization. 
Denver. 15 There was general agreement that· the magnitude of 
the case load in the district, county, and juvenile courts in Denver 
necessitated the retention of three separate courts, especially 
since the county and juvenile courts were held in high respect by 
attorneys and citizens. 
Minor Court Reform (including consolidation of county and justice courts) 
Glenwood Springs. In general, there was opposition from 
judges, justices of the peace, and attorneys to eliminating justice 
courts. All thought the number of justices of the peace should be 
reduced, justices should be placed on a salary, and given both pre-
service and in-service training. One proposal that all jurisdiction 
be placed in one court in small counties has already been discussed. 
One justice of the peace who is also a district court clerk stressed 
the need for minor courts, but said that in small counties there was 
no need for both a justice court and a county court. 
Alamosa. Only one of the county judges offered no objections 
to handling justice of the peace jurisdiction in the county court. 
Two of the county judges said that they had the time to hear these 
14. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
Meeting of December 18, 1959. 
15. Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of Justice, 
























matters, but that it would be inconvenient to have minor civil cases 
filed in count.y court. The district attorney felt there should be 
at least one justice of the peace in each population center. As one 
solution to the problem, he suggested that municipal court jurisdiction 
in the larger cities be expanded lo include justice court cases, 
Some of the municipal judges in these cities are attorneys, which would 
improve the quality of justice. Justice courts should be accessible 
to the district attorney and members of his staff, although they never 
appear in justice court unless there is opposing counsel. The justices 
of the peace present made recommendations similar to those offered at 
the Glenwood Springs meeting. The attorneys concurred in the need for 
a minor court system but felt that overhaul was necessary, with both 
county court-justice court consolidation and a new minor court system 
under the supervision of the district court considered as possible 
approaches. 
Grand Junction. Opinion was equally divided between those 
who wished to abolish justice of the peace courts and those who 
wished to improve or modify the system. There was no agreement, how-
ever, on what sort of a system should be adopted to replace justice 
courts. It was suggested that the small claims jurisdiction of justice 
courts be increased, the number of justices of the peace be decreased, 
and that all other justice court jurisdiction be transferred to county 
court. This would leave the justice court to function as a small 
claims court, while criminal cases would be tried in county court, 
assuring the defendant that his rights would be protected and 
elim~nat~ng trials de novo on criminal appeals. A training pr~gram 
for Justices of the peace and better procedures in jury selection 
were offered as remedies by attorneys who favored the retention of 
justice courts. 
Durango. Geographic problems were cited as a major obstacle 
to the effective consolidation of county and justice courts. The 
county judges were in agreement that the addition of justice court 
cases to their present jurisdiction would impose an undue burden on 
their courtsr some of the attorneys favored such consolidation, how-
ever. The proposal was also made that a separate court should be 
established with traffic case jurisdiction. The district attorney 
and members of his staff said that justices of the peace were 
necessary for the posting of bond and preliminary hearings in rural 
areas. 
Pueblo. The lack of rules of procedure in justice court 
cases, inadequate courtroom facilities, untrained justices of the 
peace, and the expense and delay involved in trials de !lQ.Y2_ to the 
county court were all criticized; but there was no agreement on how 
to solve these problems. Suggestions included: reduction in the 
number of justices of the peace, supervision by a court of record, 
transfer of all cases in which a jury trial is requested to the 
county court, requirements in large counties that justices be attorneys 
and paid an adequate salary, and elimination of the fee system . 
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La Junta. Except for two of the county judges present, there 
was general opposition to consolidating county and justice courts or to 
eliminating justice courts, The two county judges who favored the 
proposal felt that justice court jur.isdiction and/or administration 
could be handled adequately by the county court as long as some 
allowances were made for distances and convenience. While the 
difficulty _in getting justices of the peace who were attorneys in most 
of the small Arkansas Valley counties was recognized, the attorneys 
present favored retention of justice courts even with non-lawyer judges. 
They recommended that efforts be made to improve the system through a 
reductiop in the number of justices and elimination of the fee system. 
Fort Collins. Several recommendations were made for modifying 
or eliminating justices of the peace. These were to: 1) combine 
municipal and justice courts on a precinct basis similar to the 
California minor court system, with home rule cities participating 
if they so choose; 2) to raise the civil jurisdiction to $1,000 and 
have ma..gistrates supervised by the district court; 3) to set 
qualifications and have magistrates appointed instead of elected; and 
4) to reorganize the minor courts, increase jurisdiction, and make 
them courts of record to eliminate trials de !lQYQ_. 
Fort Morgan. Elimination of minor courts was opposed, as was 
the suggestion that magistrates be appointed by district judges on 
the grounds that the protection of fair appellate review might be 
prejudiced if the appeal were heard by the judge who appointed the 
magistrate who heard the case initially. It was pointed out that the 
bar association assist in the selection of justices of the peace in 
Morgan county and that the district judges and members of the bar 
are available to advise justices of the peace on legal questions. 
Golden. The precinct consolidation adopted in Jefferson 
county, which reduced the county to one justice precinct with two 
justices of the peace was viewed favorably as a step in the right 
direction, but additional recommendations were made. Two district 
judges favored placing justice courts or magistrates under the super-
vision of the district court, with one of the two recommending that 
magistrates be appointed by district judges as well, in the same way 
that federal judges appoint commissioners. Several attorneys supported 
the creation of superior courts in metropolitan counties, with 
original jurisdiction in misdemeanors and concurrent civil juris-
diction with the county court, except for probate, me~al health, 
and juvenile matters. Each county should have a sufficient number of 
superior court judges to handle the case load efficiently and the 
courts should be located conveniently. The judges of these courts 
should receive an adequate salary, be required to be attorneys, and 
be prohibited from practicing law. 
Denver. Justice court jurisdiction in Denver is exercised by 
the municipal court, all judges of which are attorneys. The recom-
mendation was made that this jurisdiction be retained by the Denver 
M~nicipal Court under any reorganization plan considered by the com-
mit!ee, because of the large case load. The present flexibility in 














Supreme Court Backlog and Appellate Jurisdiction 
Glenwood Springs. The suggestion was made by the district 
judges that perhaps a monetary limitation should be placed on the 
right of appeal in civil cases u~less a legal or constitutional 
question is involved. This had been done in other states and didn't 
appear to be an infringement of justice. The practice of writing 
an opinion in each case was cited as one reason for the delay, but 
both district judges said that written findings were helpful and that 
the failure to provide written findings might be unfair to the parties 
in._volved. These findings are also useful to the trial court and aid 
it in making better decisions. All of the attorneys present favored 
retention of appeal to the supreme court as a matter of right. They 
did not feel that Colorado needed an intermediate court of appeals, 
because of the state's small population. As an alternative, they 
proposed making the size of the supr~me court flexible, so that 
justices might be added if and when needed. 
Alamosa. The district judges and most of the attorneys 
agreed that the delay was caused in part by written opinions in each 
case, but felt that these opinions were instructive to both bench 
and bar. Memoranda opinions were suggested in minor cases, however. 
One district judge suggested that an intermediate court of appeals 
be established, with present district judges sitting from time to 
time on the intermediate appellate court. Some of the attorneys 
disagreed with this proposal, pointing out that if appeal was a 
matter of right, the intermediate court's docket would soon be in 
the same condition as the supreme court's. Conversely, if appeal 
to the intermediate court were limited, then how could the expense 
of establishing and maintaining such a court be justified? Speedy 
disposition of appellate cases is a desired goal, but not at the 
expense of careful consideration of the issues involved. 
Grand Junction. The use of memoranda opinions on minor 
cases and the creation of an intermediate court of appeals were two 
suggestions to reduce the supreme court backlog. District judges, if 
available, could serve on the intermediate court. The jurisdiction of 
the intermediate court should be limited to lesser civil and criminal 
matters and further review by the supreme court should be limited 
as well; if further appeal can be made to the supreme court in all 
cases heard by the intermediate appellate court, nothing is gained 
by its creation. 
Durango. Both district judges favored the creation of an 
intermediate court of appeals on a temporary basis, but felt that 
it would not be needed once the supreme court case load became 
current. The use of memoranda opinions was also advocated, and there 
was general agreement among judges and attorneys that there should 
be no limitation on the right of appeal to the supreme court. 
Service by district judges, either on an intermediate court or to 
assist the supreme court, might be necessary on a temporary basis, 
but attorneys would oppose the loss of trial judges' time in the 
district on a long term basis. 
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Pueblo. There was general agreement that an intermediate 
court of appeals should be used only as a temporary measure and for 
that reason any constitutional revision should not include a pro-
vision for an intermediate appellate court. Some way should be 
found to restrict appeals from the intermediate court to the supreme 
court without impeding justice. Unless this is done, the intermediate 
court might merely provide an additional delay in having an appeal 
adjudicated. In the opinion of some of the attorneys, the long-
term solution to the supreme court's backlog problems lies in 
internal procedural changes, such as more extensive use of oral 
argume~t, use of memoranda opinions, and justices sitting in 
departments Tather than en bane on most cases. 
La Junta. Two recommendations were made favoring the creation 
of an intermediate appellate court and an increase in the size of the 
supreme court. There was a differen½e of opinion among attorneys 
favoring an intermediate court as to whether appeals to this court 
should be final. Some favored limiting the kinds of appeals which 
may be taken to the intermediate court, with that court's decision 
either to be final or subject to certiorari review by the supreme court. 
Others felt that appeal to the intermediate court should be allowed in 
all cases, regardless 6f whether further appeal could be taken to the 
supreme court. There was no objection to district judges either sit-
ting on an intermediate court or assisting the supreme court, as long 
as this service did not involve the judges from the 15th and 16th 
districts. 
Fort Collins. There was no general agreement on any method 
to reduce the supreme court backlog. There was some expression of 
favor for the creation of an intermediate court of appeals, at least 
on a temporary basis. The three district judges opposed having 
district judges sitting on an intermediate court on the grounds that 
district judges should not be sitting in judgment on the decisions 
of other district judges. Further, such service by district judges 
could easily result in an increased backlog in the trial court. As 
an alternative it was suggested that the right of appeal be limited. 
A proposal by the judicial administrator that district judges assist 
the supreme court in opinion writing met with limited enthusiasm. 
There were two objections: 1) that the district judge would be 
functioning as a law clerk, \Jhich would be a waste of judicial man-
power; and 2) that opinions should be written by members of the court 
and district judges should not write opinions unless participating 
with the status of a supreme court justice. 
Fort Morgan. There was considerable opposition to the use 
of district judges to write supreme court opinions. The district 
judges felt that it was unwise for trial and appellate judges to work 
too closely together. Fear was expressed that district judges would 
not be available for trial court work in their home districts. It 
was suggested that appellate review was the responsibility of judges 
elected for that purpose. It was also felt that the district judges 
would have insufficient time to handle opinion writing adequately. 
As alternatives it was suggested that either the right of appeal be 
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Golden. In general, the judges and attorneys present stated 
they would go along with the proposal to have retired supreme court 
justices and district judges assist the supreme court by writing 
opinions. After some consideration, this plan seemed more feasible 
as a·temporary solution than either an increase in the size of the 
supreme court or the creation of an intermediate court of appeals. 
Both of these alternatives were considered too costly and not 
necessary in the long run. There was some concern that district 
judges might neglect trial work under this plan, and that although 
it was only a temporary measure it might become permanent. The 
co_ncensus of opinion was that support should be given to any workable 
plan to reduce the supreme court backlog and that the use of outside 
judges for opinion writing was the best suggested thus far. 
Denver. Opinion was mixed but generally favorable to having 
district judges write opinions to assist the supreme court in 
reducing its backlog.l61t was recommended that the plan be dis-
continued as soon as the court becomes current. There was no 
recommendations for an intermediate court of appeals because of the 
expense involved and because Colorado was too small a state to need 
an intermediate appellate tribunal. 
Election'or Selection of Judges 
Glenwood Springs. The attorneys present favored the adoption 
of the Missouri plan for judicial selection, although one qualified 
his endorsement by stating that the Missouri plan would be satisfactory 
only if competent judges were selected in the first place. In his 
opinion, it would not be easy to remove judges from office under the 
Missouri plan, but that it was still preferable to having judges 
participate in politics. 
Alamosa. The two district judges.differed on the election or 
selection of judges. One favored the continuation of election and 
pointed out that the people of Colorado had been offered a number of 
selection plans in the past and had rejected all of them. It was 
his opinion that once a judge is elected and demonstrates competence 
in office, he is usually returned with bi-partisan support. The 
other district judge felt that judges should be appointed and meet 
certain standards to remain in office. He did not favor any partic-
ular method of appointment, however .. Most of the attorneys favored 
the appointment of judges and stressed that all judges should be 
learned in the law. They felt that the quality of justice would not 
be improved until non-lawyer judges were prohibited on all levels of 
the judicial system insofar as practical. 
16. This proposal was authorized and an appropriation made therefore 
by the 42nd General Assembly, second session (1960). See 
Chapter 38, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960 • 
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Grand Junction, The present method of unofficial selection 
in the 7th Judicial District was explained, Each party controls one 
judgeship and the bar association decides upon candidates when a 
vacancy exists. Some of the lawyers felt that this system was a 
poor substitute for a state-wide judicfal selection plan, although 
it was unlikely that any plan proposed would be acceptable to the . 
electorate-. Some of the district and county judges preferred retention 
of judicial election, but others favored some other method but were 
not sure that a selection system could be worked out which would 
offer much substantial improvement. 
Durango. Most of the district and county judges favored 
removing judges from politics, but would favor judicial selection 
only if appointees were referred to the people from time to time to 
determine whether they should be retained in office. It was pointed 
out by the attorneys that the district bar association and the two 
political parties usually agreed on district judge nominations in 
the same manner as in the 7th Judicial District. As an argument 
against the selection of judges, the federal judicial system was 
referred to as autocratic as the result of life appointments. 
Pueblo. The attorneys favored removing judges from politics, 
so that even if they were elected it should be by nonpartisan ballot. 
Tenure was stressed as an important inducement to get qualified men 
in judicial office. Even though a large number of judges are re-
elected continuously, election still does not provide enough assurance 
of tenure. The national trend has been toward judicial selection, and 
the constitutions of Alaska and Hawaii were cited as examples. Most 
of the district judges present, although appointed in the first instance, 
favored election of judges. 
La Junta. The district judges favored some modification of 
the present system such as a nonpartisan ballot~ It was pointed out 
that it is difficult for judges to find campaign issues and that 
voters often lack knowledge of judicial officials. On the other hand, 
neither judge would favor a system where it would be difficult to 
remove incompetent judges from office. On the other hand, the attor-
neys present favored the partisan election of judges, although a few 
would be willing to consider some method of appointment for supreme 
court justices. They stated tt,at election by-and-large had resulted 
in qualified judges in the Arkansas Valley and that once judges demon-
strated they were doing a good job they seldom had election opposition. 
Fort Collins. The three district judges, all of whom had been 
appointed initially, had few comments except to express the opinion 
that judges should be removed from political pressures; for that reason 
nonpartisan .elections might be preferable. It was stressed, however, 
that whatever method of selection might be adopted, local control 
should be retained. Justice O. Otto Moore remarked that the Judicial 
Council had considered this subject but had reached no conclusion. 
He stated that he opposed the Missouri Plan and suggested an alternative. 








initial election, judges, upon completion of their initial terms of 
office, would run on their record rather than against an opponent. 
He felt that the people's right of selection would be retained while 
at the same time providing tenure· for competent judges. In conjunction 
with this proposal, he suggested mandatory retirement at age 70. Two 
of the three county judges and most of the attorneys favored judicial 
appointment rather than election, perhaps along the lines of the 
Missouri Plan, although some of the attorneys felt Justice Moore's 
proposal had considerable merit. 
- Fort Mor~an. There was general objection to the appointment 
of judges. Int e 13th Judicial District, it was explained, judicial 
candidates are normally acceptable to the bar association; and the 
Morgan County Bar Association consults with the board of county com-
missioners on the appointment of a county judge, should.there be a 
vacancy. The Missouri Plan was opposed because the appointment method 
i~volved was considered more political in nature than judicial election. 
Golden. In addition to some support among judges and attorneys 
for retention of the present method of election, several alternatives 
were suggested. Two district judges and some of the attorneys favored 
· nonpartisan election. One district judge favored initial appointment 
by the governor with senate approval and subsequent referral to the 
voters on a nonpartisan basis. Some favor was expressed for the 
Missouri Plan, and one attorriey and one county judge proposed that 
judges be elected on a partisan basis twice, with the second election 
for a life term. The committee was cautioned against combining court 
reorganization and judicial selection in the same proposal, because 
of the likelihood both would be lost. 
Denver. The present method of judicial election was generally 
favored, although some support was indicated for non partisan ballots. 
The suggestion was made that terms of district judges should be stag~ 
gered in multi-judge districts. 
Court Procedures and Internal Operation 
This section covers district court operation and includes: 
court congestion and case backlog, use of pre-trial conferences, court 
rules, and related matters. County courts are not included, as there 
was no evidence of docket congestion, only a very limited need ex-
pressed for uniform court rules, and little comment on other operations 
and procedures aside from the difficulty in obtaining a reporter if a 
transcript is needed. 
Glenwood Sprin1s. Both district judges indicated that there were no case ba~klogsn their districts. In either district a case 
can be brought to trial within two weeks if the litigants agree they 
want the case tried. In the 9th Judicial District, cases are dis-
missed after one year for failure to prosecute; however, attorneys 
are given 30 days' notice, and any explanation by attorneys is· 
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usually sufficient to keep the case from being stricken from the 
docket. Both district judg~s make use of the pre-trial conference, 
although in the 14th Judicial District pre-trial conferences are held 
only in those cases which are scheduled for jury trial. In the 
9th District, court rules make pre-trtal conferences mandatory, and 
they are usually held two weeks prior to trial. 
Alamosa. Pre-trial conferences are held in only five to 10 
per cent of the civil cases in the 12th Judicial District. Formal 
pre-trial conferences are not considered as necessary as in metro-
polita~ districts because attorneys and litigants are quite informal, 
and every effort is made to get together on an informal basis prior 
to trial, if anything can be gained. One judge felt that the limited 
use of pre-trial conferences had been effective in settling cases, 
while the other judge had had little success in this respect. Both 
judges reported that any case can be.brought to trial in 30 days if 
the litigants so choose. The weekly motion day is used to clear the 
docket of dormant cases and to set almost immediate hearings on un-
contested matters, such as quiet title suits and divorces. Both judges 
recommended the appointment of a committee of district judges to pro-
mulgate a uniform. set of rules for district courts. They also stated 
that the 12th District rules needed updating and revision. Most of 
the attorneys agreed that cases could be brought to trial within the 
time limits specified by the judges. It was pointed out that de-
clining economic activity in:the San Luis Valley had reduced case 
filings and a desire for immediate litigation. 
Grand Junction. In the 7th Judicial District cases are dis-
missed if there has been no action for one year, unless cause is 
shown. Both district judges stated that there was little to be gained 
from forcing cases to trial. Despite the increase in filing rate, if 
a case is at issue, it usually can be tried within 30 days. Extensive 
use is made of pre-trial conferences by one of the judges in the dis-
trict, but not by the other. The attorneys agreed that the docket 
was current and that cases could be brought to trial quickly if desired, 
but ihey felt that the increased filing rate might necessitate a third 
judge for the district in the near future. 
Durango. One district judge stated that the docket was further 
behind than it should be, that there were too many old cases on the 
docket in all counties in the district. He added that attorneys were 
at fault in many instances, but that the court was lax in prodding 
them, although there was a one-year dismissal rule for lack of action. 
He disagreed somewhat with the other district judge's observation that 
a case could be brought to trial in two weeks (slightly longer for a 
jury trial). He said that a trial could be held that quickly in an 
emergency, but only if other matters on the docket were postponed. He 
said that patt of the delay resulted from the large number of motions 
filed by attorneys. In 60 per cent of the cases this practice was a 
delaying action. He indicated his support for a rule being considered 
by the supreme court, which would require a brief statement to be filed 
with each motion. The judge could accept or overrule.the motion 


















The attorneys agreed that they were partially responsible 
for the delay in the 6th District, but stated that some cases 
had been at issue six to seven months and still had not come to 
trial and that a few cases had been at issue as long as two years. 
The attorneys felt that the judges should take steps to curtail 
delaying tactics on the part of some lawyers and that more extensive 
use-should be made of pre-trial conferences. 
Pueblo. In the 4th Judicial District, the area to be 
covered is so great and the filing rate so high that it is difficult 
f-0r t~7ee judges to handle the case load as efficiently as they would like. The judges stated that cases usually can be set for trial 
two or three months after they are at issue, but in keeping the 
docket this current there is little time available for research 
in complicated cases. The district has an automatic,dismissal rule 
if there has been no action in a case for one year . 
The lawyers said that it was difficult to get cases set for 
trial in the 4th District during the same court term in which they 
came at issue, especially if a jury trial is requested. They added 
that attorneys were responsible for some of the delay, however. 
Both the judge and the attorneys in the 11th District agreed 
that there was no congestion. Cases can be set for trial within 
30 days, with 60 days needed if a jury trial is requested. It was 
the judge's opinion that cases not tried are usually pending for 
good reason. Instead of dismissing cases for lack of action, he 
sets them for trial and gives notice. This procedure is a good 
way to dispose of cases, in his opinion. 
The 3rd Judicial District can handle more work than the 
court now has; consequently litigants can get to trial in a short 
period of time if they wish. 
In the 10th District, the docket is usually filled two 
weeks after term day, so that it is dif.ficult to get a case to trial 
quickly. If a criminal case set for trial is not tried, no attempt 
is made to use the available time for a civil action. A third judge 
is needed but facilities are not presently available in the court-
house. The opinion was expressed that some lawyers were dilatory in 
the 10th District and that the judges were too lenient. One reason 
for delay in civil actions was the amount of time spent by the judges 
on domestic relations cases -- estimated at 30 to 40 per cent. 
La Junta. The lawyers indicated that there was no difficulty 
in getting cases tried in either the 15th or 16th Judicial Districts. 
In the 15th district, the judge stated that he had two cases per week 
set for trial for the next five months; however, half of them would 
17. A fourth district judge was authorized for the 4th Judicial 
District by Chapter 39, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960. 
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not be tried for one.reason or another, so that time would be 
available if a trial were requested for a case not yet scheduled 
or if a request were made to move a case up on the docket. In the 
16th District, the judge said he could set a case for trial within 
60 days, but it would take longer if•more than a one day trial was 
anticipated. Both judges commented on the difficulty in setting jury 
trials during harvest season. The judge in the 15th District sent 
out "no progress'' letters on cases three and four years old when he 
took office. This action resulted in numerous complaints from 
attorneys who said that even if these cases were at issue it was no 
concern of the judge whether or not they are tried. 
Fort Collins. In the 8th Judicial District, it would be 
three to four months before a case not already set for trial could 
be tried, according to the three district judges. The judges 
explained that the docket was filled, because there had been an 
unusually high number of jury trials in recent months, including 
several murder cases. The attorneys complained that often cases are 
tried too quickly in the 8th District. They also objected to the 
automatic six-months' dismissal rule with no notice given attorneys. 
If there has been no action for six months, the case is automatically 
dismissed, even if the case is at issue. 
Some of the attorneys said that the district judges told 
them that cases should be tried or dismissed because the supreme 
court wanted the dockets kept current. Justice Moore commented that 
it was not the supreme court's attitude that all cases should be 
tried. The supreme court has no desire to compel trial when the 
litigants don't wish to try the case. If one litigant wishes to go 
to trial, then a trial should be held as soon as possible. The 
judicial administrator said that the district court should keep a 
close check on the docket and find out why cases are not being 
brought to trial; then if there is no reason for trial, the case 
should not be set; but the court has a responsibility in the matter 
and should not depend entirely on the opposing counsels. In defense 
of the six-months' automatic dismissal rule, the district judges 
pointed out that attorneys could inform the court at any time during 
the six months on the status of the case and the reasons why there 
hasn't been any action, and they agreed that the court had a 
responsibility to see that there is no undue delay in getting cases 
to trial. 
~re-trial conferences are used to a limited 
district. The judges were of the opinion that they 
helpful in clarifying issues in complicated cases. 
felt that pre-trial conferences were not helpful as 
used at present. They recommended that the federal 
trial procedure be adopted. 
extent in the 
were extremely 
Some attorneys 







Fort Morgan. The district judges said that the dockets were 
current in the 13th Judicial District. There were some old cases, 
but only because neither party had requested trial. The district 








receive copies of the docket. The attorneys generally were in 
agreement on the current status of the docket and approved of the 
procedures being used on dismissal. Formal pre-trial conferences 
are used only in complicated cas~s. The usual practice is for the 
attorneys and judge ·to get together on an informal basis. 
Golden. In the 17th Judicial District all cases at issue 
have been set for trial. Because of the increased filing rate, 
it was expected that starting in January 1960 it would take si~ 
months for a case at issue to come to trial. The attorneys commented 
that the docket situation was the same in both the 17th and 18th 
Judicial districts. With the addition of a judge in each of these 
districts following the 1960 general election, the dockets in both 
districts should become more current; although if the number of 
cases filed continues to increase at the same. rate as during 1959, 
there still may be insufficient judicial manpower. In the 1st 
Judicial district, the judges reported that the criminal docket was 
up to date and that other cases could be brought to trial in two to 
four months, if not already set. The attorneys in the 1st District 
were of the opinion that both the criminal and civil dockets were 
current. 
One of the judges in the 1st District stated that he used 
pre-trial conferences in almost all civil cases and found them very 
effective. The other two district judges felt that pre-trial 
conferences would be more useful if the federal rules were followed. 
The judge in the 17th Distritt said that pre-trial •conferences 
should not be used to force settlement. He found them useful in 
some cases and holds them at the attorneys' request. 
I 
Denver. The district judges were of the opinion that the 
docket was fairly current, considering that the 2nd Judicial District 
had over 8,000 cases filed annually. Cases are being set for trial 
five to six months after they reach issue. Revised internal pro-
cedures and th~ cooperation of attorneys has resulted in a large 
number of old and dormant cases either being tried or dismissed. 
The committee was cautioned that a fetish for statistics should not 
be substituted for judicial competence; the evaluation of justice 
should not be based on the disposition rate. The complaint was 
made by one of the district judges that attorneys often wait until 
the day of trial to inform the court that a settlement· has been 
reached. This is expensive because a reporter has been assigned to 
the case and often a jury has been called, and it is a waste of 
docket time, because it is difficult to substitute another trial. 
A court rule was suggested requiring attorneys to notify the court 
within five days of settlement. 
Different views were expressed on the use and value of pre-
trial conferences. Several judges said they used pre-trial 
conferences extensively,_and one judge said that such conferences. 
were mandatory in his division. Other judges said that it depended 
on the case, the circumstances, and the attorneys involved as to 
whether pre-trial conferences were desirable. 
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Docket_Analysis Results 
While statistics do not tell a complete story of the operation 
of the court system, used properly they serve a very necessary function, 
not only in day-to-day judicial administration, but also in court 
reorganization studies. In the opinion of the committee these data 
are of assistance: 1) in describing how the court system is operat-
ing at present; 2) in pointing to particular court organization 
problems; and 3) in providing a guide for the evaluation of proposals 
for modifying or reorganizing the court system. The supreme court 
docket analysis was considered necessary for somewhat different 
reasons. It was hoped that the docket analysis would help explain 
or at least describe the continued increase in the court's backlog 
and that this information would be helpful in evaluating both immediate 
and long run recommendations to reduce the backlog and keep the court's 
docket current. 
Supreme Court Docket Analysis 
The annual case filing rate in the supreme court almost 
dpubled between 1950 and 1959. In 1950, 118 cases were filed as com-
pared with 412 in both 1958 and 1959. However, the filing rate 
decreased somewhat during the flrst ten months of 1960. There were 
306 cases filed during this ten-month period, and if this rate were 
maintained for the remainder of the year, the annual total would be 
approximately 370 cases. 
On January 1, 1950, 167 cases were pending before the court. 
The number of pending cases more than tripled by January 1, 1960, 
when there were 523. Of course, a large proportion of pending cases 
are not at issue (ready for trial); however, the proportion of 
pending cases at issue has increased steadily since 1956, when 90 
of the 161 cases pending, or almost 45 per cent, were at issue. As 
of January 1. 1960, 318 of the 523 pending cases, or almost 61 per 
cent, were at issue. This ratio increased slightly during the first 
ten months of 1960. As of November 1, 275, or 62.5 per cent, of the 
440 cases pending were at issue. 
Case Disposition. The number of cases closed has been less 
than the filing rate in each of the years from 1950 through 1959, 
with the exception of 1954, when 269 cases were closed as compared 
with 252 filed. In 1958, 127 fewer cases were disposed of than were 
filed. The court reduced this disproportion considerably in 1959, 
when 372 cases were closed and 412 cases filed. During the first 
ten months of 1960, the court had disposed of 389 cases as compared 
with 306 filed. If this disposition rate continues through the last 
two months, disposals will probably exceed filings by more than 
100 cases in 1960. 
One of the major reasons for the court's great increase in 
case dispositions has been the assistance in opinion writing provided 









1960,52 opinions had been written by retired supreme court justices, 
district judges, and qualified county judges called in to assist the 
supreme court. An additional 26 opinions were being written but had 
not yet been submitted to the court. In all, one retired supreme 
court justice, 24 district judg~s, and four county judges had assist-
ed the court through October 30, 1960. 
Funds to pay expenses and small honorariums to these•judges 
were authorized by the General Assembly in 1960. The docket status 
in each trial court is taken into consideration in determining which 
j.udges are invited to sit with the supreme court. The invitations 
are distributed as evenly as possible to avoid depriving any area of 
a trial judge or judges for an extended period. An invited outside 
judge does not have a voice in the court's decision, rather he 
reviews the briefs, sits with a department of the court during oral 
argument and while it deliberates its decision, and then if he is 
in agreement he writes the opinion on which the court's decision is 
~ased. 
Written Opinions. The number of the court's written opinions 
increased from 154 in 1950 to 160 in 1958. In 1959, however, the 
court wrote 256 opinions, an increase of 60 per cent over the 
previous year. During the first ten months of 1960, the court had 
written 297 opinions, 52 of which were written by outside judges 
as indicated above. If this rate were maintained for the remaining 
two months, the court would have in excess of 360 written opinions 
for the year. 
Table I shows a year-by-year recapitulation of the cases 
filed and disposed of, written opinions, and cases pending and at 
issue for each year 1950 through October 30, 1960. 
Reversals. In addition to population growth and economic 
expansion, a high reversal rate has been suggested as a reason for 
the increase in the number of cases filed in the supreme court. In 
other words, if a litigant had a one in three or two in five 
possibility of obtaining a reversal, he might bring an appeal, where 
he might not if the possibility of reversal were considerably less. 
An analysis of the number and proportion of reversals in cases 
before the supreme court shows that from 1953 through 1959, 485 of 
1,437 cases disposed of on writs of error or almost 34 per cent were 
reversed entirely, and an additional 62 cases were either modified 
or reversed in part. In all, slightly more than 38 per cent of the 
cases before the court on writ of error during the seven years 
(1953 through 1959) were reversed or modified to some extent. A 
year-by-year analysis of reversals is shown in Table II. 
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TABLE I 
Cases Before the Colorado Supreme Court 
1950-1959 
Cases Cases At Cases Number 
Pending Issue Cases Cases Pending Of Written 
Year Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Filed Total Closed Dec. 31 O.Qinions 
1950 167 218 385 204 181 154 
1951 181 188 131 
1952 a 199 568a 399a 169a 138 
1953 169 330 499 284 215 175 
1954 215 252 .467 269 198 162 
..... 1955 198 287 485 284 201 184 0 
0 
1956 201 90 301 502 2ql 241 161 
1957 241 133 345 586 230 356 195 
1958 356 221 412 768 285 483 160 
1959 483 295 412 895. 372 523 246 
1960b 523 318c 306 829 389 440 297d 
a. 1951 ana 1952 combined. 
b. Through October 31, 1960. 
c. As of November 1, ·1960, 275 cases were at issue. 
d. Includes 52.by outside judges. 




















Number of Reversals, Cases Heard on Error 
Colorado Supreme Court 1953-1959 




































% Modified In Part 
35.24 3 4 
30.63 1 8 
25.32 4 7 
26.42 1 2 
35.84 1 6 
47.78 1 6 
37.61 1 17 










b. Includes 1 judgment reversed on petition for rehearing. 










A relatively high reversal rate, however, does not necessarily 
lead to an increase in cases taken on writ of error to the supreme 
court. Nebraska's supreme court, for example, has a reversal rate 
similar to Colorado's and yet the number of cases appealed annually 
is about one-half the number· in Colorado. In part, this difference 
might be explained by the fact that Nebraska's population and economic 
growth has been very small in the past decade, especially when com-
pared with Colorado's. Even with a population approximately 83 per 
cent of Colorado's, it might be expected that the filing rate in 
Nebraska would be less than 83 per cent of Colorado's, even with a 
similar reversal rate, but more than 50 per cent if the reversal rate 
was a definite causal factor in the number of appeals filed. 
In the long run, the reversal rate probably would not be an 
important factor in the number of cases filed. It might be expected 
in states with high filing rates that eventually the reversal rate 
might be reduced, because of the number of unmeritorious matters 
appealed to the supreme court. Conversely, if there are a small 
number of cases appealed, it might be assumed that there would be a 
higher proportion of meritorious matters, which could increase the 
reversal rate. 
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Source of Cases Filed in Su reme Court. In 1959, 87.5 per 
cent oft e cases i ed int e supreme court originated in the 
district courts, and almost nine per cent originated in the county 
and superior courts. Almost four per cent of the cases were original 
proceedings. As might be expected, the largest number of appeals 
(144 or 35 per cent) originated in ilie 2nd Judicial District 
(Denver)l where 40 per cent of all district court cases are docketed. 
Other districts in which the number of appeals exceeded five per 
cent of the total cases filed in the supreme court for the year were 
the 1st, 8th, and 18th Judicial Districts. Table III shows the source 
and ty.pe of cases filed in the supreme court in 1959. 
These data are useful only for descriptive purposes. In and 
of themselves they provide no reasons for the increase in supreme court 
filings. In the course of making the supreme court docket analysis, 
attention was focused not only on the courts where appeals originate 
but upon the trial judges as well. It was decided that any analysis 
made on this basis would be extremely presumptuous for several reasons: 
1) Some cases would be appealed regardless of the trial judge. 2) 
Some trial judges, because of their experience and reputation, may 
preside over more difficult cases than others. 3) Some trial judges 
may have a considerably greater number of cases before the supreme 
court, because they handle a greater volume of judicial business. No 
conclusions can be drawn from the number of supreme court reversals 
per trial judge either,because supreme court opinions often change 
with the changing complexion of the court. 
Delay in Case Disposition. By the end of 1959, the average 
delay between the time a case became at issue before the supreme 
court and was disposed of was 20 month~. (Half of the cases were 
disposed of more quickly and half took longer). 18 The last analysis 
of pending cases at issue before the supreme court was made in 1959 
and was based on the 311 cases at issue as of September, 1959. Of 
these 311 cases, the earliest had come of issue in the third quarter 
of 1957. Only 21 cases, less than seven per cent, were at issue 
prior to 1958, and almost half of the 311 cases became at issue in 
1958. In other words, one-half of the pending cases were at issue 
at least ten months, as compared with 20 months from issue to final 
disposition. This information is shown in Table IV. 
18. Judicial Business of Colorado Courts, 1959, Annual Report of 
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TABLE III 
Source and Type of Cases Docketed in Supreme 
Metropolitan 
District Courts Civil Crim. 
1st Dist. (Golden) 23 4 
2nd Dist. (Denver) 113 21 
4th Dist. (Colorado Springs) 16 4 
8th Dist. (Boulder, Greeley, 
Fort Collins} 27 3 
10th Dist. (Pueblo) ·9 9 
17th Dist. (Brighton) 7 0 
18th Dist. (Littleton) 17 3 
Total-Metro. Dists. 212 A4 
Non-Metropolitan 
District Courts 
3rd Dist. 4 1 
5th Dist. 1 0 
6th Dist. 2 1 
7th Dist. 4 6 
9th Dist. 2 0 
11th Dist. 8 6a 
12th Dist. 2 0 
13th Dist. 12 6 
14th Dist. 2 0 
15th Dist. 6 2 
16th Dist. 3 4 
Total-Non-Metro. Dists. 46 26 
District Court Total 258 70 
County & Superior Courts 34 0 
Other - Original 0 0 
Total for State 292 70 
a. Writs of error from denials of habeas corpus from state 
Source: Judicial Business of Colorado Courts 1 1959, Annual 
, j , 
• J 
• \'·· z I . ~ 
.. " ... • 
Court during 1959 
Cases AQQealed 
Orig. % of 
Proc. Total Total 
2 29 7.1 
10 144 35.4 
0 20 4.9 
5 35 8.6 
0 18 4.4 
2 9 2.2 
6 26 6.4 
25 281 69.0 
I 6 1.4 
0 1 .25 
2 5 L-2 
0 10 2.4 
l 3 .7 
0 14 3.4 
0 ·2 .5 
0 18 4.4 
0 2 .5 
0 8 1.9 
0 7 1.7 
4 76 18.5 
29 357 87.5 
0 34 8.6 
16 ·1& 3.9 
45 407 100.0 
penitentiary. 
Report of Judicial Administrator. 
TABLE IV 
Cases at Issue 
Before Colorado Supreme Court 
As of September 30, 1959 
Date Became 
At Issue Number of Cases 
1957 
3rd quarter 7 
-4th quarter 14 
Total 21 
1958 
1st quarter 32 
2nd quarter 46 
3rd quarter 35 
4th quarter 38 
Total 151 
1959 
1st quarter 48 
2nd quarter 33 
3rd quarter 58 
Total 139 















Type of Cases at Issue. Priority is given by the supreme 
court to criminal cases and workmen's compensation cases. Only four 
criminal cases and one workmen's compensation case were at issue and 
undisposed at the time this analysis was made. Table V shows the 
type of cases at issue as of September 1959, according to the time 
these cases became at issue. Of the categories enumerated, money 
demand cases show the greatest number -- 50, or 16 per cent of the 
total. ~Ihirty-nine or 12.5 per cent were personal injury cases. C6n-
tract cases and cases involving local governmental units totaled 24 
each or almost 8 per cent. Property, probate, and domestic relations 
cases each a~counted for more than six per cent of the total. 
Time Lag - Filing to Issue. Another factor in the delay in 
disposition of cases before the supreme court is the length of time 
it takes for cases to be ready for trial (at issue). At the time the 
1959 analysis was made, half of the cases took more than 5.2 months 
from filing to issue, with the average for all cases, 6.3 months. 
Forty-eight cases or 15.4 per cent of the total took three months or 
less from filing to issue; 144 cases or 46.3 per cent took from three 
to six months; 106 cases or 34 per cent took from six to twelve months; 
and only 13 cases or 4.2 per cent took more than one year. Of these 
latter 13, three cases took two years or more from filing until issue. 
When the delay from filing to issue is added to the time from 
issue to disposition, it shows that the average case disposed of by 

























a. Includes auto. 
b. Other damages. 
. t t l 
\, . 1 t r j ,. ' 1. • ,-·:', I ) .. ~ .., 
TABLE V 
Cases At Issue Pending Before the Colorado Supreme Court 
By Type of Case, As of September 30, 1959 
Time When Cases Became At Issue 
1957 1958 1959 
3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 
_Q_ _g_ Total _g_ _g_ _g_ _g_ Total .l _Q_ _g_ 
4 4 3 5 5 5 18 4 6 7 
1 l l l 3 2 7 2 l 2 
l l 3 7 8 .8 26 10 5 8 
3 4 3 3 13 4 2 5· 
3 l 4 2 2 3 l 8 4 2 6 
l 2 3 2 l 2 l 6 l 2 
l 2 3 2 l 3 
l l 3 5 l 3 12 3 3 4 
l l l 6 3 l 11 5 l l 
4 2 2 l 9 3 ·3 6 
l l 2 2 4 4 11 21 5 5 13 
l 3 4 7 7 l 2 17 5 2 3 
7 14 21 32 46 35 38 151 46 33 58 















c. All cases involving municipal, county, school districts and special districts. 
d. All cases involving the state of Colorado and its agencies. 
e. Includes divorce, separate maintenance, annulment, custody, dependency, etc. 
f. Includes the few criminal cases not disposed of. 
g. Not indicated in docket book. 
J 
1957- Per Cent 
1959 Of Cases 















Almost 20,000 cases were filed in the district courts during 
1958. The number of cases filed by judicial district ranged from 
97 in the 5th District (Eagle, Lake, and Summit counties) to 8,842 
in the 2nd District (Denver). Of particular note is the variation 
in the number of cases filed per judge in the different judicial dis-
tricts. In the urban districts (1st, 2nd, 4th, 8th, 10th, 17th, and · 
18th) and in the 7th District (western slope), the number of cases 
filed per judge ranged from 395 (8th District} to 884 (Denver). In 
the other 10 districts\ the highest number of cases filed per judge 
was 341 (11th District); nine of the districts had fewer than 300 
cases filed per judge. The 5th District was again the lbwest, with 
97. Together the seven urban districts and the 7th District accounted 
for 84 per cent of the cases filed in 1958, with 45 per cent of the 
state total filed in the Denver Dist~ict Court. 
The differences in judicial district populations and in popu-
lation per judge are very similar to the variations in case filing. 
The seven urban judicial districts each have more than 100,000 popu-
lation, according to the 1960 preliminary census figures; Denver is 
the most populous with 491,409. Except for the 7th District with a 
population of 93,803, none of the other judicial districts outside 
the urban area has a population of more than 65,000. Three judicial 
districts (5th, 9th, and 14th) have fewer than 20,000 residents. 
These three districts also have the smallest population per judge. 
The largest population per judge is in the 17th and 18th districts, 
more than 100,000; however, both these districts will have a second 
judge in January, 1961. 
Table VI shows the number of district court cases filed by 
district in 1958 and the number of cases filed per judge, district 
population, and population per judge. 
Trend in District Court Filings, 1950-1958. Slightly in 
excess of 5,000 more cases were filed in the district courts in 1958 
than were filed in 1950. This increase of 36.5 per cent was five 
per cent greater than the state's population growth during the same 
period. The three judicial districts (1st, 17th, and 18th) with the 
greatest population growth also had the largest increase in the number 
of cases filed. The increase in case filings was concentrated in the 
metropolitan districts and the 7th District. Together, these eight 
districts accounted for almost 87 per cent of this increase, or 
4,476 cases. Although five judicial districts lost population, only 
two ·of these, the 3rd and 15th, had a decrease in the number of cases 
filed. The number of cases filed decreaseM by one-third in the 
3rd District and by one-sixth in the 15th. The other three districts 
(12th, 14th, and 16th) which lost population each had an increase of 
approximately 10 per cent in the number of cases filed. Table VII 
shows a comparison of cases filed and population in 1950 and 1958 

































District Court Case Load and Population per Judge, 
by Judicial District, Cases Filed in 1958 
Total Number Population Cases 
District.~./ Populationb/ 
Cases. of per Filed 






















130,957 1,196 3 
491,409 8,842 10~/ 
27,611 234 1 
165,603 1,481 3 
13,773 97 1 
38,427 508 2 
93,803 983 2 
200,020 1,186 3 
19,377 253 1 
117,547 964 2 
31,328 341 1 
38,258 340 2 
65,252 544 2 
16,222 198 1 
24,530 298 1 
35,283 269 1 
119,793 778 1cl 
112,836 845 1cl 
1,742,029 19,357 38 
Clear Creek, Gilpin, Jefferson 
Denver 

































Huerfano, Las Animas 
Douglas, Elbert, El Paso, Kit Carson, Lincoln, Teller 











Archuleta, Dolores, La Plata, Montezuma, San Juan 
Delta, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Mesa, Montrose, 
Ouray, San Miguel 
Boulder, Jackson, Larimer, Weld 
Garfield, Pitkin, Rio Blanco 
Pueblo 
Chaffee, Custer, Fremont, Park 
Alamosa, Conejos, Costilla, Mineral, 
Rio Grande, Saguache 
13th District Logan, Morgan, Phillips, Sedgwick, Washington, Yuma 
14th District Grand, Moffat, Routt 
15th District Baca, Cheyenne, Kiowa, Prowers 
16th District Bent, Crowley, Otero 
17th District Adams 
18th District Arapahoe 
Based on 1960 preliminary census figures. 
Denver had only 9 judges during 1958 and the 1st, 17th, 18th districts 
had a combined total of 3. The judges added in 1959 in these districts 
are included above to show a more current and realistic relationship 
between districts, as the 1959 case filings were similar although 




Trend in District Court Case Loads, 
Cases Filed in 1950 and 1958, by Judicial District 
Di§trict!.I Population Cases Filed 
Percent of Percent of 
1950 195al2,/ Increase 1950 1958 Increase 
1st - 59,826 130,957 118.9 539 1,196 121.9 
2nd 415,786 491,409 18.2 6,998 8,842 26.4 
3rd 36,451 27,611 - 24.3 348 234 - 32.8 
4th 99,770 165,603 66.0 1,055 1,481 40.4 
5th 11,773 13,773 17.0 64 97 51.6 
6th 31,338 38,427 22.6 321 508 58.3 
7th. 82,334 93,803 13.9 628 983 56.5 
8th 161,330 200,020 24.0 898 1,186 32.1 
9th 17,990 19,377 7.7 173 253 46.2 
10th 90,188 117,547 30.3 614 964 57.0 
11th 28,977 31,328 8.1 335 341 1.8 
12th 45,963 38,258 16.8 302 340 12.6 
13th 63,627 65,252 2.6 449 544 21.2 
14th 18,849 16,2~2 13.9 180 198 10.0 
15th 29,256 24,530 16.2 358 298 - 16.8 
16th 39,272 35,283 10.2 243 269 10.7 
17th 40,234 119,793 197.7 260 778 199.2 
18th 52,125 112.836 116.5 417 845 102.6 
Total 1,325,089 1,742,029 31.5 14,182 i9,357 36.5 
J/ Present judicial district composition used for both 1950 and 1958 
to provide uniformity, although some counties were in other districts 
in 1950. 
~I Based on 1960 preliminary census figures. 
Cases Filed by Major Category, Almost 53 per cent of the cases 
filed in the district courts in 1958 were civil actions. Domestic re-
lations accounted for 35 per cent and criminal cases for 12 per cent. 
There has been a significant increase in the number of domestic rela-
tions cases. These cases (including divorce, separate maintenance, 
annulment, and custody actions) increased 53 per cent since 1950 as 
compared with almost 28 per cent for civil cases and 34 per cent for 
criminal. The highest proportion of domestic relations cases is found 
in the urban districts, principally the 1st, 4th, 10th, 17th and 18th. 
The highest proportion of criminal cases (although not the largest 
number of criminal cases} is found in the 3rd, 7th, 12th, 13th, and 
14th districts. In only one district, the 5th, civil actions accounted 
for more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in 1958, and in only one 
district, the 10th, civil actions constituted less than 40 per cent of 
































Table VIII shows the number of civil, domestic relations, and 
criminal cases filed in 1958, by judicial district and by the counties 
within each judicial district. Table IX shows a comparison of civil, 
domestic relations, and criminal cases filed, by judicial district in 
1950 and 1958 • 
In two districts (1st and 17th~ there was more than a 
100 per cent increase in civil cases filed. Both these districts 
had large increases in the number of domestic relations actions 
filed, as well. In the 17th District, 4.5 times as many domestic 
rel:-ations cases were filed in 1958 as in 1950. Two districts, the 
6th and 10th, had more than twice as many domestic relations cases 
filed in 1958 as in 1950, and four others (1st, 5th, 7th, and 18th) 
had increases of more than 100 per cent. Three districts had more 
than 100 per cent increase in criminal cases filed. These districts 
were the 4th, 14th, and 18th. Fewer districts had large increases in 
. the number of civil cases filed. The 1st, 17th, and 18th were the only 
dtstricts with increases substantially above the increase for the state 
as a whole. Four of the five districts which lost population since 
1950 also had a reduction in the number of civil cases filed. The 
12th District had a small gain in the number of civil cases filed, 
despite a loss in population. The 3rd District was the only one in 
which there was a reduction in all three categories -- civil, domestic 
relations, and criminal. The.12th District had a small decrease in 
criminal cases, and the 11th and 15th districts also had reductions in 
the number of criminal cases filed. 
Case Disoosition. An analysis was made of the elapsed time 
between filing and disposition, based on cases filed in 1958. At the 
time this analysis was made (in the latter half of 1959), almost 
75 per cent of the civil actions filed in 1958 had been disposed of, 
as had 85 per cent of the domestic relations and criminal cases. This 
time analysis, therefore, does not indicate the elapsed time on all 
disposed cases, i.e., those filed prior to 1958. If these cases were 
included, the average time from filing to disposition would be greater. 
The average time from filing to disposition would also be greater had 
it been possible to include the elapsed time on those 1958 cases which 
were not disposed of until 1960. With these qualifications, however, 
this analysis gives an indication of how rapidly the cases filed in a 
given year progress to conclusion, because it is based on almost 
80 per cent of the cases filed in 1958. 
Within this 80 per cent, the average time from filing to 
disposition for civil cases was 4.4 months; for domestic relations 
cases it was 4.5 months; and 1or criminal cases, 3.5 months. The 
2nd Judicial District, because of its large case load, had the greatest 
average elapsed time for all th~ee types of cases: civil, 5.8 months; 
domestic relations, 6.2 months; and criminal, 5.2 months. Generally, 
the average time from filing to disposition was greater in the urban 
districts, but in one rural district (the 16th), the elapsed time for 
domestic relations cases was only one-tenth of a month less than in 






Number of Ca&es by Major Category Filed in Di&trict Court& in 1958, ;C! 
by County and Judi~ial District 
• 
121stris;t& ang C2yn;Uflii £1ill D2muUc R~lati!;!!Jlii Cdmlnal Total 
!:!s2.a. Elli !:!2... ££1.... !:!s2.a. Elli No, , . 
ls:t Di§t1:1s;t .. Clear Creek 40 69.0 13 22.4 5 8.6 58 
Gilpin 19 79.2 3 12.5 2 8.3 24 C'. 
Jeffer&on ~78 2.L..2 ~g2 !Q...£ 84 ...1.....2. 1,114 Total 637 53.3 4 8 39.1 91 7.6 1,196 -2ad 12htds;:t Denver 5,101 57.7 2,934 33.2 807 9.1 8,842 
J1:g Di§tds;t 
Huerfano 38 40.0 14 14. 7 43 45.3 95 
La& Anima& 74 ~ 32 ~ 30 ~ 132 
Total 112 47.9 49 20.9 73 31. 2 234 -~:tb Dls:tdSi:t 
Douglas 27 50.0 14 25.9 13 24. l 54 -Elbert" 16 84.2 3 15.8 0 0 19 
El Paso 546 42.l 623 48.0 128 9,9 1,297 
Kit Car&on 25 62,5 8 20,0 7 17,5 40 
Lincoln 17 44,8 11 28.9 10 26.3 38 
Teller 2~ li& 2 1i...2. 2 --2& 33 jl 
Total 657 44,4 664 44.8 160 10.8 1,481 
2:tb District .. 
Eagle 15 65.2 6 26, 1 2 8,7 23 
Lake 27 60.0 11 24,4 7 15 .6 45 
Summit 18 2bl. 8 ll.a,Q 3 ~ 22 
Total 60 61.8 25 25.8 12 12.4 97 
6th District 
Archuleta 13 65.0 6 30.0 1 5.0 20 
Dolores 13 59.l 5 22.7 4 18.2 22 
La Plata 104 50.2 78 37.7 25 12.1 207 
,,, 
Montezuma 130 51.2 87 34.3 37 14, 5 254 
San Juan 3 60.0 2 40.0 0 _Q_ 5 
,., 
Total 263 51.8 178 35.0 67 13,2 508 
7th Dist;rict 
Delta 44 34. 1 22 17.1 63 48.8 129 Gunnison 34 65,4 10 19.2 8 15.4 52 
Hinsdale 9 81.8 2 18.2 0 0 11 • Mesa 214 46,9 146 32,0 96 21.l 456 
Montrose 162 58.5 82 29.6 33 11. 9 277 • Ouray 12 54,6 5 22.7 5 22.7 22 San Miguel 22 2.2.d. Q ~ 2 ll.-..2 3'2 Total 500 50.9 273 27,8 210 21.3 983 ath D1st;r;:1s;t 
Boulder 214 47,8 181 40.4 53 11.8 448 ~ Jackson 10 41.7 5 20.8 9 37.5 24 








.. TABLE VIII - (Continued} ... Pi§trict§ ~ad c2uati1§ llill DQm~s:Uc RelaU2ns Criminal l2lil 
-· llit... .!:£L., llit... .!:£L. !:!2..a. .!:£L. !i2..a. 9th District 
Garfield 72 50.7 39 27.5 31 21.8 142 
Pitkin 35 81.4 5 11.6 3 7.0 43 
Rio Blanco 37 54.4 ll ~ 2Q 22.d 68 
Total 144 56.9 55 21. 7 54 21.3 253 
10th District 
Pueblo 359 37.2 453 47.0 152 15.8 964 
11th Bistrict 
Chaffee 51 52.0 28 28.6 19 19.4 98 
Custer 9 69.2 4 30.8 0 0 13 
Fremont 91 45.3 89 44.3 21 10.4 201 
Park 17 fill& 6 20. 7 2 20.7 22 
Total 168 49.3 127 37.2 46 13.5 341 
Ill 
12th District 
Alamosa 54 49.6 30 27.5 25 22.9 109 
Conejos 25 56.8 7 15.9 12 27.3 44 
Costilla 14 51.9 4 14 .8 9 33.3 27 
Mineral 3 50.0 3 50.0 0 0 6 ... Rio Grande 48 48.0 27 27.0 25 25.0 100 
Saguache 25 ~ 19 ~ lQ 18.5 54 ,,._ Total 169 49_. 7 90 26.5 81 23.8 340 
13th District 
~ Logan 83 44.6 58 31.2 45 24.2 186 
Morgan 103 53.1 39 20.1 52 26.8 194 
Phillips 11 40.8 10 37.0 6 22.2 27 
Sedgwick 19 50.0 11 28.9 8 21.l 38 
Washington 32 64.0 12 24.0 6 12.0 50 
Yuma 36 73.5 7 14 .3 2 12,2 42 
Total 284 52.2 137 25.2 123 22.6 544 ,. 14th District 
Grand 29 63.l 10 21.7 7 15.2 46 ,.._ Moffat 32 48.5 11 16.7 23 34.8 66 Routt 46 53.4 20 23.3 2Q ~ 86 Total 107 54 .o 41 20.7 50 25.3 198 
15th District .. Baca 51 54 .8 32 34.4 10 10.8 93 Cheyenne 15 71.4 4 19.l 2 9.5 21 
~ Kiowa 31 75.6 5 12.2 5 12.2 41 Proweri:; 72 2Qd 45 ll..2 26 ~ 143 Total 169 56.7 86 28.9 43 14.4 298 
16th District 
Bent 28 53.9 14 26.9 10 19.2 52 
.._ Crowley 18 52.9 4 11.8 12 35.3 34 
Otero 87 ~ 25 ~ 31 lLl 183 
5 Total 133 49.4 83 30.9 53 19.7 269 
17th District 
" Adams 382 49.1 339 43.6 57 7.3 778 18th District 
Arapahoe 398 47.1 367 43.4 80 9.5 845 
' 
Grand Total 10,195 52.7 6,795 35.l 2,367 12.2 19,357 ,,,__ 
.. 







District Court Case Load by Type of Case F;iled, 
1950 and 1958, by Judicial District 
District~/ Civil Domestic Relations Criminal 
Percent of Percent of Percent of 
1950 1958 Increase 1950 1958 Increase 1950 1958 Increase 
1st 304 637 109.5 166 468 181.9 69 91 31.9 
2nd 3,943 5,101 29.4 2,436 2,934 20.4 619 807 30.4 
3rd 189 112 - 40. 7 78 49 - 37.2 81 73 - 9.9 
4th 512 657 28.3 468 664 41.9 . 75 160 113.3 
5th 45 60 33.3 10 25 150.0 9 12 33.3 
6th 231 263 13.9 54 178 229.6 36 67 86.1 
7th 358 500 39.7 134 273 103.7 136 210 54.4 
8th 510 552 . 8.2 240 426 77.5 148 208 40.5 
9th 109 144 32.1 29 55 89.7 35 54 54.3 
..... 10th 355 359 1.1 146 453 210.3 113 152 34.5 ..... 11th 155 168 8.4 91 127 39.6 89 46 - 48.3 I\) 
12th 149 169 13.4 70 90 28.6 83 81 - 2.4 
13th 254 284 11.8 122 137 12.3 73 123 . 68.5 
14th 122 .107 - 12.3 39 41 5.1 19 50 163.2 
15th 218 169 - 22.5 -79 86 8.9 61 43 - 29.5 
16th 142 133 - 6.3 61 83 36.1 40 53 32.5 
17th 157 382 143.3 61 339 455.7 42 57 35.7 
18th 228 398 74.6 155 367 136.8 34 80 135.3 
Total 7,981 10,195 27. 7 · 4,439 6,795 53.1 1,762 2,367 34.3 
~/ Present judicial district composition used for both 1950 and 1958 to provide 
uniformity, although some counties were in other districts in 1950. 
I{ !if' •· • • .. • 't-- • • ., ·II -"I - Ii .. 



















elapsed time was less than four months for civil cases and slightly 
more than four months for domestic relations cases. Criminal cases 
were usually disposed of in less than three months • 
Table X shows the average.elapsed time from filing to disposi-
tion for civil, domestic relations, and criminal cases in each judicial 
district • 
Some of the averages shown in Table X need further explanation. 
Both the 6th and 12th districts had very low average times between 
filing and disposition for civil cases; but these averages were based 
on'the disposition of only 60 per cent of the civil cases filed, as 
contrasted with 75 to 80 per cent in most other districts. In those 
districts where the highest proportion of cases filed were disposed of, 
the elapsed-time average reflects actual docket conditions much more 
accurately. 
The low average elapsed time for criminal cases in some of the 
rural and mountain districts, such as the 5th, 9th, and 14th, is a 
consequence of a small number of cases being filed initially, with a 
high proportion of these resulting in guilty pleas being entered upon 
arraignment, which made it possible to dispose of these cases without 
tria 1. 
Since the more complic~ted and contested cases usually take the 
longest time from filing to disposition, these elapsed-time averages 
are based largely on dismissed and non-contested actions. In all 
judicial districts, almost 30 per cent of the disposed civil cases were 
dismissed. These cases were dismissed usually for one of three reasons: 
out-of-court settlement, action dropped by the plaintiff, or lack of 
action resulting in the invocation of automatic dismissal rules. 
Slightly less than 57 per cent of the disposed civil cases were non-
contested matters such as default judgments. Less than 12 per cent 
were non-jury contested cases, and in two per cent of these dispositions, 
jury trials were held. 
There was also a large proportion of non-contested and dismissed 
cases in domestic relations actions. Almost 65 per cent of the disposed 
domestic relations cases were non-contested, and 26 per cent were dis-
missed. Only nine per cent of these cases were contested, with jury 
trials held in only .2 per cent. 
The 8th District had the highest proportion of civil cases 
dismissed, 37 per cent; and the lowest proportion, 13 per cent, was 
in the 11th District. These statistics reflect the information given 
the _committee at its regional meetings. The judges in the 8th District 
reported that the district had an automatic dismissal rule, which 
applied to cases which had been inactive for six months. In the 
11th District, the judge does not dismiss cases for lack of action; 
instead, these inactive cases are set for trial unless notification 
is received from the attorneys • 
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TABLE X 
Average Time from Filing to Disposition, 
Civil, Criminal, and Domestic Relations c;ses 
Filed in 1958, by Juditial District~ 
Disti:ic;t . Civil Dom~s:tic R~la:tions C;riminal 
!!12..... mo, mo, 
1st 4.6 5.1 4.4 
2nd, 5.8 6.2 5.2 
3rd 3.1 5.0 4.0 
4th 3.3 4.3 2.5 
5th 3.4 3.2 1.6 
6th 2.0 3.5 2.1 
7th 2.6 3.1 2.1 
8th 3.5 4.0 2.3 
9th 3.0 3.1 1.1 
10th 2.1 2.5 3.2 
11th 2.4 2.7 1.8 
12th 1.8 2.6 1.6 
13th 3.2 4.3 2.1 
14th 2.8 4.0 • 9 
15th 3.0 3.6 3.0 
16th 2.9 6.1 1.5 
17th 3.1 4.3 4.0 
18th 3.1 2.9 3.5 
All Distri7tsb/ 3.1 3.9 2.6 All Cases.£ 4.4 4.5 3.5 
al In months. 
b/ Unweighted average for all districts. 
cl Weighted according to number of cases. 
The 2nd District had the largest number of jury trials, 70, 
but this number represented less than two per cent of the civil case 
dispositions. Three rural districts (3rd, 5th, and 12th) had the 
greatest proportion of jury trial dispositions, but in none of the 
three did jury trials exceed five per cent of total dispositions. 
Generally, the urban districts had the highest proportion of contested 
non-jury dispositions for both civil and domestic relations cases. 
Table XI shows the number of disposed civil cases (filed in 1958) for 
each judicial district, according to the type of disposition. Table XII 
shows similar data for d6mestic relations cases. 
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TABLE XI 





IH~:tx:is;;:t Qi f Sl~Hi ed a / Non-Contested Non-Jur:y: Jur:y: 
No, Pct. No, Pct. No. Pct. No, Pct, 
1st 502 149 29.7 234 46.6 100 19.9 19 3.8 
2nd 3,686 1,190 32.3 2,095 56.8 331 9.0 70 1.9 
3rd 90 15 16.7 52 57.8 19 21.1 4 4.4 
4th 512 123 24.0 306 59.8 67 13.1 16 3.1 
5th 47 10 21.3 28 59.6 7 14.9 2 4.2 
6th 155 45 29.0 95 61.3 14 9.0 1 .7 
7th 354 101 28.5 197 55.7 43 12.1· 13 3.7 
8th 476 176 37.0 228 47.9 60 12.6 12 2.5 
9th 123 31 25.2 83 67.5 8 6.5 1 .8 
I-' 10th 258 56 21.7 158 61.3 38 14.7 6 2.3 I-' 
lJ1 11th 120 16 13.3 84 70.0 18 15.0 2 1.7 
12th 99 17 17.2 69 69.7 8 8.1 5 5.0 
13th 243 66 27.1 144 59.3 32 13.2 1 .4 
14th 85 23 27.0 52 61.2 10 11.8 0 0 
15th 156 30 19.2 110 ·70.5 13 8.4 3 1.9 
16th 109 25 23.0 68 62.4 14 12.8 2 1.8 
17th 288 86 29.9 172 59.7 28 9.7 2 .7 
18th 261 84 32.2 116 44.5 57 21.8 4 1.5 
Total 7,564 2,243 29.6 4,291 56.7 867 11.5 163 2.2 
al Cases filed in 1958 which were disposed of by the latter half of 1959. 
bl Includes cases dismissed for lack of prosecution, settled out of court, etc. 
TABLE XII 
Type of Disposition, Domestic Rela~ions Cases Filed in 1958, by J~dicial District 
Number -' 
of Cases 1 Dismissedb/ 
-...... Contested Contested 
District Dis12osed~ Non-Cont~s:ted -" N2n-Juri: Jur:t 
No, Pct, No, Pct, No:----- ~ No, Pct, 
1st 435 113 26.0 247 56.8 75 17.2 0 0 
2nd 2,738 738 27.0 1,846 67.4 149 5.4 5 .2 
3rd 46 19 41.3 23 50.0 4 8.7 0 0 
4th 533 134 25.2 344 64.5 54 10.1 1 .2 
5th 25 5 20.0 18 72.0 2 8.0 0 0 
6th 143 36 25.2 98 68.5 9 6.3 0 0 
7th 204 47 23.0 133 65.2 24 11.8 0 0 
8th 385 133 34.5 204 53.0 48 12.5 0 0 
9th 24 1 4.2 22 91.6 1 4.2 0 0 ...... 
10th 333 51 15.3 259 77.8 23 6.9 0 0 ...... 
a,. 11th 96 17 17.7 69 71.9 10 10.4 0 0 
12th 56 17 30.4 35 62.5 4 7.1 0 0 
13th 127 45 35.4 66 52.0 15 11.8 1 . .8 
14th 28 4 14.3 16 57.1 8 28.6 0 0 
15th 60 12 20.0 42 70.0 6 10.0 0 0 
16th 47 25 53.2" 17 36.2 5 10.6 0 0 
17th 298 87 29.2 176 59.1 35 11.7 0 0 
18th 306 56 18.3 189 61.8 61 19.9 0 0 
Total 5,884 1,540 26.2 3,804 64.6 531 9.0 7 .2 
a/ Cases filed in 1958 which were disposed of by the latter half of 1959. 
9.I Includes cases dismissed for lack of prosecution, settled out of court, etc. 






















Concurrent Jurisdiction, The county courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the district courts in civil cases in which the amount 
in controversy is less than $2,000. The justice court'i concurrent civil 
jurisdiction is limited to cases not involving real property or amounts 
in. excess of $300. In theory, such concurrent jurisdiction should keep 
these relatively less important matters out of the district court. An 
analysis was made of the civil cases filed in the district courts in 
1958 to determine how many fell within the jurisdiction of either the 
county or justice courts. 
~ More than 3,000 (30.4 per cent) of the 10,195 civil cases filed 
in the district courts in 1958 involved amounts within the jurisdiction 
of either the county or justice courts. Seventy-seven per cent of 
these 3,103 cases could have been brought in the county courts and the 
remainder in either county or justice courts. In three districts, the 
civil cases which could have been brought in .a lower court equalled or 
exceeded one-third of all civil actions filed (2nd District, 39 per cent; 
13th District, 38 per cent; and 16th District~ 33.l per cent). These 
minor civil cases accounted for less than 15 per cent of the filings 
in only three districts (5th, 8th, and 17th). Table XIII shows the 
number of civil cases filed in 1958 in each judicial district which 
could have been filed instead in either county or justice courts • 
TABLE XIII 
Number of Civil Cases Filed in 1958, 
Under $2,000, by Judicial District 
Total No. Total Pct. 
Civil Under No. Under of Total 
District Cases $300 $300-$2.000 $2,000 Civil Cases 
1st 637 34 92 126 19.8 
2nd 5,101 479 1,513 1.992 39.0 
3rd 112 13 12 25 22.3 
4th 657 15 112 127 19.3 
5th 60 2 6 8 13.3 
6th 263 12 68 80 30.4 
7th 500 25 119 144 28.8 
8th 552 11 69 80 14 .5 
9th 144 4 24 28 19.4 
10th 359 11 58 69 19.2 
11th 168 6 32 38 22.7 
12th 169 8 31 39 23.l 
13th 284 14 94 108 38.0 
14th 107 6 14 20 18.7 
15th 169 9 26 35 20.7 
16th 133 7 37 44 33.l 
17th 382 13 38 51 13.3 
18th 398 19 70 89 22.4 
Total 10,195 688 2,415 3,103 30.4 
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County Courts 
More than 25,000 cases were filed in county courts in 1958; 
43 per cent (10,860} of the total were filed in Denver.19 Four other 
countfes beside Denver had more than ~,000 cases filed, Arapahoe, 
El Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo; and five counties had between 500 
and 1,000. cases, Adams, Boulder, Larimer, Mesa, and Weld. Only one 
other county (Las Animas) had more than 300 cases filed; five counties 
had between 200 and 300; nine counties had between 100 and 200; and 
38 counties had fewer than 100. 
Probate actions accounted for the largest number of cases 
filed in all counties (32 per cent}; and in 30 counties, at least 
50 per cent of all cases filed were probate. Juvenile cases accounted 
for almost 30 per cent of the total; civil actions, 18 per cent; mental 
health cases, 10 per cent; criminal cases, slightly more than 5 per cent; 
and domestic relations matters, 4.6 per cent. Table XIV shows the num-
ber of cases filed in each county court in 1958, according to the type 
of case. 
Trend in County Court Case Loads 1950-1958. The number of 
cases filed in county court increased 58 per cent between 1950 and 
1958. Generally, this increase was concentrated in Denver and the 
five counties with more than 100,000 population (Adams, Arapahoe, 
El Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo}. Denver and these five counties 
excluded, the other 57 counties had an increase in county court cases 
filed of only 3.5 per cent, which was less than the 5.7 per cent aver-
age population growth of these counties during the same period. Twenty-
nine counties had fewer cases filed in county court in 1958 than in 
1950. These included 26 of the 36 counties which lost population 
during the same period. Seven counties which had fewer residents in 
1958 had slight increases in the number of cases filed in county 
court. A comparison could not be made for three of the counties 
which lost population, because 1950 case load information was not 
available. Table XV shows a county-by-county comparison of popu-
lation and cases filed in county court for 1950 and 1958. 
Relationship between Case Loads and Judicial Salaries. An exami-
nation of Tables XIV and XV indicates the wide variation in county court 
case loads between the 12 largest counties and the remainder of the 
state. To a certain extent, this variation is recognized in the 
statutes setting the salaries of county judges.20 In Denver, the only 
Class I county, the county judge receives a salary of $12,500.21 In 




The totals for the state and Denver include the cases filed in 
the Denver Juvenile and Superior courts, whose jurisdiction is 
exercised in the rest of the state by the county courts. 
56-2-3 and 56-2-4, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, as amended. 






C:;i GeS Filed in County Courts in lG":>8, by Type of Case 
Domestic Menta 1 
Totill:.l' rounty r ·iv'·· l r:Platiom. T ncornnp+pnt. Probate Juvenile <:r imi n;il 
Ne\. --· f'ct. iln. Pct. " Pct. lli'LL Pct. No, Pct, !:.!0 -:-· 1.,-,J . ~h 
l\d.irn'. 1 :)1) 12.fl '57 6. l S6 6.n lP-1 10.7 -1:12 ,1 f,. -~ w) 'I. l '1:M 
/\ la~'io~.;1 31 26. ':J 3 2.6 16 13.7 J') :n.J ~~? lU.H (, ',. l JJ'/ 
Arn1)t,ho~: 1 ':l 1 1'1 .8 116 11.3 11() l n. ·1 2rn 2H.6 ?TT '.>7 .1 Tl L,02-1 
,\rchuleta 4 14. 3 3 10.7 4 14. 3 13 ,t6. ''., 2 7. l 2 i. { 2P 
Paca 11 LLB 4 5.0 ") 6.2 44 'J'i. 0 10 } '.). '1 6 .. ~ ~~' BO 
Bent 12 17.9 0 0 13 19.4 40 '50.7 l l . 'l l I. 'j 6"/ 
Boulder 120 16.0 46 6.2 74 9.9 319 42.6 143 19.1 4(, (,. 2 74B 
Chaffee 22 16. 1 8 5.9 l '5 10.9 67 48,9 21 15. 3 4 7. <) 137 
Cheyenne 2 6.7 1 3.3 2 6.7 l '5 '50.0 8 26.6 2 6. ·, 30 
Clear Creek 8 8.9 3 3.3 10 11. 1 2'5 27.8 9 10.0 35 38.9 90 
Conejos 11 13. 9 2 2. '5 4 '5. 1 38 48.1 20 2'5.3 4 ">. 1 79 
Costilla '5 13.2 '5 13.2 0 0 20 52.6 7 18.4 l. 7.6 38 
'Crowley 2 7. 1 0 0 2 7. 1 19 67.9 2 7. 1 3 · l O. 8 28 
Custer l 7,7 0 0 0 0 11 84.6 1 7.7 0 n 13 
Delta 31 11.3 35 12.7 33 12.0 111 40,4 22 8.0 43 l'L 6 27':J 
Denver!2/ 2,391 22.0 204 1.8 1,038 9.6 2,508 23. 1 4,343 40,0 376 3. "> 10,860 
Dolores 5 26.3 2 10.5 4 21.0 4 21.0 3 15 .B 1 5.3 10 
Douglas 6 7.7 13 16. 7 5 6.4 34 43.6 11 14 .1 9 l l."J 78 
Eagle 6 11. 1 3 5.6 5 9.3 24 44.4 6 11. 1 10 HJ.", '54 
Elbert / 4 10,8 2 5.4 2 5.4 24 64.9 5 13. '5 0 0 37 
El Paso.£. 261 15. 3 78 4,6 236 13.8 577 33.8 473 27.7 83 4.8 1,708 
Fremont 9 4. 1 1 .5 26 11.8 136 61.5 39 17.6 10 4. :, 221 
Garfield 23 15.5 24 16.2 9 6. 1 78 52.8 7 4.7 7 4.7 148 
Gilpin 0 0 1 5.3 3 15.8 7 36.8 5 26.3 3 l "J. 8 19 
Grand 12 22.2 9 16.7 2 3.7 19 35.2 12 22.2 0 0 54 
Gunnison 18 26.1 11 15.9 1 1,4 35 50.7 4 5.8 0 0 69 
Hinsdale 2 66,7 0 0 0 0 1 33.3 0 0 0 0 3 
Huerfano 8 4.2 15 7. q 18 9.5 89 47,l 46 24.4 13 6. q 189 
Jackson 2 50.0 0 0 2 '50,0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Jefferson 205 19.6 33 3.2 86 8.2 347 33.1 312 29.8 64 6. 1 I ,047 
Kiowa 2 6.9 2 6.9 1 3.4 20 69.0 4 13.8 0 0 29 
K,i t r:arson 10 12.3 4 4.9 5 6.2 44 54.3 3 3.8 15 18.5 81 
Lake 7 9.0 6 7,7 9 11.6 48 61.5 4 5.1 4 5 .1 78 
La Plata 41 18.2 17 7,5 16 7.0 124 54.6 26 11.4 3 1.3 227 
Larimer 102 17. 1 42 7,0 49 8,2 279 46.7 113 18.9 12 2. l C.)97 
Las Animas 32 9.8 32 9.8 37 11.4 124 38.l 94 28.8 7 2.1 326 
Lincoln 2 4.3 3 6.5 1 2.2 35 76 .1 4 8,7 l 2.2 46 
Logan 6 2.8 0 0 26 12.3 122 57.5 57 26.9 1 .5 21? 
Mesa 161 22.6 77 10.8 48 6.7 272 38.3 149 20.9 '5 ,7 712 
Mineral 0 0 0 0 1 20.0 4 80.0 0 0 () 0 ") 
Moffat 12 12.8 5 5.3 9 9.6 50 53.2 14 14. 9 4 4.2 q4 
Montezuma 79 41.l 17 8.9 9 4.7 45 23.4 34 17. 7 8 4.2 192 
Montrose 20 11.6 0 0 21 12.2 85 49.4 36 20.9 10 '5. 9 172 
Morgan 7 4.1 l .6 16 9.4 97 57.l 45 26.5 4 2.3 170 
Otero 10 4.9 7 3.5 22 10.9 141 69.9 21 10.4 1 .4 202 
Ouray 2 14. 3 0 0 3 21.4 8 57.l 1 7,2 0 0 14 
Park 4 16. 7 2 8.3 l 4.2 15 62.5 l 4.2 l 4.2 24 
Phillips 8 18.2 l 2.3 l 2.3 31 70.4 3 6.8 0 0 44 
Pitkin l 7.1 3 21.4 0 0 8 57.1 l 7.1 1 7.1 14 
Prowers/ 14 8.7 10 6.3 12 7.5 82 51.3 20 12.5 22 13.7 160 
Pueblo!:!. 425 20.8 151 7.4 296 14. 5 569 27.9 337 16.5 263 12.9 2,041 
Rio Blanco 4 7.7 4 7.7 5 9.7 36 69.l 3 5.8 0 0 '52 
Rio Grande 23 17 .4 3 2.3 17 12,Q 59 44.7 23 17.4 7 '5. 3 132 
Routt 14 14.4 9 9.3 4 4. l 48 49.4 20 20.6 2 2.0 07 
Sagu;iche 2 2.9 0 0 6 8.7 44 63.7 9 13. 0 8 11.6 6Q 
San Juan 2 16. 7 2 16. 7 2 16. 7 5 41. 7 1 8.3 0 0 l? 
San /.'.iguel 14 35.0 0 0 0 0 19 47.5 6 15. 0 1 2. '5 4 () 
Sedgwick l 1.9 5 9.4 3 5.7 24 45.3 16 30.2 4 7. '5 '°13 
Summit 8 34.8 l 4.3 2 8.7 9 39.2 l 4.3 2 8.7 23 
Teller 4 11.4 6 17.2 4 11.4 19 59.3 l 2.9 1 2.9 3'.> 
Wa~hington 17 18.4 1 1.1 14 15.2 51 55.5 7 7.6 2 2.2 92 
Weld 105 12.8 62 7.6 61 7.5 378 46.3 176 21.5 35 4.3 817 
Yuma 3 3.1 0 0 8 8.3 69 71.1 13 13.4 4 4.1 r17 
Total 4,625 18.4 1,152 4.6 2,490 9.9 8,085 32.l 7,486 29.8 1,319 5.2 25, l ') 7 
al Does not include birth certificates. bl Totals for county, superior, and juvenile courts. cl Includes unoff ic ia 1 cases: El Paso, 231 juvenile cases plus 242 unoff ic ia 1 cases. 






































































































































Comparison of Cases Filed in County Court 







































































































































































































Based on 1960 preliminary census figures. 






































































































































Includes 4,343 cases in Denver Juvenile Court and 2,378 cases in Denver Superior Court; per cent 
of increase for Denver Juvenile Court, 1950-1958, 43.5; for Denver County Court (total used here 
for 1958 includes Denver Superior Court cases, which were filed in County Court in 1950), 242.3. 
Does not include Archuleta, Mineral, and Summit counties, for which data werP not available. 
These three counties had an estimated total of 50 cases in 1950. 
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Class II A: Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, El Paso, 
Jefferson, Larimer, Pueblo, and Weld 
Class II B: Las Animas, Mesa, and Otero 
' 
Clas 9 III A: Delta, Fremont, Garfield, La Plata, 
Logan, Montrose, Morgan, Prowers, and Rio Grande 
Class III .B: Huerfano and Yuma 
Class III C: Alamosa, Baca, Bent, Conejos, Kit 
Carson, Montezuma, Routt, and Washington 
Class IV A: Chaffee, Costilla, Crowley, Douglas, 
Eagle, Elbert, Grand, Gunnison, Lake, Lincoln, 
Moffat, Phillips, Rio Blanco, Saguache, and 
Sedgwick 
Class IV B: Archuleta, Cheyenne, Clear Creek, 
Kiowa, San Miguel, and Teller 
Class V: Custer, Dolores, Jackson, Ouray, Park, 
and Pitkin 
Class VI A: Gilpin, San Juan, and Summit 











When these judicial salaries, as well as total expenditures for 
county court operation, are related to case loads, as in Table XVI, 
the results show that county courts cost the taxpayers considerably 
more per case in small counties .. This cost differential between 
large and small counties points up the major economic obstacle --
lack of judicial business -- to raising judicial salaries in small 
counties to a level.which would attract attorneys to the position. 
A comparison of judicial salaries and case loads by county classifica-
tions (based on the data in Table XVI). is shown in the following 
tabulation. As shown therein, these cost differentials, however, are 
offset in varying degrees in each county by several intangible factots 
including: 1) the convenience and accessibility of the county court; 
2) court services which cannot be measured by case load; and 3) the 
importance to residents of retaining a court at the county level . 
22. Increased from $9,500 by Chapter 40, Session Laws of Colorado, 
1960. $9,500 is used in this section as the salary in effect 




TABLE XVI 4 ,.. 
Relationship Between County Court Case Loads, Judicial 
Salaries, and Total Court Expenditures, Cases Filed in 1958 i 
., 
Total Judie ial Total Expenditures L 
Number Judicial Salary Court Per 
County Cases Salary Fer Case Ex12enditures Case 
• 
Adams 934 $ 9,500 $ 10.17 $32,842 $ 35.16 
JI Alamosa 117 4,700 40.17 8,793 75.15 
Arapahoe 1,024 9,500 9.28 28,475 27.81 • 
Archuleta 28 3,600 128.57 4,350 155.35 
Baca 80 4,700 58.75 7,600 95.00 
• 
Bent 67 4,700 70.14 8,050 120.14 
Boulder 748 9,500 12.70 30,081 40.21 
,I 
Chaffee 137 4,100 29.93 6,740 49.20 4. 
Cheyenne 30 3,600 120.00 4,710 15.70 
Clear Creek 90 3,600 40.00 4,498 49.97 
~ 
Conejos 79 4,700 59.49 7,484 74.73 
Costilla 38 4,100 107.89 6,825 179.60 -Crowley 28 4,100 146.42 4,883 174.39 ., 
Custer 13 3,000 230.76 3,054 272.30 
Delta 275 5,600 20.36 9,820 35.71 
Denver 10,860a 36,5oob 3.36 _.s,. 
__ c 
Dolores 19 3,000 157.89 3,800 200.00 -Pouglas 78 4,100 52.56 5,300 67.94 . ~ 
Eagle 54 4,100 75.92 5,100 94.44 
Elbert 37 4,100 110.81 4,800 129.72 
-\, 
El Paso 1,708 9,500 5.56 76,800 44.96 
Fremont 221 5,600 25.34 13,660 61. 80 • 
Garfiei,d 148 5,600 37.84 8,800 59.46 -~ilpin 19 2,660 140.00 3,059 161.00 
t',rand 54 4,100 75.92 4,300 79.62 
.:, 
Gunnison 69 4,100 59.42 6,496 94.14 
Hinsdale 3 734 244.67 990 330.00 1' 
Huerfano 189. 5,200 27.51 10,687 56.54 i, 
Jackson 4 3,000 750. 00 3,280 820.00 
Jefferson 1,047 9,500 9.07 44,108 42.13 
t, 
I 
Kiowa 29 3,600 124.14 4,100 141.37 
Kit Carson 81 4,700 58.02 6,100 75.30 • ' 
Lake 78 4,100 52.56 7,433 95.29 • La Plata 227 5,600 24.67 14,400 63.43 


















Total Judicial Total Expenditures 
Number Judicial Salary Court 
£ounty Cases Salary Per Case Expenditures 
Las Animas 326 $ 8,600 $ 26.38 $21,000 
Lincoln 46 4,100 89.13 6,100 
Logan 212 5,600 26.42 13,100 
Mesa 712 8,600 12.08 21,269 
Mineral 5 734 146.80 1,389 
Moffat 94 4,100 43.61 4,736 
Montezuma 192 4,700 24.48 9,200 
Montrose 172 5,600 32.56 10,679 
Morgan 170 5,600 32.94 12,445 
Otero 202 8,600 42.57 16,622 
Ouray 14 3,000 214.28 3,247 
Park 24 3,000 125.00 5,847 
Phillips 44 4,100 93 .18 9,970 
Pitkin 14 3,000 214.28 3,500 
Prowers 160 5,600 35.00 10,974 
Pueblo 2,041 9,500 4.65 64,107 
Rio Blanco 52 4,100 78.84 7,742 
Rio Grande 132 5,600 42.42 9,705 
Routt 97 4,700 48.45 7,293 
Saguache 69 4,100 59.42 6,345 
San Juan 12 2,660 221.66 2,758 
San Miguel 40 3,600 90.00 4,033 
Sedgwick 53 4,100 77.35 5,070 
Summit 23 2,660 115.65 3,247 
Teller 35 3,600 102.85 4,780 
Washington 92 4,700 · 51.08 9,253 
Weld 817 9, ::,oo 11. 63 31,121 
Yuma 97 5,200 53.60 6,537 
a. 
b. 
Combined case load for county, superior and juvenile courts. 
Combined salaries for judges of the above courts. 
































Average Annual Judicial Salary 
County Class Case Load Per Case 
Class I 10,860 $ 3.36 
Class II A 8 counties 1,114 8.53 
Class II B 3 counties 413 20.82 
Class III A 9 counties 191 29.32 
Class III B 2 counties 143 36.36 
Class III C 8 counties 101 46.53 
Class IV ,\ 15 counties) 62 66.13 
Class IV B 6 counties 42 85.71 
Class V 6 counties 15 200.00 
Class VI A 3 counties 18 147.78 
Class VI B 2 counties 4 183.50 
Probate Cases. It is very difficult to determine the amount 
of county court judicial time devoted to probate matters. The number 
of probate cases filed each year presents only a partial indication of 
the relative importance of probate work, because many estates, guardian-
ship,., conservatorships, etc.,remain open for a number of years and 
involve court orders and hearings from time to time. Much of the 
county courts' probate work is administrative, rather than judicial; 
except for contested matters,:much of the work involved is 
perfunctory. 
It is therefore difficult to assess the additional amount of 
time required to handle probate matters resulting from the filing of 
new cases. Even the number of new cases filed is misleading because 
this total includes small estates. These are actions involving less 
than $1,500, which are brought under the small estate law, and are 
usually closed after a court order authorizing the transfer of prop-
erty or funds. In 1958, small estates actions constituted 45 per 
cent of all probate cases filed in the county courts. In eight 
cour,ties, more than 60 per cent of the probate cases filed were small 
estates, and in 13 others, small estates accounted for more than 
half of the new probate cases. Table XVII shows the total number of 
probate cases and the number of small estates actions filed in each 
county court in 1958. 
Concurrent Jurisdiction. In the secion on district courts, an 
analysis was presented of the number of civil cases filed which fell 
within the jurisdiction of the county or justice courts. A similar 
analysis was made of civil cases filed in county courts, which were 
within the justice courts' $300 civil jurisdiction. Almost 26 per 
cent of the civil actions filed in the county courts in 1958 could have 
been brought in justice courts. In several counties, more than 50 
per cent of the civil cases filed were in this category. Table XVIII 
shows both the total number of civil cases filed in each county in 










r- TABLE XVII 
.. Small Estates and Other Probate Cases 
Filed in Coun~y Courts in 1958 -
... Total Pct . 
~ 
Probate Small Small 
County Cases Estates Estates 
l ~- Adams 184 85 46.2% Alamosa 39 16 41.0 Arapahoe 293 123 42.0 
I Archuleta 13 6 46.2 
Baca 44 12 27.3 
Bent 40 12 30.0 ... Boulder 319 171 53.6 
-- Chaffee 67 35 52.2 
r- Cheyenne 15 3 20.0 Clear Creek 25 8 32.0 
l :-
r .. Conejos 38 29 76.3 
! • Costilla 20 12 · 60.0 .. ~ Crowley 19 9 47.4 
Custer 11 2 18.2 ... Delta 111 62 55.9 
Denver 2,508 1,127 44.9 
~ I"' Dolores 4 1 25.0 
,._ Douglas 34 N.A. 
Eagle 24 11 45.8 
~- Elbert 24 15 62.5 ,. 
El Paso 577 205 35.5 .. ., Fremont 136 78 57.4 
.., Garfield 78 38 48. 7 
Gilpin 7 0 
.... "' Grand 19 4 21.0 
... 
Gunnison 35 14 28.6 
r • Hinsdale 1 1 100.0 
- Huerfano 89 46 51.7 Jackson 0 0 r - Jefferson 347 169 48.7 
r Kiowa 20 6 30.0 ... Kit Carson 44 20 45.5 
~ Lake 48 24 50.0 
La Plata 124 53 42.7 








Probate Small Small 
County Cases Estates Estates 
Las Animas 124 81 65.3% 
Lincoln 35 17 48.6 
Logan 122 35 28.7 
Mesa 272 143 52.6 
Mineral 4 2 50.0 
Moffat 50 12 24.0 
Montezuma 45 22 48.9 
Montrose 85 45 52.9 
Morgan 97 48 49.5 
Otero 141 57 40.4 
Ouray 8 4 50.0 
Park 15 6 40.0 
Phillips 31 12 38.7 
Pitkin 8 1 12.5 
Prowers ·82 31 37.8 
Pueblo 569 325 57.1 
Rio Blanco 36 7 19.4 
Rio Grande 59 18 30.5 
Routt 48 27 56.2 
Saguache 44 21 47.7 
San Juan 5 3 60.0 
San Miguel 19 10 52.6 
Sedgwick 24 15 62.5 
Summit 9 N.A. 
Teller 19 12 63.1 
Washington 51 13 25.5 
Weld 378 137 36.2 
Yuma 69 30 43.5 
Total 8,085 3,640 45.3%0 
a. Douglas and Summit counties, for which information on number 
of small estates was not available, are not included. 
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Table XVIII 
~umber of Civil Cases Under $300, Filed in County Court, 1958 
Total No. Per cent Total No. Per cent 
Civil Under of Total Civil Under of Total 
Counti Cases $300 Civil Cases Counti Cases $300 Civil Cases 
Adams 120 26 21. 7. Lake 7 3 42.9 
Alamosa 31 11 35.5 La Plata 41 10 24.4 
Arapahoe 151 31 20.5 Larimer 102 22 21.6 
Archuleta 4 0 Las Animas 32 l 3.1 
Baca 11 3 27.3 Lincoln 2 0 
Bent 12 5 41.7 Logan . (:, 3· 50.0 
Boulder 120 42 35.0 Mesa 161 26 16.l 
Chaffee 22 7 31.8 Mineral 0 0 
Cheyenne 2 0 Moffat 12 2 16.7 
Clear Creek 8 6 75.0 Montezuma 79 21 26.6 
Conejos 11 4 36.4 Montrose 20 14 70.0 
Costilla 5 0 Morgan 7 0 
Crowley 2 0 Otero 10 0 
Custer l l 100.0 Ouray 2 0 
Delta 31 9 29.0 Park 4 2 50.0 r••rY 2,391 626 26.2 Phillips 8 l 12.~i olores 5 0 Pitkin l 0 
ouglas 6 l 16.7 Prowers 14 7 50.0 
agle 6 4 66.7 Pueblo 425 118 27.8 
Elbert 4 0 Rio Blanco 4 0 
El Paso 261 70 26.8 Rio Grande 23 9 39.l 
f:remont 9 5 55.4 Routt 14 4 28.6 
Garfield 23 4 17.4 .Saguache 2 0 
Gilpin 0 0 San Juan 2 0 
Grand . 12 6 50.0 San Miguel 14 2 14.3 
Gunnison 18 6 33.3 Sedgwick l 0 
liinsdale 2 0 Summit 8 0 
Huerfano 8 0 Teller 4 0 
Jackson 2 l 50.0 Washington 17 5 29.4 
Jefferson 205 48 23.4 Weld 105 19 18.l 
~iowa 2 0 Yuma 3 l 33.3 
it Carson 10 4 40.0 
Total 4 ,6:Z, 1,190 25.8 
l I Includes both county court and superior court. 
Table XIX 
Number of Justice Court and Municipal Co4rt Appeals 









































































































































































!_/ Counties in which no appeals were filed in county court include: 
Archuleta, Costilla, Custer, Douglas, Eagle, Elbert, Garfield, 
Grand, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Jackson, Kiowa, Lake, Lincoln, 
Mineral, Moffat, Ouray, Phillips, Pitkin, Rio Blanco, San Juan. 
Sedgwick, and Summit. 
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Justice and Municipal Court Appeals. In 1958, 921 appeals from 
justice and municipal courts were tried in county courts and the Denver 
Superior Court. Seven hundred and four of these appeals were in 
criminal cases and 218 were civil~23 Almost 48 per cent of the total 
number of appeals were brought in Denver, with Adams, Arapahoe, El 
Paso, Jefferson, and Pueblo counties together accounting for another 
third of the total. There were no appeals brought in 23 counties. 
Table XIX shows the number of civil and criminal appeals heard in each 
county court in 1958. 
Justice Courts. An analysis of justice court dockets was made 
in 1957-1958 by the Legislative Council Committee on Justice Courts. 
A summary of the data resulting from this analysis follows: 24 
Approximately 60,000 justice court cases were filed in 1957, 
not including the City and County of Denver. Traffic cases account 
for 60 per cent of the total; civil cases, 29 per cent; and PUC 
violations, game and fish violations and other criminal cases, 11 
per cent. Approximately two-thirds of all justice court cases are 
tried in county seats, and 85 per cent are tried within 15 miles of 
of the- county seats • 
TABLE XX 
Distribution of Counties According 
to Number of Justice Court Cases Filed in 1957 
More than 5,000 cases - 3 counties 
Adams, El Paso, Jefferson 
3,000 to 5,000 cases - 2 counties 
Arapahoe, Pueblo 
2,000-3,000 cases - 4 counties 
Boulder, Las Animas, Mesa, Weld 
1,500-2,000 cases - 3 counties 
Larimer, Montrose, Morgan 
l,OOO~l,500 cases - 2 counties 
Douglas, Montezuma 
750-1,000 cases - 6 counties 
Fremont, Garfield, Huerfano, La Plata, Logan, Otero 
23. Includes municipal ordinance violations. 
24. For a more complete discussion see Justice Courts in Colorado, 




500-750 cases - 4 counties 
Chaffee, Clear Creek, Grand, Lincoln 
250-500 cases - 14 counties 
Alamosa, Bent, Conejos, Delta, Eagle, Gunnison, Kit Carson, 
Lake, Moffat, Prowers, Rio Blanco, Rio Grande, Washington, 
"-t.lma 
100•250 cases - 15 counties 
Archuleta, Baca, Cheyenne, Costilla, Dolores, Elbert, Jack-
son, Kiowa, Ouray, Park, Routt, Saguache, San Miguel, Sedwick 
Summit 
Fewer than 100 cases - 9 counties 
Crowley, Custer, Gilpin, Hinsdale, Mineral, Phillips; Pitkin, 
San Juan, Teller 
Of the 78 justices of the peace included in the docket analysis 
sample, more than half made less than $300 in fees in 1957; only 
nine per cent made more than $2,400, including five per cent who 



















CRIMINAL CODE STUDY -- COMMITTEE PROORESS 
The Colorado criminal code and rules of criminal procedure 
were among the major subjects designated in the two joint resolutions 
authorizing the administration of justice study,l There were several 
reasons why a study of the criminal code was considered necessary, 
While numerous changes ~ave been made in the criminal code over the 
years, much of the language and many of the provisions are archaic 
because there has never been a complete revision, Recent studies 
of probation, parole, and correctional institutions have called 
attention to wide variations in sentencing and the lack of relation-
ship between length of sentence and the offender's prospects for 
rehabilitation, Other related subjects upon which recent attention 
has been focused include the definition of criminal insanity and 
the provision of counsel for indigent defendants. 
Rules of criminal procedure were included in the study because 
no such rules had been adopted in Colorado, although the supreme court 
had promulgated rules of civil procedure in 1941, Legislation recom-
mended by the committee and passed by the General Assembly in 1960 
gave the supreme court authority to promulgate rules of criminal 
procedure.2 A Colorado Bar Association committee has recently com-
pleted a draft of criminal rules after a two-year study, and these 
rules are now being reviewed by the supreme court. 
The committee considered the judicial system study the most 
important of its several assignments. For this reason full con-
sideration of the criminal code was deferred until the work on court 
reorganization was completed, although some study was made of several 
criminal law subjects, 
Among the topics discussed at the committee's regional 
meetings were several which related to criminal law: sentencing, 
probation, parole, definition of criminal insanity, the need for a 
public defender system, and the regulation of bail bondsmen, The · 
docket analysis yielded information on these subjects, along with 
other data on criminal cases. Study was made of sentencing practices 
and parole board composition and authority in other states, as well 
as the recommendations of Colorado law enforcement, correction, and 
judicial officials on sentencing and release, 
As a first step in revising the criminal code, the different 
categories of crime and related penalties in the Colorado statutes 
were compared with similar provisions in surrounding states and in 
certain other states selected as having modern and well-written 
criminal codes, Comparisons were also made with the preliminary 
drafts of the m~del penal code.3 Two proposed statutes were 
I. Senate Joint Resolution No, 16 (1959), and Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 9 (1960). 
2. Chapter 37, Session Laws of Colorado, 1960, 
3. Model Penal Code, Tentative Drafts, The American Law Institute, 
Philadelphia, 1956 • 
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prepared for committee consideration. One was designed to combine 
all illegal acquisition of money, goods, and other property in one 
general theft statute. The other provided a definition of criminal 
attempt and provided the penal ties ·therefor • . 
Originally, the committee was of the opinion that certain 
improvements could be made in the criminal laws prior to a complete 
revision. After further study, the committee feels that a piecemeal 
approach is not advisable and that such changes which it might wish 
to suggest as a result of its study thus far should be made only as 
part of a general revision of the criminal laws. Therefore, the 
only measure recommended by the committee is a bill to permit the 
creation of a public defender office on a single or multiple-
county basis. Because of the amount of work involved in the judicial 
administration study, the committee·was unable to do much more than 
make a beginning on the criminal code. Judging by the experiences 
in other states where the criminal code has been revised recently 
or is in the process of revision, and the comments of experts with 
whom the committee discussed this phase of the study, it will take4 at least two years and perhaps longer to complete this assignment. 
It is the committee's recommendation, therefore, that ·the General 
Assembly authorize the continuation of the administration of justice 
study for the purpose of completing its work on the criminal code 
and related subjects. This report outlines the progress of the 
committee on these matters thus far. 
Sentencing 
In Colorado there is no fixed penalty for the commission of 
a felony. The statutes provide the range for each crime (e.g., 
voluntary manslaughter, minimum sentence of one year and maximum 
sentence of eight years; grand larceny, minimum sentence of one 
year and maximum sentence of ten years; aggravated robbery, minimum 
sentence of two years and maximum sentence of life). Minimum and 
maximum sentences for each offender are set within these limits by 
the district judge who tries the case. This method of fixing 
criminal penalties is known as indeterminate sentencing, which, 
in the broadest sense, is defined as any method of sentencing which 
includes a variable rather than a fixed period of incarceration. 
There have been three major criticisms of sentencing in 
Colorado. First, penal, probation, and parole officials and some 
judges state that the sentences imposed usually have no relation to 
the offender's potential for rehabilitation or to the period of 
incarceration needed before this potential can be realized. More 
than 95 per cent of all offenders committed to the penitentiary and 
practically all offenders committed to the reformatory sooner or 
later are released~ 
4. New Mexico has been working on criminal code revision for five 
years, and the American Law Institute has been working on its 









Second, there is a wide variation in the sentences imposed 
for the same crime. Variation is expected because of previous 
criminal records, extenuating circumstances, and the potential for 
rehabilitation; however, it is argued that the variations in 
sentencing are not always relate~ to these differences. Often 
first offenders will receive a greater sentence for a similar crime 
than repeated violators. These differences in sentence not only 
result in injustices to individual offenders but also limit the 
success of correctional programs. Inmates who feel they have 
received an unfair sentence are less likely to respond to prison 
rehabilitation programs. 
Third, often the spirit and intent of indeterminate sen-
tencing are violated by the imposition of sentences such as nine 
years, 11 months and 29 days to 10 years.5 Such a sentence in 
effect is a fixed sentence, and provides no leeway for early 
release, if such is warranted by the inmate's attitude and per-
formance in the institution. 
A further complicating factor is the present method of 
parole release in Colorado. Each inmate of the penitentiary may 
receive certain statutory good time allowances which are deducted 
from his minimum sentence. This allowance may be as much as two 
months during each of the first two years of incarceration; four 
months for each of the third and fourth years of incarceration; 
and five months for the fifth year and each succeeding year of 
incarceration. For example, an inmate with a minimum sentence of 
one year would be eligible for a parole after 10 months if he 
received his maximum good time allowance; an ihmat~ with a 
four-year minimum sentence would be eligible for parole after 
three years if he received his maximum good time allowance. In 
addition to statutory good time allowances, so-called trusty time 
may be.earned, not to exceed 10 days per month. A first offender 
is eligible for trusty time after he has been in the penitentiary 
for 30 days. An inmate with previous felony convictions is not 
eligible for trusty time until he has been in the penitentiary for 
one year. 
There is some question as to whether there is much rela-
tionship between an inmate's readiness to return to society and 
the amount of statutory good time and trusty time which he may 
earn. The warden of the penitentiary and other correctional 
offici~ls _ag~ee that the granting of good time allowances does 
not necessarily;result in a· release-date which corre~ponds to an 
inmate's readiness to leave the institution. 7 
5. Such sentences are not common, but there are many 9 to 10 and 
4~ to 5 year sentences imposed as shown in §tatistical Report 
and Movement of Inmate Population, Annual Report, July 1, 1959 
through-June 30, 1960, Colorado State Penitentiary, Canon City. 
6. 105-4-4 and 105-4-5, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. 
7. Colorado's Programs in the Fi.eld of Corrections, Colorado 
Legislative Council, Research Report No. 21, December 1956, p. 68 • 
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The Colorado adult parole board has no pow~r to release an 
inmate on parole before he has served his minimum sentence less 
accumulated statutory good time and trusty time. The board is 
reluctant to hold back an inmate from parole if these requirements 
are satisfied, unless the granting of• parole is clearly against the 
public interest. The board recognizes that the institution would 
have a real custody, discipline, and morale problem which could 
erupt and be potentially dangerous to public safety if a high 
proportion of inmates were refused parole. By statute and 
precedent, inmates expect parole after serving the required 
lengtn Qf time, and, in general, the parole board fo~lows this 
policy.8 
Several alternatives to present sentencing and parole 
practices in Colorado h~ve been suggested. These include limita-
tion of judicial sentencing authority, removal of good time 
provisions, appointment of a full-time qualified parole board, 
and the expansion of the parole board's authority for determining 
release based on professional evaluation of the prospects for 
parole success. 
Sentencing in Other States 
The method of sentencing and parole release in several 
other states include the above ·components in varying degrees and 
in several different ways, while others are similar to Colorado 
in these respects. 
In twenty-five of the states having indeterminate sentencing, 
setting the sentence is a judicial responsibility. In six of these 
twenty-five states, one of the two extremes is fixed by statute 
while the other may be varied by the sentencing authority. These 
six states include: Idaho, Michigan, South Dakota, Tennessee, · 
Texas, and Wisconsin. In all, except Michigan, the court may set 
the maximum term but not the minimum, which is set by statute 
(except for Idaho, which has no provision for a particular minimum 
term). In Michigan, the maximum term imposed is the statutory 
maximum, while the judge has the discretion to set the minimum. 
In eighteen of these twenty-five states, the judge sets 
the maximum and minimum at his discretion within the statutory 
limits. These states include: Arizona, Arkansas, COLORADO, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Wyoming. In Georgia, sentence 
is prescribed by the jury within the statutory minimum and maximum. 
In three of these states there are statutory provisions 
designed to prevent a judge from fixing a minimum term so nearly 
identical with the maximum as to approximate a definite sentence 
(e.g., 4~-5 years). The statutes in these states (Maine, New York, 
and Pennsylvania) provide that the minimum term may not exceed half 
.of the maximum term imposed. 























Generally, in these twenty-five states, parole eligibility 
depends upon completion of the minimum sentence. The exceptions 









Earliest Date of Possible 
Parole Release 
when one-third of minimum sentence 
has been served 
at any time, as state has no 
statutory minimum, and none is 
imposed by the court 
after two-thirds of minimum 
sentence, if minimum is two 
years or more 
when one-third of minimum sentence 
has been served, if minimum less 
than 10 years; if more than 10 years, 
must serve one-third of first 10 
plus one month for each additional 
year 
when one-fourth of minimum 
sentence has been served 
with perfect prison conduct record, 
when either minimum or one-fourth 
the maximum has been served, which-
ever is less; with imperfect conduct 
record, one-third of maximum or 
15 years, whichever is less 
after two years, or one-half the 
maximum sentence, whichever is less 
Several of these states allow prisoners time off for good 
behavior. This ''good time" is subtracted from the minimum sentence 
in determining eligibility for parole release, as it is in Colorado. 
In the states which allow release prior to completion of the 
minimum sentence, the parole authority, in effect, has some of the 
powers of a sentence-fixing board, in that it can release an inmate 
sooner than was prescribed in the minimum sentence. It would appear 
that the ~arole authorities in the states where the minimum (less 
good time) must be served still have sentencing discretion, because the 
parole boards have the power to withhold release until the maximum 
is served. 
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Sentence Set by Statute 
In 11 states, the courts have the responsibility only for 
the determination of guilt. T~e sentence imposed is a restatement 
of the maximum and minimum set by statute. These states include: 
California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Utah, Washfngton, and West Virginia •. 
The removal from judicial responsibility of sentencing 
discretion within statutory maxima and minima does not necessarily 
mean that this discretion has been transferred to the paroling 
authority. This tr~nsfer actually takes place only in those states 
where the paroling authority has the power to determine parole 
release at a time prior to the completion of the minimum sentence 
set by statute. These states ( of those enumerated above) includ·e: 
California, Iowa, Utah, and Washington. 
California, of the four states whose parole boards have the 
authority to determine parole release prior to completiori of the 
statutory minimum, appears to have a sentencing system which has 
made a complete break from the placement of sentencing authority in 
the courts and the use of good time and trusty time in considering 
parole release. 
Sentence Determination by Board -- Pro and Con 
Advocates of the approach taken to sentencing by California, 
Iowa, Utah, and Washington present the following principal arguments: 
1) Legal ,training does not necessarily equip judges to be 
able to make proper determination of the sentence to be imposed. 
Consequently, the sentence may bear no relationship to the period 
of incarceration needed to enable an offender to have a chance 
for a successful return to society. Some violators need little 
if any confinement, while others may never be released safely. 
2) The courts, for the most part, lack enough adequately 
trained probation officers to provide judges with sufficient pre-
sentence data to assist them in setting sentences commensurate with 
an offender's possibilities for rehabilitation. 
3) Sentencing practices differ among judges -- not only 
among those whose courts are in different districts, but also 
among judges in the same district. This disparity is known to 
convicted offenders who compare sentences, and it lessens the 
success of institutional rehabilitation programs for this reason. 
4) Length· of sentence can be more adequately and fairly 
determined by a full-time qualified board removed from the immediacy 
of the trial and local attitudes toward the case. This is especially 
true when the board has the assistance of competent professional in-
stitutional personnel who can observe and evaluate the offender 











I~- . r: -
Opponents of proposals to remove sentencing responsibility 
from the judiciary list the following major arguments: 
1) The judge is the person most acquainted with the case. 
He has presided during the trial~ has observed the offender, and 
is acquainted with his record. Consequently, the judge can do a 
better job of sentence setting than a board whose determination will 
be based primarily on secondary, written, reports. 
2) There is no basis for assuming that a board would be 
any better at sentencing than the courts either in respect to 
length of sentence or sentence variation for the same offense. 
In fact, a qualified board could do much worse than the courts, if 
the institutions are not adequately staffed to provide the data the 
board needs. 
3) There is the possibility of recourse in the courts if 
the offender believes that he has been given an unfair sentence. 
What recourse would be available from an unjust sentence deter-
mination on the part of the parole board? 
4) There are institution-wise prisoners who can "con" 
professional personnel as easily as they can accumulate good time 
credits. Institutional conduct may not indicate that a man is 
ready for release, but it does show an effort to get along and 
obey rules and regulations; therefore, it should be considered 
in determining release. 
5) The paroling authority will be subjected to undue 
public pressure 1 and criticism if it exercises sentencing authority. 
Mistakes made by the board will cause public reaction which in 
turn could limit the board's effectiveness by forcing it to be 
more conservative in its actions, regardless of the worthiness 
of the cases before it. 
Parole Board Composition 
A full-time, well-qualified parole board is considered 
necessary for the successful operation of a correctional program 
which places considerable discretion for determining release with 
the paroling authority. Experience and training in correctional 
work, law, social welfare, or psychology are considered prime 
prerequisites for parole board membership. In addition, correc-
tional institutions should be staffed with professional personnel 
who can develop and analyze the data which the parole board needs 
to determine release dates. Some of the states cited above meet 
these criteria in all respects, but more do not. 
Nine states in which either the minimum or maximum sentence 
or both are fixed by law have full-time parole boards. These states 
include: California, Florida, Ohio, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, 
Michigan, Texas, and Wisconsin. Minimum qualifications must be met 
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by parole board members in all of these states except Texas, Utah, 
and Washington. In three states -- Florida, Michigan, and West 
Virginia -- training and experience in corrections and penal work, 
social welfare, and7or the social sciences is required. Qualifi-
cations are somewhat similar in Wisconsin, where parole board 
appointments are made by the civil service commission. The 
seven-member California Adult Authority is composed of people 
with varied professional backgrounds including law, corrections, 
social work, law enforcement, and probation. The board is required 
to include members representing a variety of disciplines, and 
standards are set for each. 
In six of these nine states, parole board appointments are 
made by the governor. In Wisconsin, as previously indicated, 
appointments are made by the civil service commission. The board 
of corrections makes parole board appointments in Michigan, and 
a committee of state executives makes the appointments in Florida. 
Five states have three-member boards (Florida, Texas, Utah, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin); three have five ·members (Michigan, Ohio, 
and Washington); and one (California) has seven members. 
The other states in which sentencing is fixed, at least in 
part, by statute have part-time parole boards. In most -of these 
states, board members are appointed by the governor and there are 
no qualifications for the position. 
Evaluation of Programs in Other States 
Most of the states which limit judicial sentencing report 
satisfaction with their present programs, but stress the need for 
qualified personnel on the parole board and institutional staffs 
to make the program effective. Many of these states report that 
it is difficult to measure program results on the basis of parole 
success for several reasons: 1) Accurate records usually were not 
kept prior to the adoption of the present program, so no comparison 
can be made. 2) There are so many factors involved in parole 
success that no definite evaluation can be made on this basis. 
3) As a result of improved and expanded probation programs, first 
offenders and those violators who have the best chance of rehabil-
itation usually are not sentenced, so that prisons and ultimately 
the parole agency primarily receive the repeaters and hard-core 
failures. The prognosis of parole success for this group of 
violators is not too favorable under any circumstances, and a 
comparison of parole success for this group and a group of parolees 
of a previous year which included more first offenders and other less 
difficult violators would be unfair. 
In general, these states report that their parole success 
would be less if their present programs had not been adopted, 
that further improvement is both desirable and possible, and that 























Comments on Sentencing at Regional Meetings 
Two-thirds of the 27 district judges with whom sentencing 
was discussed at the committee's regional meetings favored a change 
in the method of sentencing. The other nine judges advocated 
retention of the present judicial sentencing authority. Most of 
the judges favoring change felt that the California system had 
merit and recommended that the maximum and minimum sentences be 
set by statute, with the courts' function confined to a determination 
of guilt. One district judge advocated one day to life sentences in 
pll felonies, with the parole board to determine release within this 
range. Another district judge felt that the parole board should be 
given the discretionary authority to determine release at any time 
after six months had been served. These judges were unanimous in 
the opinion that a qualified full-time parole board would be 
necessary to make such a change in sentencing procedures successful • 
Fixed statutory sentences were favored rather than open-ended 
sentences to limit the effect of arbitrary parole board action, 
which might result in incarceration of unjust length • 
Several reasons were given by the district judges in favor 
of adopting a system of statutory sentencing. Some judges said 
that it was not possible to determine at the time sentence is 
imposed what the offender's possibility for rehabilitation might 
be five to 10 years in the future. It was pointed out that legal 
training does not give judges special competence to determine what 
to do with a man after he has been found guilty. Even recognizing 
differences between individual cases, several judges felt that there 
was inequality in the imposition of sentences and that the proposed 
change would provide more opportunity for release on the basis of 
an offender's prospects for a successful return to society. 
The judges who opposed a change in the method of sentencing 
pointed out that the sentencing judge is much more acquainted with 
the case and the offender than any board would be after reviewing 
the record and interviewing the offender months or years after the 
crime had been committed. In imposing sentence, these judges said 
they took into consideration the crime and extenuating circumstances 
as well as the information developed through the pre-sentence 
investigation. 
Attorneys and other judges with whom the committee discussed 
sentencing at the regional meetings were also divided two to one on 
this question; the reasons advanced for both positions were very 
similar to those of the district judges. 
Comparison of Crimes and Penalties in Selected States 
As a prerequisite to the adoption of statutory sentencing, 
an analysis of the crimes and penalties provided by statute is 
necessary to determine whether the penalties are adequate both with 
respect to each crime and in relation to each other. A comparison 
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was made of Colorado criminal categories and penalties with those 
of other states and the model penal code. Mountain and neighboring 
plains states were used for this comparison, except for Wisconsin 
and Louisiana, which were included because of recent criminal code 
revision~ This comparison is shown in Table X~I. Because ·or the 
considerable variation among the states shown in Table XXI with respect 
t6 most categories of crimes, further study is needed to determine 










Death while driving. 
under influence 
Assault & Battery 
Simple 
Assault & Battery 
with deadly weapon 
A & B with intent 




Rape • fore ible 
R~pe • statutory 
Kldn,1pping 
TABLE XXI 
Comparhon of Crime&, Penalties iind Related Provhions, Color11do Rnd Selected Shte& 
COLO!'IADO 
Life or de;i th 
(40-2-3) 












(i day to life if 
r
s,ault to rape)* 
39-19-1) 1-14 yrs, 
40-2-34) 
1-20 yrs, (40-2-24) 
3 yrs. t9 life 
(40-2-281 
3 yrs, to life, if 
male ia over 181 1 
yr, to 5 yrs, if 
male 11 under 18 
(40-2-28) 
Life or death, if for 
ransom and victim 
harmed, 30 yra. to 
life if ransom and no 
harm, 30 yr1, ~ax, 





5-25 yrs, (9'10,02) 
3rd drigree murdllr 
(fel.ony) 15 yrs. 
mn, (940,031 
10 yr, maw, 
(940,05) 
5 yr. maw, 
(940,06) 
5 yr, max, 
(940,09) 
6 mos. max, 
(940,20) 
LOllrnIANA 
Death only 1st de· 
gre", intent, or felony 
murder (14130) 
Same a& above 
21 yr, maw, 
(14131) 
(Negliqent Homicide) 
5 yr, max, (14132) 
No special statute 
Battery 2 yr, max. 
(14:35) Assault, 
90 day maw, (14:35) 
MODrL PENAL 
CODE 
isl doqroo fHlony 
(1-20 to life) Death 
if ag9rnv,, tad 
Same as above 
Second dP.qree felony 
( 1-3 to 10) 
Same as above 
Negligent homicide 
3rd'degree felony 
( 1-2 to 5) 
Mi&dem, (1 yr, max,) 
Aggravated battery 
(intent) 5 yr, max, 
(940,22) depraved 
heart - battery 
Battery - 10 rrs. maw, Second degree felony 
(14:34) Assau t -
.2 yr. maw, (14:37) 
10 yr. maw. (940.23) 
No special statute 
15 yrs, maw, (940,21) 
(Physical violence) 
30 yrs. max, (944,01) 
(without consent -
fraud) 15 yr&, max. 
(944,02) 
Female under 12, mnle 
ov~r 18, 30 yrs.maw, 
Fcm~Je undar 16, mnle 
over lH, 1~ yrs. m;iw, 
Femnle under 18, ~ yrs, 
maw, (9'1<1,10) 
No special statute 
See Assault & 
Battery 
Physical force, or 
female child under 121 
Death (14:42) without 
consent or fraud 1-20 
yrs. (14-43) 
5 yrs, max, (14180) 
Ransom - life, but if Ran1om - denth. but 
releaaed safe 30 yrs. 1f reh;ised r .. 1 I•· -
max, All other 15 yrs.life "slmple" ~ 
max, (9-10,31) yrs, max, (1<11'1'.1) 
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Same as above 
Second degree felony 
intent to inflict 
s/b/11 intent to infl-
ict non s/b/i with a 
deadly weapon 
First degree felony 




Third degree felony 
First degree felony 
except 2nd degree 
felony if releaaed 










cide, 1-10 yrs. 
also misdem, 6 mos, 
max, (28-403,01) 
No special statute 
1-5 yrs, (28-413) 
Also misdem, (6 mos, 
max, 28-411) 
Felony assault 
2-15 yrs, (2.8-409) 
Shoot or stab 
1-20 yra. (28-410) . 
1-20 yrs. (28-406) 
Daughter - slater 
life (28-407), other 
3-20 yrs, (28-408) 
3-2n yrn. (28-408) 
R~nsom and injury 
death-life, Ransom 








Table XXI Continued: 
CHIME 
-~ Abort ion 
Larcer:y - grand 
Larceny - petit 
Larceny from person 














~ yrs, max, (40-2-23) 
1-10 yrs, (40-5-2) 
6 mos, max. (40-5-2) 
1-10 yr~, (40a5-2) 
l-10 yrs. (40-5-10) 
12 mo&, max, 1st 
ottenie 1-10 yrs. 
2nd offense wlthln 
'., yrs. (13-13-2) 
1-10 yrs (grand) 6 
mos. max! (petty) 
(40-5-16 
10 yrs. max, (grand) 
6 mos, max, (petty) 
(40-14-2) 
1-20 yrs, (40-10-1) 
1-5 yrs, (40-14-10) 
Misdem, (40-14-20) 
1-10 yrs, (grand) 
6 mos, max, ()etty) 
(40-5-12, -22 
1-14 yrs, (40-5-1) 
2 yrs, to life 
(40-5-1) 
WISCONSIN LO\JIS{I\N_/\ 
0ther than mother 1-10 yrs, (14187) 
unquickened foetus 
3 yrs, max,, quickened 
foetus 15 yrs, max, 
death of mother 15 yrs, 
max,, unquickened 
mother 6 mos, max, 
quickened mother 2 
yrs, max, (940,04) 
Theft crimes over_ 
$2,500, 15 yrs. max, 
$100-'.&2,500 5 yrs, 
m;nc. 
Theft crimes over 
$100, 10 yrs, max, 
$20-$100, 2 yrs max. 
(14167) Livestock 
1-10 yrs. \14:67,1 
Supp, 1959 
tinder 1100 (, mos, 
max. Special cir-
cumst.:1nces 1111dr.r 
$2,500 5 yrs, max, 
(943,20) 
lhder $20, 1st off-
ense: 6 mos. mAX, 
2nd offense, 6 mos.-
1 yr, later offense 
6 mos,•2 yrs. (14167) 
5 yrs, max, (943,20 
(J)(d) 
!~ec l,1.rcnny 
5 yrs. max, (9~3.23) 
See theft crimes 
under larceny 
See theft crimes 
under larceny 
See larceny 
1 yr , max , ( 94 3. 24 ) 
No spncial statute 
No specinl stntute 
See theft crimes 
under larceny 
See theft crimes 
under larceny 
See larceny 
See short checks 
MODr:L PENAL 
coor: 
Third degree felony 
if pregnant under 26 
wks., 2nd degree 
felony if pregnant 
over 26 wks, 
NF.ORASKA 
Vitalized foetus 
1-10 yrs, (28-404) 
Other 1 yr, max, 
(28-405) 
Third degree felony 1-7 yrs. (28-506) 
if over $500 (206,15) 
Misdem, if $50-500 
Petty misdem. if 
under $50 ( 206, 15) 
First offense - misdem, 
2nd offense, 1-2 yrs, 
(28-512) 
Third degree felony 1-7 yrs, (28-505) 
(regnrdlcss of amount) 
Auto or guns, third 1-10 yrs, (~8-522) 
degree felony (206,15) 
Third degree felony 
if fiduciary third 
degree felony if over 
$500 (206.15) 
Same as larceny 
Misdem. 3-6 mos. 
(28-521) 
Same penalty as lar-
ceny (28-538) Public 
moneys 1-21 yrs, 
(28-543) 
Under $351 misd~m. 
( 30d) over $35 
1-5 yrs. (28-1207) 
2-5 yrs, (28-953) 
Petty Misdem7 (206.2?.) Misdem, or 1-10 yrs, 
(28-1212) 
1 yr, max, (943,24) Check over $1001 Same aa above lhder $351 misdem, 
(90d) over. $351 7 
yrs, max, (28-1213) 
Under $100 - 6 mos. 
maJC., $100-2,500 
5 yrs, max., over 
$2,500 15 yrs. max, 
(943,34) 
10 yrs. max. (943,32) 
30 yrs, max, (943,32) 
5 yr, max,, $20-1001 
2 yr, max,, under 201 
6 mos, max) (14171 
Supp, 1959 
Over $1001 10 yrs, 
max.• $20-100 2 yrs. 
max., under f201 
6 mos, max, 14169) 
5 yrs.max, (14165) 
2-30 yrs, \14164 
Supp. 1959 
Third degree felony Grand 1-7 yrs, 
if over $500 or if (28-508) 
dealer 
Second degree felony 3-50 yrs, (28-414) 
First degree felony No special statute 
if (1) attempt to 
kill or do s/b/i 
(2) purposely do s/b/i 
Blackmail (extortion) 20 yrs, max, (40-12-1) 5 yrs. max. (943,20) 1-15 yrs, (14166) Threatened kidnapping 
1-20 yrs, (28-417) 
Other 1-3 yrs, (28-
441 to 445/ 
Malicious mischief 
Forgery & uttering 
If damage over $100 
1-10 yrs, If less 
than $100, misdem, 
(40-18-1) 
1-14 yrs, (40-6-1) 
$1,000 damage 5 yrs. 
max, Spec, prop. 3 
yrs, max, Other 
6 mos, max. (943,01) 
Danger to life1 1-15 
yrs, (14155) damage 
over $5001 2 yrs, 
max., damage under 
$5001 6 mos, max. 
(14156) intent to 
defrauds 4 yrs, max, 
( 14 157) 
10 yrs.max, (Legal 10 yrs, max, (14172) 
documents or pub.record) 
(Other/ 6 mos, max, 
(943,38) 
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Third degree felony 
if property over 
$1,0001 misdem, if 
property over $1001 
petty if property ia 
recklessly caused over 
$25 damage 
$100 damage 1-3 yrs, 
(28-572) under $100 
damage 6 mos, max. 
( 28-573) 
Second degree felony 1-20 yrs, (28-601) 
if forgery of part of 
issue of stocks, bonds, 
money, 3rd degree fel-
ony f other writings, 






















5-21 yrs, 2nd 
deqree heat of 
pa s·slon (cruel) 
3-5 yrs, ( 21-407ff, 
421) 
Third degree 
Involuntary 6 mos; 
3 yrs,: 4th degree 
heat of pa sslon 
(not cruel) 6 mo&. 
2 yrs. ( 21-472, 
423) 
OKLAHOMA Nf.W MEXICO 






Death-1 ife ( 76-
30-4) 
Not under 3 yrs, Not under 10 yrs. 10 yrs,-llfe 
(40-24-10) (13-453) (76-30-4) 
First degree, 
not under 4 yrs, 
i 715 
Second degree 
2-4 yrs, or 
mlsdem,-1 yr. 
max, § 722 






10 yrs, max, 
( 13-457 Supp, 
1%9) 
10 yrs, max, !13-
457 Supp 1959 
driving vehicle 
1-5 yrs, or 











20 yrs, max, (6-58) 
No special statute No special statute No special &tatute No special statute 1-10 yrs. (76-
30-7\4 Supp. 
1959 
No special statute 
l yr, 
436) 
max, (21- Mlsdem\ (30d) 
(ti 644 
Upon wlfe1 30d-3 
yrs., Felony 
assault 6 mo~.-
3 yrs,, genP.ral 
misdem, 90d max. 
(40-6-1 to 4) 
Assaul t-3 mos. 
max,; Batt,-6 mos, 
max., aggravated 
1-5 yrs. ( 13-243 
to 245) 
Assault-3 mos, Mlsdem,• 6 mo&, 
max., Batt,-6 mos, max. (6-68) 
max., (76-7-2,4): 
by convict w/mallce 
death-life (76-7-
12 Supp. 1959) by 
convict: 3-20 yrs. 
(76-7-11 Supp. 1959) 
Assault & battery 10 yrs, max. 
with deai:11 y ( 21-431) 
5 yrs, max, Armed robbery1 1-10 yrs, (13-
1-5 yrs. (40-6-B) 249) 
5 yrs, max. (76-7- Inflicts grievous 
6) harm mlsdem, 
weapon 
or misdem,-1 yr, 
max, (I 645) 
A & B with Intent 10 yrs, 
to kill, rape, 431) 
max, (21- Polson-not under 
10 yrs. § 651 
shootlng-20 yrs. 
max. § 652, Other 
5 yrs. max, or 
mlsdem.-1 yr. max, 
Ii 653 
Rape-50 yrs. max. 
(40-6-9) Intent to 
kill 1-25 yrs, 
40-6-6) 
Intent to murder 
not under 5 yrs,· 
life (13-248) 
r,1pe & mayhem, 
etc. 1-14 yrs. 
(13-252) 



















7 yrs. max, or 
mlsdem,-1 yr, 
max. § 759 
1-5 yrs. (40-30-1) 
Forcil)le or male 1-99 yrs. (40-
over 1B, female 39-1) 
under 14 or lunatic 
15 yrs,-death 
§§ 1114-1115 
1·15 yrs. §§ 1114, Female under 161 
1116 life, 1-99 yrs. 
(40-39-1) 






Ransom & injury To extort, 10 yrs, For ransom, 5 yrs. Ransom-serious 
death, child under harm: death-life 
121 6 mos.-20 yrs. w/o parole ransom 
Other1 10 yrs, max,20-50 yrs. Other 
death-life, ransom death, other 10 
not under 20 yrs. yrs, max, §§ 741, 
(21-449 Supp. 1959)745 
Other 30 yrs, max, 
(21-450) 
1 yr, max. (21-
437) 
Livestock 7 yrs. 
m.:JX,, othr.r 5 
yrs. max. (21-534) 
1 yr. max, (21-
53'.l t;upp. l 959) 
4 yr,,. m,H • ( 21-
242?) 
Quickened foetus 
l&t degree mans!. 
i 713. death of 
mot.her, 1st deqree 
mansl, § 714, pro-
curing - 3 yrs. max, 
or mlsdem.-§ 061 





yrs, max, § 170B 







Mi sdem, 3 mos, 
max, (40-45-1) 
:;hoplift.ing-3rd 
offense 3-5 yrs, 
('10-45-:>S ~upp, 
1959) 
3 mor,. - 4 yis. 
('10-4'.\-9) 
2-5 yrs. ( 13-211) 
Grand 11 thcft, 11 1-
10 yrs, (13-671) 
l'et.t.y "theft" 
misdem, ( 13-671) 
6 mos, max , ( 13-
1645) 
1-10 yrs, ( 13-
663,671) 
Rape, mayhem, 1-
10 yrs. !76-7-7) 
murder1 5 yrs.-
life (76-30-14) 
10 yrs. max, (76-
41-2) 
1 yr, max, (6-70) 
Rape, 1-50 yrs. 
(6-64) felonious 
Intent, 14 yrs. 
max. (6-69) 
14 yrs. max, (6-72) 
Not under 10 yrs, l yr, • life (6-63) 
(76-53-18) 
Female under 13120 l yr.-life (6-63) 
yrs.-life (76-53-
18) carnal knowledge 
female 13-181 5 yrs, 
max. (76-53-19, 76-
1-15) 
Ransom-death, life Ransom-harm death 
other l yr.-llfe ransom 20 yrs,-






1-10 yrs, 76-38-6 
Misdem, 6 mos\ 
m,lX, ( 76-38-7 
tli,fincd as (Jro1nd 
(76-38-4) 1-10 
yrs, (76-38-6) 
14 yrs. max. (6-77) 
solicitation by 
woman misdem: 6 mos, 
max. (6-78) 
10 yrs. max, (6-132) 
Misdem: 6 mos. Max. 
2nd offense: 10 yrs. 
max. (6-133) 
No special stat.ute 
Larceny of auto "l-1', yrs. (21-
~,3'1) 























1 yr, max, (21-
544 l 
Same pen,1lty as 
larceny (21-545) 




Under $50 6 mo&, 
ma,c, , Over $50 
1-5 yra, (;zl-555 
Supp, 1959) 
See no acct, 
check, 
Same penalty a& 
larceny (21-549) 
First degree-10-
21 yrs,, 2nd 
degree 5-10 yr,, 
'(21-530) 
OKLAHOMA Nf:W Mf'XICO Afl!ZONA 
Misdem,fine only No special statute Misdem, (13~672) 
Ii 1787 6 mos, ma,c, (13. 
1645) 
As for larceny 
I 1462 
Over $20 7 yre; 
mu, , Under $20 
misdem, I 1541 
Over $20 7 yn, 
ma,c,, Under $20 
mi&dem, I 1541 
Over $20 7 yre, 
ma,c,, Under $20 
mi&dem, Ii 1541 
Same a, above 
5 yre, ma,c, or 
misdem, 6 mos, 
max. I 1713 
Over '.!,501 1-10 
yre,, under $501 






Over $20 5 yre, 
max, , Under $20 
mhdem, 3 moe, 
max. 
Same a, above 
Under $50-misdem, 
3 mo&, ma,c, 
Over $501 l•lO 
yrs, 40-45·1 





1-~ yre, al&o 
mi&dem, 1 rr, 




1959) 5 yn. 
mu, (13-1645) 
Under $25-miadem, 
6 mos, mall, (13-
1645) Over $25-
felony (13-316 
Supp, 1959) 5 yre. 
mn • ( 13• 1645) 
Over $50-felony 
(13-621) 5 yr&, 
max, ( 13-1645) 
Two or more 3-15 yrs. (40-9- Not under 5 yrs, 
robber11 5-50 yre, l) (40-42-1) (13-643) 
I 800, force or 
fear, not under 
10 yre, § 798, 
other• 10 yrs, mall, 
Ii 799 
UTAH l''YOIHNG 
No specia 1 statute No statute 
Same penalty as 
lnrceny (76-17-
11) 
Same penalty as 
larcenr (7~-20-8 
Supp, 959) 
10 rrs, mall, (76-
20- 7) 
"lnauff icient 
fund1 11 Same •• 
ehort checke 




Public funds: 21 
yrs, ma,c, (6-136) 
by atty, 20 yrs, 
mall,, other 14 rrsj 
ma,c, (6-138 to 42 
10 yre, mall, (6-38) 
No &pecial &tatute 
"In1uff icitnt 
funds" Same a, 
ehort check, 
Under $25-6 mo1, 
ma,c, (ml&demlJ 2nd 
offense, 5 yr1, mall 
Over $25· 5 yrs, 
mu, (6-39, 40) 
Grandt 5 yre, mall, Same penaltr a1 





14 yra, mall, (6-65) 
Robbery-aggravated No special statute 5 yrs,-death I 801 3-25 yrs, (40-
(armed) 42-2) 
No special statute 5 yrs,-life 
76-51-3 




robbery) 5 yrs, 
ma,c, !21-530) l-5 
yrs, 21-2412) 
5 rrs. ma,c, 
I 483 
6 mos, - l yr, 
(40-46-1) 
5 yrs, ma,c, (13· 
401) 
3 yrs. mall, 
(76-19-3) 
5 yrs. mall. (6-147) 
Malicious 
Mischief 
Misdem, 1 yr, ma,c, Generally- misdem. Certain named General-misdem, 
(13-501) 6 mos. 
mall, (13-1645) 
Mi&dem, 6 mos, 
mall, ( 76-60-
Misdem, 6 mos, 
mall, (6-227) 1 yr, ma,c, !iii 1760 realty, crops 8. 
Special property fixtures 10 day&-
2, 3, 4, 5 8. 10 3 yrs, (40-47-5 
l to 8 76-1-16) 
yrs, ma,c, i§ 1751- to 25) 
1786 
Forgery 8. uttering First degree-21 
yrs, ma,c, , 2nd 
degree-lo yrs,. 
mall,, 3rd degree 
7 yrs, mall,, 4th 
First degree-7-20 
yrs,, 2nd degree 











degree 6 mo&,-5 
yrs, ( 21-631) 
Dwelling-2-20 rrs, Inhabited hldg,-
Other bldg.-1- 0 1-30 yrs, Other 
yrs, Personalty- bld91 1-15 yrs. 
1-3 yrs,, Defraud Other-1-5 yrs, 
inaurer-1-5 yrs, ii 1390-1392 
Attempt 6 mos,-2 
yrs. (21-58 to 585) 
First degree-
10-21 yr&,, 2nd 
degree 5-10 yrs, 
3rd degreP. 5 yrs, 
mn, ( 21-523) 
w/e,cplosives 10-
30 yrs, (21-526) 
No statute 
10 ~rs. m~ll. ( 21-
907 
7 yrs. ffl'1)(. (21-
906) 
6 mo~.-!, yrs, 
(21-901) 
6 mo!a.-5 yrs. 
(?l-905) 
Occupied bldg, 
7-20 yrs., Other 
2•7 yr1, ii 1431• 
1436 w/ellplosives 
20-50 yrs. I 1~41 
Mlsdem, 1 yr, 
mall, i 1~37, I 10 
10 yrs. mr1x. I 
10 ri~~I m,1x. a 
5 yrs, mall, 
( § 003) 
!l yrs. m,,x, or 
ml sdem,-1 yr, 
mall, 8 f!(M 
11116 
1-5 yrs, §i 40-20- l-14 yrs. (13-421) 1-20 yrs, (76-
l to 17, 2nd off- 26-4) 




Dwelling: 2-20 yrs.Dwelling: 2-20 yrs.Owellin91 2-20 yrs.Dwelling• 2-20 yrs, 
Other bldg, 1-10 Other bldg, 1-10 Other bldg, l-10 Other bldg. 1-10 
yrs,, Personalty- rrs,, Personalty: rrs,, Personalty yrs., Personalty 
1-3 yrs., Insured -3 yrs,, Attempt -3 yrs,, Oefraud l-3 yrs,. Attempt 
Personal tr• 1-5 yrsl-2 yrs,, defraud insurer 1-5 yrs, l-2 yrs,, Oefraud 
Attempt: -2 yrs, insurer, 1-5 yr&, Attempt l-2 yrs, Inaurer 1-5 yrs, 
(40-5-1 to 5) 13-231 to 235 (76-6-1 to 5) (6-121 to 1251 
1-15 yr&, (40-9-
l, 3) armed, 3-25 
r
rs •• ~llplosives 
0-30 yrs. (40-9-
2, 5) daytime, 6 
mos,-3 yrs. (40-9-
7) 
10 yr&, ma~. (40-
q.9) 
1 yr, t.o life 
(40-7-7 ::upp. 
1%"1) Attempt 
10 yrs, mnll, (40-
7-11 Supp, 1%7) 
~lo lrs. m,,x. (40-
7-3 
2-·1 yrs. (40-·1.l) 
No L t.,,tul.r. 
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not under 5 yrs, 
(13-302, 303) 
Ml sdem. (13-304) 
6 mos, mall, (13. 
1M5) 
5-'?.0 yrs, (13-
6,1 l Lr.wd Ach 
1-~, y.rs, ( l3-6r,:;,) 




t\m11, 1-20 yrs, 
daytime 6 moe,-
3 yrs. {76-9·1 to 
6) 
Mlsdem. (76-9-8) 






10 yrs, m~ll. (13- 5 yrs. mall, 
271) (76-53-11 
3 yrs, m,,ll, (13-
273) 
No statute 
14 yn. mall, 
(6-129) 
10 yrs, mall, (6-131 
10 yrs, mall, 
(6-9R) 
5 yrs. mall, or 

















with minor (&exual 











Sale of Narcotics 
No.n- support 
CQLQRAOO 
20 yr1, max,, dwell• 
ing, 10 yrs, max,, 
other realty. 3 yr&, 
max,, peraonalty, 
5 yra, max,, defraud 
ins, co, (40-3-1, et, 
&eg,) 
1-10 yr,., 25-40 yr&, 
if dynamited (40•3-
6, • 7) 
WISCONSIN 
19!)!) 
Building 15 yr, max, 
(943,021 Other prop-
erty 3 yr,, max, 
(943,03) defraud 
insurer 5 yra,max, 
(943,04) 
10 rra, max. (943,10) 




Danger to life 2-20 
yu•, ( 14 1 51) damage 
under i!:>00, l yr, max, 
damage over $500 
10 yrs, max, (14152) 
intent to d~fraud 5 
yr, max, (14153) 
Armed or commit& 
battery 1-30 yr1, 
(14160) other 9 yr&, 
max, (14162) . 
MODEL PENAL 
CODE 
Second degree felony 
if purpoaely burn 
house, occupied bldg, 
Third degree felony 
if to defraud ins, co, 
& no one endangered 
Third degree felony• 
dar, Second degree 
fa ony1 night, injury 
Nl.'BRASKA 
Dwelling 2-20 rr1, 
Other bldg, 1- 0 yrs, 
Per1onalty 1-3 yr&, 
Attempt 1-2 yrs, 
Defraud in,urtr 1-5 yr~ 
(28-504,01 to ,05) 
1-10 rr•. (28-533) 
w/exp oaives 20 yrs.-
life (28•5 
2 yrs, max, (40-3-8) 10 yr~. mo, (943,12) 6 mo&, max, (14195) 1-5 yr&, (28-534) 
(1 day to• lifj)* 1-14 5 yrs, max, (944,17) 
yrs, (40-2-31 
(1 day to life)* 6 mo&, 10 yr&, max, (944,06) 
to 5 yr&,, exc, 20 yrs, 
mnx, for father with 
daughter (40-9-6) 
2 yr&, max, (40-9-1) 5 yrs. ffltl)t', ( 944, 05) 
1 yr, max. (felony) 5 yrs. fflrl)(, (944,0!:>) 
(40-9-2) 
10 yrs, max,, or 10 yrs, max, (944, 11 p day to life)* Supp, 1960) 
40-2-32) 
1-14 yrs, (40-7-1) 5 yrs, max, (946,31) 
1-14 yrs. (40-7-1) No st,1 tute 
1-5 yrs. (40-7-6, -7) 5 yrs, m.Jx, (946,10) 
1-10 rrs. (40-7-54) 
Assau t by lifer, 
death. Assault by 
other, 5-50 yr1. 
Hoatage during escape 
5-10 yrsj (40-7-50, 
-51, -52 
5 yrs. max:-after 
arrest, b•ifore 
&entencing 1 yr. 
max. (946,42) 
To commit felony 1-10 As for completed 
r
r&,, to commit mi1dem.crime except crime 
yr, max, (40-7-30) pennlized by life 
30 yr&, mu, 
(939,31) 
No general attempt 
,t.atut.e 
2-10 yr&,, l&t off-
ense, 5-15 yrs, 2nd 
offense (48-6-20) 
5-15 yrs, if victim 
21, 10-20 yrs, if 
victim under 21 
(48-6-20) 
'l yrs, max. (43-1-1) 
Felony, battery, 
theft~ penalty for 
completed crime ex-
cept 11 fe-crime 
30 yr1, max, 
(939,32) 
1-5 yrs. also misdem, 
1 yr, max, in jail 
(161.02) 
Same •• above 
2 yrs, mnx. (52,03) 
5 yrs. max, (14189) Second degree felony 20 yr&, max. (28-919) 
if force, fear, victim 
under 10. Third degree 
A&cendant-deacendant 
siblings• 15 yrs. 
max, uncle-niece-
aunt-nephew 5 yr&, 
max. (1417B) 
5 yrs, max. (14176) 
!'> yrs, max. (14177) 
2 yrs, max, ( 14181 
Supp, 1959) 
Felony trial 10 yrs. 
max, Other case 5 
yrs, max, (141123) 
No statute 
felony if victim under 
18, No crime if in 
private with ~on1enting 
adult& (207,51 
Third degree felony 
(207,3) 
Third degree felony 
(201.2) 
Misdem, ( 207. 2) 
Third degree felony 
if force, threats, 
carnal contact! other-
wise, misdem. (207,6) 
Thlrd degree felony 
(208,20) 
Puhlic 1 !'> yrs, max, Thlrd degree felony 
(14:llll), voters1 (208,10) 
l yr. max, (1409) 
commercia\1 1 yrs. max. 
(14173) sports par- · 
t!cipants1 1-!:> yrs. 
(141118.l supp. 1959) 
0anger to life 10 
yr&; max~ (141109) 
Other l yr, max, 
(141110) 
0eath-life crime 1-
20 rr&, theft, rec. 
sto en good& J yrs. 
max. - other~ max, 
for complete crime 
( 14 I 26) 
0eath-life crime 20 
yrs, max., theft, rec, 
&tolen goods 1 yr, max, 
other~ max. for com-
pleted crime (14127) 
10-15 yrs. (401981) 
Same aa above 
1 yr, max, (14174 
supp, l9'l9) 
Third degree felony 
if felon escapes, or 




5-15 yr&. (28-905) 
father w/daughter not 
under 20 yr&, (28-906) 
1-7 yr&, (28-903) 
No &tatute 
1st offense misdem,/or 
1-5 yr&, 2nd offense 
5-10 yrs. (28,929) 
1-14 yrs. (28-701) 
1-10 yrs. (28-702) 
Juror or witnes& 1-~ 
yrs, (28-703) 
l-10 yr&. (28-736) 
2 yr&, max, (28-301) 
No general attempt 
1tatute 
1st offense 2-5 yrs, 
2nd offense 5-10 yrs, 
Later offense 10-20 yrs, 
( 28-470) 
Same aa above 















Two prior felony 
conviction a 






























Not lea& than longeat 
term, not more. than 
3 time& longeat term 
(39-13-1) 
1 felony, or 3.m11dem, No general atatute, 
w/1 ~ yr&, p1at1 a, if see petit larceny for 
max, term 1 yr, or special case 
Extended term if D 
peraiatent offender, 
D profeasionai crim-
inal, D dangeroua 
and.mental}( abnormal, 
No general atatute 
aee petit larceny 
indecent liberties 
and narcotic& aection1 leaa, add up to 3 yra,1 
b, if max, term 1-lp 
yra, 1 add up to 6 yra,1 
c. if max, term 10 or 
more yr&,, add up to 
10 yr&, (939,62) 
D multiple offender 
(aeries of crime& 
charged together) 
Extended term punish-
ment11 1st degree 
felony, 1-30 {min,) 
to life, 2nd degree 
felony 1-5 (min,) to 
10-20 (max), 3rd degree 
felony 1-3 to 5-10 
Life ( 39-13-1) Same aa above Same as above Third conviction not 
over 15 yrs, (21-107a: 
Felony, except life 
terms, court fix max, 
& min, within the 
max, & min, fixed by 
statute (39-12-1) 
Good time, 1st yr.-
2 mo,, 2nd yr.-2 mos, 
· 3rd yr, - 4 mo&,, 4th 
yr.-4 mos,5th and each 
succeeding yr.-5 mos, 
Trusty time1 max. of 
10 da, per mo, p~~s 
good time with a -
itional 3 da, per mo. 
for constructive work, 
Both subtracted from 
min. sentence. (105-4-
4 and 105-4-5) 
Court sets max, term, 
min, is set.by stat-
ute, parole eligibility 
after yr, or ~ of max, 
sentence whichever 
is less (with certain 
other exceptions) 
(606 & 607 I 
Good time1 similar 
to Colorado plus 
max. of 5 da, per 
mo, for diligence 
in labor/study, 
Note that time is 
subtracted from max, 
sentence rather than 
min, 
Court sets min, & Court sets min, & max, 
max, within statutory within statutory limit 
limits which va~y 
according to degree 
of crime 
Good Time1 6 da, per 
mo. plus a max. of 6 
da, per mo, for extra 
meritorious behavior 
both subtracted from 
min, to determine date 
of parole eligibility 
and from max. to 
determine date when 
parole release manda-
tory ( 305. 5) 
Good Time1 1st yr.-
2 mos,, 2nd yr,-2 
mos,, 3rd yr.-3 mos,, 
4th and each succeed-
ing yr,-4 mos, (29-263 
Colo. Rev, Stat, 
Ann, (1953) 
Wis: Stat. Ann, 
TJ95A,---
La, Hev. Stat, 
Ann,7195~ 
Nebr, Rev. Stat, 
Ann, {1956)--_ 
KANSAS OKLAIIOf.lA 
Solicitation to 1-20 yrs. § 1123 
indecencies child 
under 15, 1-5 yrs. 
15-18, 1 yr, max. 
(38-711 Supp, 1959) 
Capital trial Felony trial 2-20 
against accused rrs,, other trial 
death or notunder -10 yrs., Other 
10 yrs. other fol- 5 yrs._max. § 499 
ony not under 7 yrs. 
Other 7 yr&. max, 
(21-702) 
Nr:v, MEXICO 
6 mos,-5 yrs, 
(40-34-21 J 
Capit~l c~se 3-
15 yrs,, Other 
2-5 yrs, (40-
32-1) 
Same penalty as 
for perjury (21-
704) 
Same penalty as Same penalty as 
for perjury I 504 for perjury (40-
32-4) 
Witne&s-1 yr, max, Exec, Off,-10 yrs. Of Judges & Pub. 
Juror-5 yrs. max., max, (21 I 265) Off ,-1-5 yrs, 
(21-708, 709) Legislator-2•5 yrs,Legislators-1-~ 
Pub. officer-7 yrs,(21 § 320)0ther yrs, (40-8-1, 3) 
max., Voter-5 yrs, Officers-5 yrs, Witness-! yr, max. 
max, (21-801-805) max, I 3Al (40-31-1) 
Breaking out 
5 yrs. max. (21-
732) w/o break-
ing out 3 yrs, 
ma ic , ( 21- 734 ) 
Kidnappi.ng 5-50 
yrs, (21-452) 
Jurors-10 yrs, max. 
I 383 
State pen or 
priGon 2 yrs, 
max, 8§ 434, 435, 
9 
Misdem, 1 yr, 
may, § 421, i 10 
1-5 yrs. (40-41-
2) with we.ipons 
or explosives 25-
50 yrs, (40-41-3) 
1-14 yrs, (40-11-





Lewd Acts 1-5 yrs. No statute 
(13-652) 
Procures death sen-Judicial pro-
tence-death1 other ceeding 1-5 
1-14 yrs, (13- yrs, Other-
572) mlsdem, 1 yr, 










5 yrs, max. 
(13-1645) 
1 rr, max. 13-
33 
Judicial pro-










5 yr&, m~•i f16: 
2fH!f3, 76- - bl 
l3s~l~' max, 1•6~ 
l,li&dem, l yr, 
max. (76-12-l) 
WYOMING 
Some acts1 10 yrs, 
max, (6-98) 
14 yrs, max, (6-153 
14 yr&. max, (6-155 
l4 ns, max. (6-
l!it,, t!i?) 
l-10 Yf~, (6-167 
Supp, 1%9) 











crime 10 yra, 
mu, Other 1/::z 
ma!( for compll 
crime (21-101 
7 y·u. mu, (6~-
2~02, 2!'.1191) 
OKLAHOMA 
4 yra, or more 
crime 1/2 mu, 
for compl, crime 
Under 4 yra, 
crime mhdem, l 
yr, ma!(, (21 I 42) 
Flrat offenae, 2 
yra, ma!(,, Sub• 
aeq, offenae 
3 yr•. mil(, (Title 
63 11 402, 420) 
5Ale of Narcotic• Same aa above Same•• above 
Desertion 1-10 
yra, II 8~1. 8~3 
non-aupport 
mhdem, l yr, 
mu, II 8~2, 10 
Non-&upport 
Two prior felony 
conviction& 
2 yra, ma!(, (21• 
442) 
Second convic-
tion, Panaltr . 
doubled (21- 071) 
Petit larceny 
5 yra, ma!(, Over 
5 yra, crlme1not 
under 10 yrs,, 5 




r,••• ma!(, (21 
Three prior felony Thlrd convic• 
conviction• ~ion, not under 
15 yr&, (21-
l07a) 






Min; and ma!(, set 
by i.tatute 
No provlslon 
Accumulated ace• 1st yr. -3 da, per 
ording to regul-. mo,, 2nd yr,-
ations promulgated 6 da. per mo., 
by Board of Pro- 3rd and each 
batlon and Parole succeeding yr,• 
and &ubtracted 8 da. per mo, 






3 yra, (40-1-6 
Flrat offenae 2-





ing to minor 10 
r
ra,-llfe (~4-7-
• ~4-7-1~ Supp. 
19~7) 
Same•• above 
l'lrst offenu l 
yr, ma!(,, 2nd & 
aubaeq. offense 
2 yrs, mu, (40• 
2-3) 
No general &tat-
, ute; see forgery 
and petlt larceny 
Same aa above 
Mln, nnd ma!(, 
are ~et by stat• 
ute1 parole 
eligibility aflei 
one-third of m n, 
if less than 10 
rrs, lf more than 0 yrs, one-third 
of flrst 10 plus 
l mo. for each 
,1ddl t.lon.i 1 yr, 
~lmllar to Colo. 
plus 10 da, per 
mo. for meritor-
ious service or 
conduct ptur an 
addltlona ump 
sum award of 1 yr. 
for el(tra meritor• 
lous service or 
conduct. Nltl..t!.l 
all good tTiiie&ub-




reference ~an, YtQA lli_L_ = 9-,--------- Qlli~ lliL. A2J' ~i~53hltl... ao.ri... crt:"""21; TI9~ -,---------
* lndetermlnAte ••ntence for 1ew offen•••• 39-19•1, 
Colorado Revlaed Stetut••• 19~3, •• emended, 
Abbrevhtlon1 I 
D • Dehndent 




~ yr&. crime 
IS mo, for 
compl, crime 
Under !'.I yra, 
crime 6 moa, 
mu, 13-110 
Fl rat off enae l 
yr. ma!(, (miadem) 
or 25 yr&, ma!(, 
Subnq, offense 1 
25 yrs, ma!(, (36-
1002, 1020) 





~ yra, crime IS 
ma!(, for compl, 
crime, Under 
~ yra. crime l 
yr, ma!(, (mladem) 
(76-1-31) . 
Flrat offen1e !'.I 
yra, mu, 2nd 
or aubaeq, !'.I yr,, 
life (!'.>B-13a-i, 
44 Supp, 19~9) 
Same•• above 
~ yrs, ma!(, (76-
1~-l Supp. 19!'.>9) 
Over~ yrs. crime Not under 1~ yra, 
not under 10 yra, (76-1-18) 
Under~ yr&, crime 
10 yrs. ma!(, Petty 
theft, molestation, 
lewd conductf under 
5 yrs. crime, 5 yra, 
mu. (13-1649) 
Same as above 
Court sets mln, 
and ma!(. within . 
statutory liml ts 
Same as above 
Court seta min, 
and ma!(., both 
of which may be 
modlfled by Board 
of Pardon, 
1st y-rr2 mos., 2nd l yr, aeritenc'e or 
yr,-2 mos,, 3rd yr,less-5 da, per mo, 
4 mos., 4th yr,• 1-3 yr, sentence-
4 mos., 5th and 6 da, per mo,, 3-
succeeding yr, 5 5 yr, &entence-7 
mos, plus trusty da, per mo, 5-10 
time equal to good yr aentence-8 da, 
time, both to be per mo., 10 yrs. 
subtracted from sentence or more• 
min, if first 10 da, per mo, 
offenae or from ~ofer court dec-
mal(, lf &econd or & ons have held 
YNOMING 
No general attempt 
1tatute 
Flrat offen1e 2-~ 
yra,, 2nd offenae 
5-10 yra,, 3rd or 
Subaeq,10-20 yra, 
adult selling to 
minor,, lat offenae 
10-20 yra. 2nd or 
iubseq, 20-50 yra. 35.3~0. 369) 
Same II above 
3 yrs, max, (20-71) 
10-~0 yrs, (6-9) 
Life (6-10) 
Court sets min. and 
ma!(, wlthln statutory 
limit& 
b1m1rar to Colo, 
plus special good 
time allowance 
conferred by 
Board of Pardons 
not to el(ceed 210 
da, in any 12 mo, 
perlod1 both to 
be deducted from 
ma!(, 1·1-308 and 
7-325 
&ubseq, offenae that it 11 not 
(31-251 and 31· mandatory that good 
252) time allowance& 
Arn~ ~g5t lli.L. ~() 
be applied by the 





( 77-62-10 I 





























Counsel for Indigent Defendants 
In district court criminal actions, statutory authority is 
given the judge to appoint counsel for indigent defendants.9 This 
authority is permissive rather than mandatory, but if counsel is 
appointed he receives a fee fixed by the judge and paid by the county 
in which the case is tried.lo There are no provisions for court-
appointed counsels in cases before county, juvenile, and municipal 
courts. The method of providing counsel for indigent defendants in 
Colorado has been criticized for several shortcomings: 1) Counsel 
is provided only for district court defendants when there is often 
need for counsel in other courts as well. 2) Usually counsel is 
not appointed until the defendant is arraigned, and to prepare an 
adequate defense, counsel should be appointed as shortly after arrest 
as possible. 3} The alleged violator is entitled to the best possible 
defense, but often, inexperienced attorneys are appointed. 4} The 
present system does not provide the investigatory and other facilities 
necessary for a complete defense. 5} In some counties, the fees 
paid are too small for the work involved in preparing an adequate 
defense. 6) In some of the larger counties where the fees paid 
are more commensurate with the work required, the total cost is too 
great for the services provided. 
Other Methods of Providing Counsel 
These criticisms have also been made of the assigned-counsel 
system in other states. As a result, several alternate approaches 
to providing counsel for indigent defendants have been developed. 
These include the voluntary-defender system, lhe public-defender 





These systems may be described as follows:12 
The Voluntary-Defender System 
Voluntary-defender organizations ••• lare7 
private, non-governmental organizations 
representing indigent defendants accused 
of crime. They may or may not be affiliated 
with a civil legal aid organization ••• 
The voluntary-defender system is charac-
terized by what may be termed the "law-office" 
approach to the representation of the indigent 
defendant. While the assigned-counsel system 
39-7-29, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. 
Ibid. 
Egual Justice for the Accused. Special Committee of the New 
York City Bar Association and the National Legal Aid Associ-
ation, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York, 
1959, p. 25. 
Ibid., pp. 50-52. 
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generally results in a number of different 
lawyers being assigned from time to time 
to represent indigent defendants, the 
voluntary-defender system creates a law 
office which the court may assign to 
represent any and all indigent defendants. 
These law offices vary in size from the 
substantial organizations of New York and 
Philadelphia to smaller offices such as 
New Orleans. Nevertheless, under this 
system the function of defending indigents 
is centralized in a professional defense 
unit. · 
Voluntary-defender offices are 
privately controlled and supported. 
Private control is usually achieved through 
an independent governing body to which the 
staff of the organization is responsible. 
Financial support is sought either through 
independent efforts to secure charitable 
donations or through participation in 
cooperative charitable efforts such as 
the Community Chest. In some instances, 
both methods are used. 
The voluntary-defender system may 
utilize trained, salaried investigators 
to assist its legal staff. It may also 
be aided by volunteers from private law 
offices or local law schools ••• 
The Public-Defender System 
The public defender, like the public 
prosecutor, is a public official. The 
former is retained by the government to 
fulfill society's duty to see that all 
defendants, irrespective of means, have 
equal protection under the law; the latter 
is retained by the government to serve 
society's interest in law enforcement. 
Generally, whenever there is a public-
defender office, that office represents 
all indigent defendants in those courts 
in which the public defender regularly 
appears. 
· Public-defender systems vary in size 
from large offices such as those in 
Los Angeles County and Alameda County, 
California, to a single-lawyer office 
such as the public defender in the 
New Haven District in Connecticut. 














California, have facilities for investi-
gation; others have only limited funds 
and facilities. 
The staff of public-defender offices 
may be selected through civil-service 
procedures, appointed by the judiciary or 
the appropriate local officials, or elected. 
On the whole. the legal staffs of public-
defender offices appear to be relatively 
stable and in a number of instances these 
staffs have developed the characteristics 
of career services. 
The larger public-defender offices 
receive office facilities from the 
gdvernment. However, smaller public-
defender offices often are operated 
from the private law office of the 
attorney serving as public defender. 
Public-defender systems are financed 
by public funds. In some instances, they 
are treated in the same manner as other 
government institutions and submit a 
yearly budget to the proper appropriating 
body. Others operate on a fixed retainer 
basis, the public defender being paid a 
yearly salary or fee for his services and 
being expected to finance his office 
expenses from his compensation. 
The Mixed Private-Public System 
The cities of Rochester and Buffalo, 
New York, have a mixed private-public 
system which is unique in the United 
States. 
Rochester has had for some time a 
Legal Aid Society which is active in civil 
cases. In 1954, pursuant to an enabling 
statute. the Legal Aid Society requested 
and received from the Board of Supervisors 
of Monroe County an appropriation to estab-
lish a defende.r service to function in the 
inferior criminal courts of the county. A 
lawyer employed by the Society has since 
performed this function. 
Thus, Rochester furnishes counsel to 
the indigent defendant in lower court 
criminal cases within the organizational 
framework of a private legal aid society 
and supports this system by public funds. 
Buffalo has recently instituted a similar 
program of operation. 
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Recommendations for the Defense 
of the Indigent in Colorado 
In both the 1957 and 1959 sessions of the General Assembly, 
a bill was introduced to establish a• public defender system in 
judicial districts with more than 50,000 population. A public 
defender was to be appointed for each such district by the governor 
from person~ recommended to him by the district judge or judges. 
The salaries set for public defenders were comparable to those for 
district attorneys. In neither session was this measure approved by 
the General Assembly. 
Permissive Public Defender System 
In September 1960, the Metropolitan Public Defender Committee 
was formed with its membership composed of representatives from the 
Legal Aid Society, Denver Mental Health Association, League of Women 
Voters, Catholic Welfare, American Civil Liberties Union, and other 
organizations. After considerable study, this group has recommended 
legislation patterned after the Model Defender Act, which was drafted 
by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association in conjunction 
with the American Bar Association. This model act was adopted in 
1959 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws. 
The proposed legislation differs from the measures introduced 
in 1957 and 1959 in three important respects: 1) The act is permis-
sive rather than mandatory. 2) All counties, singly or in groups, 
may establish a defender system instead of limiting the office of 
public defender to judicial districts of a certain size. 3) The 
public defender would be authorized to represent indigent defendants 
charged with crimes in county and municipal court, as well as in 
district court. · 
In those counties which would establish the office of public 
defender as permitted in this act, the county commissioners would 
appoint the defender, set his salary, and provide adequate office 
space and supplies. The commissioners would also determine the number 
of additional professional and clerical staff members, prescribe their 
method of appointment, and set their salaries. If a public defender 
office were established on a multi-county basis, the county commis-
sioners of the several counties would make the appointment of the 
defender jointly and devise a formula for sharing the expense of the 
office. In the City and County of Denver, the bill provides that the 
public defender would be appointed by the mayor. · 
Even if the office of public defender is established, the 
court would have the authority to appoint an attorney other than the 
public defender in the same way as now provided by law in district 
courts. If the defender were appointed, however, it would be his duty 
to represent the indigent defendant and provide counsel at every stage 




















The act is flexible enough to permit the court to appoint 
a representative of a local legal aid and/or defender organization 
as counsel, if the county does not wish to establish the office. 
Proponents of this measure feel that the permissive and 
flexible provisions will make it possible for each local area to 
adopt-a system tailored to meet its own needs. The Metropolitan 
Defender Committee proposed this measure primarily to make it 
possible for a defender office to be created in Denver and, perhaps, 
in the large surrounding counties. The committee's opinion is that 
th~ present method of assigning counsel, especially in Denver, is 
extremely expensive for the services provided. This committee con-
tends that more defendants can be assisted more adequately at less 
cost through a public defender system and has cited experience in 
other major cities as examples • 
Fees Paid Court-Appointed Attorney§ 
Table XXII shows the annual amount of fees paid court-appointed 
attorneys in Denver for 1950, 1954, and 1957 through 1959. The annual 








Court-Appointed Attorney Fees Paid, 
Denver Diitrict Court Criminal Divisions, 







Denver and the two Denver-metropolitan area judicial 
districts (17th and 18th} for which data were available paid court-
appointed attorneys considerably higher fees than the remaining 
districts in criminal cases filed in 1958. The mean and median fees 
paid in each judicial district for which information was available is 
shown in Table XXIII. 
Only the three judicial districts already cited had mean and 
median court-appointed attorneys' fees in excess of $100, and in five 
judicial districts both the mean and median fees were less than $75. 
Many of the attorneys and judges who appeared before the committee 
at its regional meetings complained of the low fees paid, but pointed 
out that the county commissioners refused to allow larger amounts. 
The attorneys stated generally that they tried to do an adequate job, 
even if the fees were not commensurate with the work involved. However, 




Fees Paid Court.- Appointed Attorneys, 
Criminal Cases Filed in 1958. by Judicial District 
Judicial 
Districta M!!!l Median 
2nd $195 $150 
3rd 25 25 
4th 93 75 
6th 83 75 
7th 41 40 
8th 53 35 
9th 82 75 
13th 81 50 
15th 62 61 
16th 35 35 
17th 18~ 175 
18th 33 150 
\,,.---
a. Information not available for 1st, 5th, 10th, 11th, 
12th, and 14th districts. 
b. Not a true reflection of average fees because of the 
Early case and one or two other involved cases which 
resulted in large fees to court-appointed attorneys. 
These fees raised the average considerably; therefore, 
the median is a much better indication of typical 
fees paid. 
Defendants Represented by Couns~l in Criminal Cases 
One-fourth of the defendants in criminal cases filed in 
the district courts in 1958 were not represented by counsel. In 
three judicial districts (11th, 12th, and 14th), more than three-
fourths of the defendants were not represented by counsel, and there 
were three others (4th, 9th, and 16th) where counsel appeared for 
less than half of the defendants. In contrast, there were five 
districts (2nd, 3rd, 8th, 15th, and 17th) where 88 per cent or more 
of the defendants had attorneys. In one of these districts (15th), 
all defendants were represent~d by counsel. 
Sixty per cent of the defendants represented by counsel had 
court-appointed attorneys. This proportion varied from almost 
80 per cent in the 3rd District to 12.5 per cent in the 12th District. 
In a number of cases in which no counsel appeared, the docket analysis 
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counsel was requested. Some criminal cases in which there was no 
representation by counsel were dismissed at the request of the 
district attorney without prosecution, and in a few instances the 
alleged offender had not been apprehended or had been returned to 
prison for parole violation r~ther than prosecuted on a new charge. 
Even when these factors are taken into consideration, the 
small number of court-appointed attorneys in some judicial districts 
as shown by the docket analysis indicates that present statutory 
provisions for court-appointed counsel may not be entirely adequate. 
An analysis by judicial district of defendants represented by counsel 
in criminal cases filed in 1958 is shown in Table XXIV. 
TABLE XXIV 
Defendants Represented by Counsel 
Criminal Cases Filed in 1958 by Judicial District 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
No. No. Rep. 
No. of for Which by Ct. 
7 
Judicial Defend- Counsel Rep. by Pct. Appt. Pct. Pct. 
District ands Indicateda Counsel 3 of 2 Attorney 5 of 3 5 of : 
1st Incomplete Data 
2nd 1,056 1,046 919 87. 8% 594 64.6% 56. 85 
3rd 113 97 93 95.8 74 79.6 76.3 
4th 159 131 61 46.6 25 41.0 19.8 
5th 15 15 8 53.3 2 25.0 13.3 
6th 80 65 47 72.3 29 61.7 44.6 
7th 266 220 130 59.1 90 69.2 40.9 
8th 259 244 224 91.8 143 63.8 58.6 
9th 62 58 25 43.l 14 56.0 24.l 
10th 218 187 132 70.6 51 38.6 27.3 
11th 50 43 6 13.9 4 66.7 9.3 
12th 96 68 16 23.5 2 12.5 2.6 
13th 129 120 82 68.3 37 45.1 30.8 
14th 52 43 6 13.9 2 33.3 4.6 
15th 52 38 38 100.0 30 78.9 78.9 
16th 88 80 38 47.5 11 28.9 13.8 
17th 82 82 74 90.2 36 48.6 43.9 
18th 89 66 51 77.3 30 58.8 46.0 
Total 2,866 2,603 1,950 74.9% 1,174 60.2% 45. 1: 
a. Data not available for all cases on presence of counsel. 
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Obstacles and Objections to Public Defender System 
One of the major obstacles to adopting a public defender 
system in most of the judicial districts is the small number of 
criminal cases filed each year. Only eight judicial districts have 
more than 100 criminal cases filed annually. Proponents of the 
,public defender system contend that the appointment of a part-time 
public defender and assistants in these districts at salaries equal 
to those received by the district attorney and his assistants would 
provide better defense counsel at less cost. At the committee's 
regiQnal meetings, very few attorneys and judges in non-urban districts 
wished to adopt the public defender system in their areas, although 
conceding that perhaps such a system would work in Denver and the 
surrounding counties. Expense and the small number of criminal cases 
were cited as the reasonswhy a defender system would not be satis-
factory in rural areas. 
There have also been objections to the adoption of the public 
defender system in Denver and other metropolitan areas. Some judges 
and attorneys feel that adequate defense is now being provided and 
at less .cost than through a public defender's office. 
The Legislative Council Committee on the Administration of 
Justice has recommended the adoption of the legislation proposed by 
the Metropolitan Defender Committee, because it is permissive rather 
than mandatory, so that no county would be required to adopt the 
system unless there was local support. 
Licensing and Regulation of Bail Bondsmen 
There is no provision in the Colorado statut~s regulating 
bail bondsmen or prescribing the terms and conditions for the issuance 
of bail bonds. The absence of such regulation has led to several 
alleged malpractices.13 Because there are no regulations or 
qualifications applying to bail bondsmen, it is _alleoed that many 
ex-convicts are now in the bail bond business. There is no way 
at present to prohibit possible arrangements between bondsmen and 
attorneys, which might require alleged violators to engage certain 
counsel before bond would be made. It was stated that fees charged 
by bail bondsmen were exorbitant and that it was not an uncommon 
practice for a bondsman to request the court to terminate bond after 
the fee had been paid on the grounds that the alleged violator was 
a poor risk, even though this is not the case. 
With the goal of taking some corrective legislative action, 
an examination was made of statutory regulations in other states 
pertaining to bail. bondsmen. Seven states (Arizona, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New York) 
13. As indicated by some judges and attorneys who attended the 
March 18 regional meeting of the Legislative Council Committee 
































were found to have such legislation. A summary analysis of each 
state law is presented below:14 
Arizona 
Arizona requires only that each professional bondsman . 
(other than a surety company) be registered with the clerk of the 
superior court • 
Connecticut 
This act requires that each professional bondsman be 
licensed by the state and includes other regulations. 
Bondsmen Licensed. Any person who makes bail in five or 
more criminal cases, whether for compensation or not, must be 
licensed. 
Licensing Aythority. The state police commissioner is 
charged with the licensing and regulation of professional bondsmen. 
Qualifications. Each applicant must make a sworn statement 
which contains the following: 
a list of assets and liabilities 
applicant's fingerprints and photo 
proof of sound moral character 
proof of financial responsibility 
statement that applicant has never been 
convicted of a felony 
The commissioner may deny or suspend a license if any of 
the above are not truthfully provided • 
License Fee. The license fee is $100. 
Maximum Bond Fees. First $100 of bond -- $5 fee; 
$100 to $5,000 -- five per cent of bond amount; over $5,000 
2.5 per cent of bond amount. 
Annual Report. Each bondsman must submit an annual report 
to the commission showing: 1) the number of bonds handled; 
2) amount of bonds; and 3) the fees charged • 
Penalty. For violation of any of the above laws, sentence 
may be $1,000 fine and/or two year~ in jail • 
Florida • 
This state has the most comprehensive regulations of the 
states which h~ve such laws. 
14. Except for Georgia, for which current Gtatutes were not available • 
l "' ['. - .).) -
Bondsmen Licens • The state licenses sureties, bail 
bondsmen, and runners who are leg men for professional bondsmen). 
Licensing Authority. The state treasurer is the designated 
insurance commissioner and enforces 'the law regulating bondsmen and 
runners. 
Qualifications for Bondsmen. Each applicant for a license 
must take an examination administered by the commissioner of 
insurance. In addition, he must show the following qualifications: 
21 years of age 
citizen and resident for six months 
experience in bonding business by previous employment 
or completion of correspondence course 
high moral character 
a detailed financial report 
the rating plan the applicant will use (bond fees) 
License Fee. The license fee in Florida is $10. 
Annual Report. Once a year the professional bondsman must 
file a statement of his assets and liabilities and must list every 
bond forfeiture. 
Penalty. Any violation of law may be punished by $500 fine 
and/or six months in jail. 
Other. Several specific prohibitions are made in the law 
pertaining to the conduct of bondsmen, including: 
( a ) 
(d) 
Ma§sachusetts 
Bondsmen may not advise employment of a particular 
attorney. 
Bondsmen may not solicit business in court. 
Bondsmen may not pay any fee to a jailer, attorney, 
policeman or public official. , 
No bond agency may hold itself out as a surety company. 
Bondsmen are required to register, but are subject to very 
few regulations; they are regulated by the local courts. 
Bondsmen Registered. All bondsmen, other than surety 
companies, who make bond on five or more occasions must be 
registered. 
Registering Authority. Each bondsman must register with 
and be approved by the superior court (similar to Colorado's 


























Monthly Report. A 1959 amendment to the Massachusetts law 
requires each bondsman to submit a monthly report to the chief judge 
of each superior court showing the bail or surety, defendant's name, 
offense charged, and fee charged on each case bonded for that month~ 
P~nalt7. Any violation of Massachusetts law is subject to $1,000 fine and or one year in jail. 
New Hampshire 
The law requires registration of all bondsmen and makes them 
subject to limitations on the fees that may be charged • 
· Bondsmen Reatstgred. All professional bondsmen who receive 
compensation for making ail must register • 
Registering Authority. The clerk of the superior court 
registers and administers an oath of financial responsibility to 
each bondsman. 
Registration Fee. The clerk of each superior court sets 
the fee. 
Maximum Fees. Professional bondsmen are prohibited from 
charging more than five per cent of the amount of bail and in no 
instance can charge more than $100 for a bond. 
Penalty. Failure to comply with any of the above require-
ments may result in a $100 fine or 30 days in jail. 
New York 
New York has a rather rigid set of license requirements for 
bondsmen. 
Bondsmen Licensed. Any person other than a surety company 
who makes bond on more than two occasions within a two-month period 
must be licensed. 
Licensing Authority. The superintendent of insurance 
licenses and regulates all professional bail bondsmen. 
Qyalific~tion§. Each applicant must submit to a written 
examin-ation over any phase of the bonding business administered by 
the superintendent of insurance. In addition, each applicant must 
show proof of good character and reputation. 
Qualification Bond. Each applicant must post a $5,000 
bond in order to do business in New York State.· 
License Fee. Examination fee of $5 and a license fee of 
$25 is charged to applicants. 
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Other. The superintendent of insurance may suspend or 
revoke such licenses for any "fraudulent or dishonest conduct" 
after due notice and opportunity for,hearing is given the licensee. 
Sygg~§t~g Legislation· for Colorado 
Proposed legislation for regulating bail bondsmen in 
Colorado has been drafted for consideration along with other 
subjects to be included in a major revision of the criminal code. 
An outline of this proposed legislation follows: 
' 
Professional Bond9men to be Licensed 
This provision is patterned after the law in Connecticut which 
requires any person who makes a business of furnishing bail in criminal 
cases to be licensed as a professional bondsman. It also requires 
any person who furnishes bond in five or more criminal cases to be 
licensed; this provision allows a person to occasionally furnish bail 
for a friend or relative without being required to register as a 
professional bondsman. Surety companies are exempted because their 
bonding a~tivities are already regulated. 
Department of Insurance Vested with Enforcement 
The department of insurance is suggested as the authority to 
enforce the provisions of this article. This is done in at least one 
other state (New York). However, other state agencies that might be 
qualified to enforce this bill are the department of state and the 
office of judicial administrator. 
License Application, Qualification Bond, and Forfeiture 
The applicant for a professional bondsman's license is 
required to provide certain information to the department of 
insurance. Persons who have been convicted of a felony or crime 
of moral turpitude and persons who are engaged in law enforcement 
are prohibited from doing business as a professional bondsman 
(as is required in the laws of Connecticut, Florida, and New York). 
Each applicant is also required to post a $5,000 qualification 
bond with the department of insurance as proof of his financial respon-
sibility. Under present law, the attorney general must initiate civil 
action in order to collect the amount due on a defaulted bond. The 
provisi6n in the proposed bill requiring a $5,000 qualification bond 
insures the court against loss on a bond issued by a professional 
bondsman. If a bond issued by a professional bondsman is declared 
forfeited and not p~id within a reasonable time, the court may order 
the department of insurance to declare the qualification bond of 
such professional bondsman to be forfeited. In addition, the 
department is authorized to suspend the license of a professional 






































The license fees of the states which regulate professional 
bondsmen vary considerably (from $10 in New York to $100 in 
Connecticut); a $50 fee was Gelected as an arbitrary figure between 
these extremes. While no estimate is available on the number of 
bondimen in this gtate, the $50 fee should provide most of the co~t 
of adminigtering the act • 
Annual Report§ Reguireg 
' 
In order to detect fraudulent activity on the part of a 
professional bondsman, provision is made for annual reports to the 
department of insurance. Such reports will provide the department 
with suffici~nt information to investigate properly any suspicious 
activities on the part of a professional bondsman • 
Denial, Suspension, Revocation, and Refusal to Renew License 
The department is authorized to deprive a professional 
bondsman of his license for misrepresentations made to the department, 
fraudr or dishonest business activity. 
Notice to Courts of Names of Bondsmen 
ThiG provision requires the department of insurance to 
provide all courts of the state with the names of professional 
bondsmen lic~nsed under the act. Courts are prohibited from accepting 
bond from a profesGional bondsman unless such bondsman is licensed 
under the act. 
Maximum Cgmmi•ssion or. Fee 
Since professional bondsmen are in a position to charge 
unreasonable fees, a maximum commission would be set by statute. 
Connecticut limits bond fees to five per cent of any bond up to 
$5,000 and 2.5 per cent of bond amounts in excess of $5,000. 
New Hampshire limits professional bondsmen fees to five per cent 
of the amount of bail, not to exceed $100. It is proposed that 
bond fees be limited to 10 per cent· on the fir.~t, $100 of bail 
furnished, five per cent on the amount of bail furnished up to 
$5,000, and not more than 2.5 per cent of the amount of bail in 
excess of $5~000. As an alternative to establishing maximum fees, 
each professional bondsman could be required to submit a schedule 
of his bail bond fees to the enforcing agency (as is provided in 
the Florida law) • 
Prohibited Activities -- Penalties 
Several prohibited activitieG for professional bondsmen are 
enumerated ~nd criminal penalties provided; these activities are 
similar to those contained in the laws of Florida and Connecticut • 
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This provision also prescribes a criminal penalty for one who attempts 
to act as a professional bondsman under the act without a license. 
Penalty for Violation of Bond Conditio~s 
It would be unlawful for a person to "jump bond." Bond jumping 
is similar to theft in that it deprives another person of his property. 
It was thought that this provision might give some measure of pro-






























CONSTITUTION OF ALASKA 
Article IV1 The Judiciary 
Judicial Power and Jurisdiction. 
SECTION 1. The judicial power of the State is vested 
in a supreme court, a superior court, and the courts established 
by the legislature. The jurisdiction of courts shall be 
prescribed by law. The courts shall constitute a unified 
judicial system for operation and administration. Judicial 
districts shall be established by law • 
Supreme Court •. 
SECTION 2. The supreme court shall be the highest court 
of the State, with final appellate jurisdiction. It shall 
consist of three justices, one of whom is chief justice. The 
number of justices may be increased by law upon the request 
of the supreme court. 
Superior Court. 
SECTION 3. The superior court shall be the trial court 
of general jurisdiction and shall consist of five judges. The 
number of judges may be changed by law. 
Qualification§ of Justices and Judges . 
SECTION 4. Supreme court justices and superior court 
judges shall be citizens of the United States and of the State, 
licensed to practice law in the State, and possessing any 
additional qualifications prescribed by law. Judges of other 
courts shall be selected in a manner, for terms, and with 
qualifications prescribed by law . 
Nomination and Appointment. 
SECTION 5. 
office of supreme 
appointing one of 
council. 
The governor shall fill any vacancy in an 
court justice or superior ccurt judge by 
two or more persons nominated by the judicial 
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· Approval or Rejection. 
SECTION 6. Each supreme court justice and superior court 
judge shall, in the manner provided by law, be subject to 
approval or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot at the first 
general election held more than three years after his appoint-
ment. Thereafter, each supreme court justice shall be subject 
to approval or rejection in a like manner every tenth year, 
and each superior court judge, every sixth year. 
Vacancy. 
SECTION 7. The office of dny supreme court justice or 
superior court judge becomes vacant ninety days after the 
election at which he is rejected by a majority of those voting 
on the question, or for which he fails to file his declaration 
of candidacy to succeed. himself. 
Judicial Council. 
SECTION 8. The judicial council shall consist of seven 
members. Three attorney members shall be appointed for six-
year terms by the governing body of the organized state bar. 
Three non-attorney members shall be appointed for six-year 
terms by the governor subject to confirmation by a majority of 
the members of the legislature in joint session. Vacancies 
shall be filled fbr the unexpired term in like manner. Appoint-
ments shall be made with due consideration to area representation 
and without regard to political affiliation. The chief justice 
of the supreme court shall be ex officio the seventh member 
and chairman of the judicial council. No member of the 
judicial council, except the chief juctice, may hold any other 
office or position of profit under the United States or the 
State. The judicial council shall act by concurrence of 
four or more members and according to rules which it adopts. 
Additional Duties. 
SECTION 9. The judicial council shall conduct studies 
for improvement of the administration of justice, and make 
reports and recommendations to the supreme court and to the 
legislature at intervals of not more than two years. The 


























Incapacity of Judges. 
SECTION 10. Whenever the judicial council certifies to 
the governor that a supreme court justice appears to be so 
incapacitated as substantially to prevent him from performing 
his judicial duties, the governor shall appoint a board of 
three persons to inquire intQ the circumstances, and may on 
the board's recommendation retire the justice. Whenever a judge 
of another court appears to be so incapacitated as substantially 
--to prevent him from performing his judicial duties, the judicial 
council shall recommend to t~e supreme court that the judge 
be place under ~arly retirement. After not!ce and hearing, 
the supreme court by majority vote of its members may retire 
the judge. 
Retirement. 
SECTION ll. Justices and judges shall be retired at 
the age of seventy except as provided in this article. The 
basis and amount of retirement pay shall be prescribed by law. 
Retired judges shall render no further service on the bench 
except for special assignments as provided by court rule. 
Impeachment. 
SECTION 12. Impeachment of any justice or judge for 
malfeasance or 'misfeasance in the performance of his official 
duties shall be according to procedure prescribed for civil 
officers. 
Compensation. 
SECTION 13. Justices, judges, and members of the judicial 
council shall receive compensation as prescribed by law. Compen-
sation of justices and judges shall not be diminished during 
their terms of offiGe, unle~s by general law applying to all 
salaried officers of the State . 
Restrictions. 
SECTION 14. Supreme court justices and superior court 
judges while holding office may not practice law, hold office 
in a political party, or hold any other office or position of 
profit under the United States, the State, or its political 
subdivisions. Any supreme court justice or superior court 




SECTION 15. The supTeme cou~t shall make and promulgate 
rules governing the administration of all courts. It shall 
make and promulgate rules governing practice and procedure 
in civil and criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be 
changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members 
elected to each house. 
Court Administration. 
SECTION 16. The chief justice of the supreme court shall 
be the_administrative head of all courts. He may assign 
judges from one court or division thereof to another for tem-
porary service. The chief justice shall, with the approval of 
the supreme court, appoint an administrative director to serve 
at his pleasure and to supervise the administrative operations 












CONSTITUTION OF HAWAII 
SECTION 1. The judicial power of the State shall be vested 
:i:n one supreme court, circuit courts, and in such inferior courts 
as the legislature may from time to time establish. The· several 
courts shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as provided 
by law. 
Supreme Court. 
SECTION 2. The supreme court shall consist of a chief 
justice and four associate justices. When necessary, the chief 
justice shall assign a judge or judges of a circuit court to 
serve temporarily on the supreme court. In case of a vacancy 
in.the office of chief justice, or if he is ill, absent or other-
wise unable to serve, an associate justice designated in accordance 
with the rules of the supreme court shall serve temporarily in 
his stead. ~ 
Appointment of Judges. 
SECTION 3. The governor shall nominate and, by and with 
the advice and consent of the senate, appoint the justices of the 
supreme court and the judges of the circuit courts. No nomination 
shall be sent to the senate, and no interim appointment shall 
be made when the senate is not in session, until after ten 
days' public notice by the governor. 
Qualifications. 
No justice or judge shall hold any other office or position 
of profit under the State or the United States. No person shall 
be eligible to such office who shall not have been admitted to 
practice law before the supreme court of this State for at least 
ten years. Any justice or judge who shall become a candidate 
for an elective office shall thereby forfeit his office. 
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Tenure - Compensation - Retirement - Removal 
f 
The term of office of a justice of the supreme court shall 
be seven years and that of a judge of a circuit court shall be 
six years. They shall receive for their services such compensation 
as may .be presribed by law, which shall not be diminished during 
their respective terms of office, unless by general law applying 
to all salaried officers of the State. They shall be retired 
upon attaining the age of seventy years. They shall be included 
in aoy retirement law of the State. They shall be subject to 
removal from office upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the 
membership of each house of the legislature, sitting in joint 
'session, for such causes and in such manner as may be provided 
by law. 
Retirement for Incapacity. 
SECTION 4. Whenever a commission or agency, authorized 
by law_for such purpose, shall certify to the governor that any 
,justice of the supreme court or judge of a circuit court appears 
to be so incapacitated as substantially to prevent him from 
performing his judicial duties, the governor shall appoint a board 
of three persons to inquire into the circumstances and on their 
recommendation the governor may retire the justice or judge from 
office. 
Administration. 
SECTION 5. The chief justice of the supreme court shall 
be the administrative head of the courts. He may assign judges 
from one circuit court to another for temporary service. With 
_the approval of the supreme court he shall appoint an admin-
istrative director to serve at his pleasure. 
Rules. 
SECTION 6. The supreme court shall have power to promulgate 
rules and regulations in all civil and criminal cases for all 
courts relating to process, practice, procedure and appeals, which 

























NUMBER OF DISTRICT AND COUNTY JUDGES REQUIRED 
UNDER THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
The proposed transfer of county court probate, juvenile, 
and mental health jurisdiction to the district courtsl would 
require 28 additionel di1trict judges, if present judicial district 
goundaries are retained.2 This total includes two district 
judges recommended by the committee immediately for the 2nd 
District (Denver), four judges who may be needed anyway in the 
near future because of increased district court business, and 
two judges who might not be needed necessarily because of 
consolidated case loads, but who have been added to provide better 
judicial service and at least two judges in each judicial district. 
The following table shows the present number of district 
judges in each judicial district and the number of additional 
judges required under the proposed amendment: 
Present Additional 
Judicial No. of Judges 
District Judges Reguired 191.tl Comments 
1st 3 1 4 
2nd 10 2 12 addition recommended because of increase 
in district court business 
3rd 1 1 2 
4th 4 2 6 
5th 1 1 2 addition to make 2-judge district 
6th 2 1 3 
7th 2 3 5 including one judge who may be needed 
shortly anyway 
8th 3 3 6 
9th 1 1 2 
10th 2 2 4 including one judge who may be needed 
shortly anyway 
11th 1 1 2 
12th 2 1 3 
13th 2 2 4 
14th 1 1 2 addition to make 2-judge district 
15th 1 1 2 
16th 1 1 2 
17th 2a 2 4 including one judge who may be needed 
18th 2a 2 4 
shortly anyway 
including one judge who may be needed 
shortly anyway 
Total 41 8 28 69 
a As of January, 1961 • 
1 Except in Denver (2nd District). 
2 Based on present case load data and anticipated increases • 
- 167 -
Consideration of Judicial Boundary Changes 
Several factors should be considered in evaluating the 
adequacy of present judicial distritt boundaries and proposed 
changes following expansion of di$trict court jurisdiction. Where 
possible, as justified by increased case loads~ districts should 
be reduced in size. The possibility of establishing one-county 
districts in the larger Class II counties should be examined. 
The exceptions would include those large counties with small 
counties immediately adjacent, which because of geography or 
limited judicial business could not be appended to any other 
district. Attention should be directed as well to realigning 
districts (if compatible with case load) to encompass homogeneous 
geographic areas and to eliminate mountain passes and other 
travel impediments. 
All districts should have at least two judges under 
the proposed plan. With two judges in multi-county, less 
populous districts, better judicial service could be provided 
and travel time reduced. In such districts, the judges could 
have cases assigned either according to the type of case or the 
county of filing, whichever method provides the most efficient 
administration of justice. In the eight districts (aside from 
Denver) where the total number of district judges would be four 
or more, it would be possible to have at least one judge for each 
division of the court, such as probate, civil, criminal, and family. 
County Court Judges 
New county court jurisdiction, which would be provided 
by statute pursuant to the proposed amendment, would require 
at least one additional county judge in 12 counties, because of 
case load and/or geography. The estimated total number of county 
judges required would be 84. Counties where additional judges are 



















































possibly located in Thornton, Brighton, 
and Aurora 
possibly located in Littleton, Englewood, 
and Aurora 
possibly located in Boulder and Longmont 
one located outside of Colorado Springs 
geographic considerations: judges in 
Glenwood Springs and Rifle 
possibly located in Fort Collins and 
Loveland 
geographic considerations: judges in 
Montrose and Nucla 
a In addition to present superior court judge 
At present, there are 41 district judges, 63 county 
judges, one juvenile judge, one superior court judge, and 
approximately 275 justices of the peace. Under the proposed 
judicial reorganization there would be initially 69 district 




PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 1. Vestment of judicial power.--
The judicial power of the state as to all 
matters of law and equity. except as in the 
constitution otherwise provided. shall be 
vested in the supreme court, district courts, 
county courts. and such other courts as may 
be provided by law. In counties and cities 
and counties having a population exceeding 
100,000. exclusive original jurisdiction in 
cases involving minors and persons whose 
offenses concern minors may be vested in a 
separate court now or hereafter established 
by law. 
ci Section 2. Appellate jurisdiction.--
' The supreme court, except as otherwise pro-
" 
vided in this constitution. shall have 
appellate jurisdiction only. which shall be 
coextensive with the state, and shall have 
a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts, under such regulations and 
limitations as may be prescribed by law. 
.. _ .. 
APPENDIX D 
CO,IPARISON OF JUDICIAL ARTICLE AND PROPOSED AMENDMENT 
PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 1. Vestment .Qi judicial power. 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested 
in a supreme court, district courts, a probate 
court in the city and county of Denver, a 
juvenile court in the city and county of Denver, 
county courts, and such other courts or judicial 
officers with jurisdiction inferior to the 
supreme court, as the g.eneral assembly may, 
from time to time establish; provided, however, 
that nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued to restrict or diminish the powers of 
home rule cities and towns granted under 
Article XX, Section 6 of this constitution 
to create municipal and police courts. 
Section 2. Appellate jurisdiction. 
(1) The supreme court, except as otherwise 
provided in this constitution, shall have 
appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be 
coextensive with the state, and shall have 
a general superintending control over all 
inferior courts, under such regulations and 
limitations as may be prescribed by law. 
(2) Appellate review by the supreme 
court of every final judgment Qf the district 
courts, the probate court of the city and 
county of Denver, and the juvenile court of 
the city and county of Denver shall be allowed, 
and the supreme court shall have such other 
appellate review as may be provided by law. 
No appeal shall lie to the district court 
from any final judgment of the probate court 
of the city and county of Denver or of the 




The proposed amendment eliminates justice 
of the peace courts as constitutional courts. 
While county courts retain constitutional 
status, their jurisdiction would be limited 
generally to that of present justice courts. 
except that the limit in civil cases would 
be set by law. Denver would also have a county 
court to handle minor state jurisdiction instead 
of the Denver municipal court as at present. 
(See Sections 14 and 15 for more detailed pro-
visions re: county courts.) The proposed 
amendment would also create a probate court 
and a juvenile court as constitutional courts 
in the city and county of Denver. Certain 
jurisdiction of the present Denver county court 
would be transferred to the probate court, as 
provided in Section 9 (3) of the amendment. A 
clause has been added to insure no interference 
with the constitutional authosity given home 
rule cities to create municipal or police courts • 
The proposed amendment adds a paragraph to 
Section 2, which provides for appellate review 
by the supreme court from final judgments of the 
district courts and Denver probate and juvenile 
courts (not now provided in the judicial article). 
Trials de novo in Denver are eliminated by pro-
viding that there is no appeal from the Denver 
juvenile and probate courts to the district 
courts. Supreme court review of county court 
decisions would be as provided by law. 
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PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 3. Original jurisdiction--opinions.--
It shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, 
mandamus. quo warranto. certiorari, injunction, and 
other original and remedial writs, with authority 
to hear and determine the same: and each judge of 
the supreme court shall have like power and author-
ity as to writs of habeas corpus. The supreme 
court shall give its opinion upon important 
questions upon solemn occasions when required 
by the governor, the senate, or the house of 
representatives: and all such opinions shall be 
published in connection with the reported de-
cisions of said court • 
Section 4. Terms.--At least two terms of 
the supreme court shall be held each year, at 
the seat of government. 
Section 5. Personnel of court--depart-
ments.--The supreme court shall consist of 
seven judges, who may sit en bane or in two 
or more dep=tments as the court may, from 
time to time. determine. In case said court 
~ shall sit in departments, each of said depart-
... ments shall have the full power and authority 
of said court in the determination of causes, 
the issuing of writs and the exercise of all 
powers authorized by this constitution, or 
provided by law, subject to the general con-
trol of the court sitting fill bane, and such 
rules and regulations as the court may make, 
but no decision of any department shall be-
come the judgment of the court unless 
concurred in by at least three judges, and 
no case involving a construction of the 
constitution of this state or of the 
United States shall be decided except by 
the court fill bane. 
Section 6. Election of judges.--The 
judges of the supreme court, except as 
herein provided, shall be elected by the 
electors of the state at large. 
PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 3. Original jurisdiction--opinions. 
The supreme court shall have power to issue writs 
of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certi-
orari, injunction, and such other original and 
remedial writs as may be provided by rule of court 
with authority to hear and determine the same; and 
each judge of the supreme court shall have like 
power and authority as to writs of habeas corpus. 
The supreme court shall give its opinion upon 
important questions upon solemn occasions when 
required by the governor, the senate, or the 
house of representatives; and all such opinions 
shall be published in connection with the re-
ported decisions of said court. 
Section 4. Terms.--At least two terms of 
the supreme court shall be held each year, at 
the seat of government. 
Section 5. Personnel of court--depaft-
ments. The supreme court shall consist o not 
less than seven justices, who may sit en~ 
or in departments. In case said court shall 
sit in departments, each of said departments 
shall have full power and authority of said 
court in the determination of causes. the 
issuing of writs and the exercise of all 
powers authorized by this constitution, or 
provided by law, subject to the general con-
trol of the court sitting~ bane, and such 
rules and regulations as the court may make, 
but no decision of any department shall be-
come judgment of the court unless concurred 
in by at least three justices, and no case 
involving construction of the constitution 
of this state or of the United States shall 
be decided except by the court~ bane. Upon 
request of the supreme court, the number of 
justices may be increased to no more than nine 
members whenever two-thirds of the members of 
each house of the general assembly concur 
therein. The court shall provide by rule for 
the manner of selecting a chief justice from 
among the court membership, who shall preside 
at all sessions of the court. 
Section 6. Election of justices.--The 
justices of the supreme court shall be 
elected by the electors of the state at 
large. Vacancies shall be filled as 
provided in Section 20 of this article. 
CQI.V,IENTS 
Section 3 of the proposed amendment is 
similar to Section 3 of the present judicial 
article except for two changes. •The supreme 
court" has been substituted for "It" in line 
one. The phrase "as may be provided by rule 
of court• was added to provide that the supreme 
court shall define by rule those unspecified 
original and remedial writs which it is 
willing to entertain. • 
No change. 
The proposed amendment provides that the 
general assembly may increase the number of 
supreme court justices from ~even to nine upon 
two-thirds vote, if such increase is requested 
by the supreme court. This 1ast clause was 
added to insure that no incr~ase would_be made _ 
in the size of the court, if the court:ct,jected. 
The supreme court is oiven authority to-make 
its own rules for selection of a chief justice. 
At present, the supreme court justice with 
the shortest time to serve oot holding 
his office by appointment ~r election to 
fill a vacancy, serves as chief justice 
as provided in the present section 8 of 
the judicial article. 
This section in the pro~osed amend-
ment is very similar to Section 6 in the 
present judicial article. 
PRESEITT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 7. Term of office.--The term of 
office of the judges ofthe supreme court, 
hereafter elected, except as in this article 
otherwise provided. shall be ten years. 
Section 8. Appointment and election of 
J..!!s!9il.--No successor of the judge of the court 
of appeals whose term expires in April, 1905, 
shall be appointed. 
On the first Wednesday of April, 1905, the 
court of appeals shall cease to exist, and the 
judges of said court whose regular terms shall 
not then have expired shall become judges of 
the supreme court. All causes pending before 
the court of appeals shall then stand trans-
ferred to, and be pending in, the supreme court, 
and no bond or obligation given in any of said 
causes shall be affected by said transfer. 
The term of office of that judge of the 
supreme court whose term expires on the second 
,-. Tuesday in January, 1907, shall so expire; the 
;:; term of office of that judge transferred from 
the court of appeals whose term shall expire in 
April, 1907, shall expiTe on the second Tuesday 
in January, 1907; and the term of office of 
that judge of the supreme court whose term 
expires in January, 1910, is hereby extended 
to the seCQnd Tuesday in January, 1911; and 
tile term of office of the judge or judges 
transferred· from the court of appeais whose 
term would expire in April, 1909, shall 
expire on the second Tuesday in January, 1909; 
and the term of office of the judge of the 
supreme court.whose term expires on the second 
Tuesday in January, 1913, shall so expire. 
At the general election in the year 1906 
and every tenth year thereafter, there shall be 
elected two judges of the supreme court. 
At the general election in the year 1908, 
there shall be elected three judges of the 
supreme court, one for the term of six years, 
and two for the term of ten years. 
At the general election in the year 1910 
and every tsnth year thereafter, there shall be 
elected Orte judge of the supreme court. 
At the general election in the year 1912 and 
every tenth year thereafter, there shall be 
elected one judge of the supreme court. 
At the general election in the year 1914 and 
every tenth year thereafter, there shall be 
elected one judge of the supreme court. 
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 7. Term of office. The term of 
office of justices of the supreme court shall 
be ten years, and justices of the supreme court 
holding office on the effective date of this 
constitutional amendment shall continue in 
office for the remainder of the respective 




The proposed amendment adds the pro-
vision that supreme court justices holding 
office on the effective date of the amend-
ment shall continue in office for the 
remainder of their respective terms. 
This section of the present judicial 
article is repealed. 
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PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 8. Continued: 
At the general election io the year 1918 and 
every tenth year thereafter, there shall be elected 
two judges of the supreme court. 
Provided, that if said court of appeals shall 
at the time of the going into effect of this amend-
ment, by law consist of only three judges, the 
governor shall nominate and by and with the advice 
and consent of the senate appoint two judges of 
the supreme court whose terms of office shall 
begin on the first Wednesday of April, 1905, and 
expire on the second Tuesday of January, 1909. 
Provided also, that nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to prevent the general assembly 
from changing the time of electing judges of the 
supreme court and frOlll extending or abridging · 
their terms of offi~e as provided in Art. VI, 
Section 15 of the constitution of this state. 
The judge having the shortest time to 
serve, not holding his office by appointment or 
election to fill vacancy, shall be the chief 
justice. 
Of the two judges whose terms of office 
'.::; expire upon the same day, the younger in years 
~ of the two judges shall be chief justice during 
, the next to the last year of his term of office 
and the elder of the two judges shall be chief 
justice during the last year of his term of 
office. 
The chief justice shall preside at all 
sessions of ~he court !!l bane, and, in case 
of his absence. then the judge present who 
would next be entitled to become chief justice 
shall preside. 
Until otherwise provided by law, the 
supreme court shall have power to review the 
judgments and proceedings of inferior courts, 
in such instances and in such manner as was 
provided by law previous to the act estab-
lishing the court of appeals. 
Section 9. Clerk of supreme court.--
There shall be a clerk of the supreme court, 
who shall be appointed by the judges thereof, 
and shall hold his office during the pleasure 
of said judges, and whose duties and emolu-
ments shall be as prescribed by law and by 
the rules of the supreme court. 
PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
This section is not included in the 
proposed amendment, as the position is 
provided for by statute. 
PRESEITT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 10. Qualifications of jfdqes.--
No person shall be eligible to the of ice of 
judge of the supreme court unless he be le~rned 
in the law: be at least thirty years of age 
and a citizen of the United States, nor unless 
he shall have resided in this state or terri-
tory at least two years next preceding his 
election. 
Section 11. Jurisdiction.--The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all causes both at law and in equity, and 
such appellate jurisdiction as may be con-
ferred by law. They shall have original 
jurisdiction to determine a 11 controversies 
, upon relation of any person on behalf of the 
..,. people, concerning the rights, duties and 
~ liabilities of railroad, telegraph or toll-
~ road companies or corpcnations. 
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 8. Qualifications of Justices. No 
person shall be eligible to the office of justice 
of the supreme court unless he shall be a quali-
fied elector of the state of Colorado and shall 
have been licensed to practice law in this state 
for at least five years. 
Section 9. District courts--jurisdiction. 
(1) The district courts shall be trial courts 
of record with general jurisdiction, and shall 
have original jurisdiction in all civil, probate, 
and criminal cases, except as otherwise pro-
vided herein, and shall have such appellate 
jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law. 
(2) Effective the second Tuesday in 
January, 1965, all causes pending before the 
county court in each county, except those 
causes within the jurisdiction of the county 
court as provided by law, and except as pro-
vided in SubNction (3) of this section, shall 
then be transferred to and pending in the 
district court of such county, and no bond or 
obligation given in any of said causes shall 
be affected by said transfer. 
(3) In the city and county of Denver, 
exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters 
of prabate, &ettlemenu of estate.s of deceaed 
per sons, apl),9i:nt111ent of guardians, conservators 
and administrators, and settlement of their 
accounts, the adjudication of the mentally ill, 
and such other jurisdiction as may be provided 
by law shall be vested in a probate court, 
created by Section 1 of this article, and to 
which court all of such jurisdiction of the 
county court of the city and county of Denver 
shall be transferred, including all pending 
cases and matters effective on the second 




Section 8 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 10 of the present judicial 
article, with the qualifications for the 
office of supreme court justice changed. 
The 30-year age minimum i1 eliminated and 
the qualification as to legal training is 
increased. The present qualification is 
that a supreme court justice be learned in 
the law. The proposed amendment change~~ 
this· to. ,•have been lic;eoM!Cl -to"'I>ractice law 
in this stat&-. for at least five years.• 
The present provision includes two-year res·i-
dency in the state among the qualifications. 
The proposed amendment stipulates that a 
qualified elector shall be eligible without 
the two-year requirement. 
Section 9 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 11 of the present judicial 
article. It confers upon the district 
court all original jurisdiction, with 
certain exceptions, in line with t!N! 
changed jurisdiction of county courts and 
elimination of justice courts~ 
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 10. Judicial districts--district 
. judges. (1) The state shall be divided into 
judicial districts. Such districts shall be 
formed of compact territory and be bounded by 
county lines. The judicial districts as pro-
vided by law on-the effective date of this 
• 
Section 12, Judicial districts--term of 
judges.--The ,~ate shall be d~vided in~ -
judicial di,tri~ts, in each of which ther~ 
sh~~! be elected by the electors thereof, one 
or lllff• judges of the district court therein, 
as m~y Qe provided by law. whose term of 
offise shall be six years; the judges of the 
ijistiict-courts may hold courts for each 
other, and shall do so when required by law, 
and the general assembly may by law provide 
for the selection or election of a suitable 
person to preside in the trial of causes in 
~pecial cases. 
1,.-_ ~mendment stiall constitute the judicial districts 
of_the state until changed. The general,assembly 
_ may by law, whenever two-thirds of the members of 
each house concur therein, change.the boundaries 
of-any district or increase or diminish the num-
ber of judicial districts. · 
(2) In each judicial district there shall 
be elected by.the electors thereof one or more 
judges of the district court. The term of 
office of a district judge shall be six years 
and district judges holding office on the· 
.. , effective date of this constitutional amendment 
·-- ·shall continue in office for the remainder of 
· the respective terms for which they were 
elected or appointed. Vacancies shall be 
filled as provided in Section 20 of this 
article. 
(3) The number of district judges pro-
vided by law for each district on the effec-
tiva date of this amendment shall constitute 
the number of judges for the district until 
changed. The general assembly may by law, 
whenever two-thirds of the members of each 
house concur therein, increase or diminish 
the number of district judges, except that 
the office of a district judge may not be 
abolished until completion of the term for 
which he was elected or appointed, but he 
may be required to serve in a judicial district 
other than the one for which elected, as long 
as such district encompasses his county of 
residence. 
(4) S~parate divisions of district 
eourts may be established in districts by 
law, Q~ in the absence of any such law, by 
rule of c;aurt. 
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COMMENTS 
This section replaces Sections 12, 
13, 14, and 15 of the present judicial 
article. It provides for election of 
district judges in the same way as is 
provided in Section 12 of the present 
judicial article. Proposed Section 10 
also provides that separate divisions of 
the district court in any district may be 
established by law, or in the absence of 
any such law, by majority vote of the 
judges in any such district. 
, 
The judicial districts are not 
enumerated as in Section 13 of the present 
judicial article. Instead, Section 10 
states that the judicial districts as pro-
vided by law upon the effective date of the 
amendment shall constitute the judicial 
districts of the state. Section 14 of 
the present judicial article ~rovides that 
no change in j~dicial district boundaries 
shall cause the removal of any judge during 
the time for which he shall have been 
elected or appointed. This provision is 
also incorporated in the proposed Section 10. 
An additional phrase has been added to 
Subsection (3) to provide that a judge may 
be required to finish his term in a district 
other than the one in which he was elected 
as long as it encompasses his county of 
residence. This makes it possible to 
change judicial district boundaries during 
a judge's term of office. This provision 
is necessary because without it the possi-
bility of staggered terms would ma"lce it 
impossible to change judicial district 
boundaries. 
PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 13. Judicial districts.--Until 
otherwise provided by law, said districts 
shall be four in number, and tonstituted as 
follows, viz: · 
First District--The counties of Boulder. 
Jefferson, Gilpin. Clear Creek. Summit and 
Grand. · 
Second District--The counties of Arapahoe, 
Douglas, Elbert, Weld and Larimer. 
Third District--The counties of Park. 
El Paso. Fremont, Pueblo, Bent, Las Animas and 
Huerfano. 
Fourth District--The counties of Costilla, 
Conejos, Rio Grande, San Juan, La Plata, 
Hinsdale. Saguache and Lake. 
Section 14. Number of districts 
increased or diminI'stied':" ..,.he general assembly 
may (whenever two-thirds of the members of each 
house concur therein) increase or diminish the 
number of judges for any district, or increase 
or diminish the number of judicial districts 
and the judges thereof. Such districts shall 
' be formed of compact territory, and be bounded 
~ ~: ~~~~~! t~n~~! ~~n~~~~e!n~fe:s~is~!r~~u:~:~i 
.. 
, not work the removal of any judge from his 
office during the time for which he shall have 
been elected or appointed. 
Section 15. Election of jud1vs--term.--The judges of the district court irstelected 
shall be chosen at the first general election. 
The general assembly may provide that after the 
year eighteen hundred and seventy-eight, the 
election of the judges of the supreme court, 
district and county courts, and the district 
attorneys, or any of them, shall be on a 
different day from that on which an election 
is held for any other purpose, and for that 
purpose may extend or abridge the term of 
office of any such officers then holding, but 
not in any case more than six months. Until 
otherwise provided by law. such officers shall 
be elected at the time of holding the general 
elections. The term of office of all_judges 
of the district court, elected in the several 
districts throughout the stat~, shall expire 
on the same day; and the terms of office of 
district attorneys elected in the several 
districts throughout the state shall, in like 
manner, expire on the same day. 
fl • •I' 
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
:; .. 
CCM,!ENTS 
This section of the present article 
is repealed, and judicial district com-
position is covered in Section 10 of the 
proposed amendment. 
The provisions of Section 14 of the 
present judicial article are covered in 
Section 10 of the proposed amendment. 
The provisions of Section 15 of the 
present judicial article are covered in 
Section 10 above of the proposed amendment. 
Present Section 15 provides that the terms 
of all district judges shall expire on the 
same day. This provision is eliminated 
from Section 10 of the proposed amendment, 
because proposed Section 20 concerning the 
filling of vacancies provides that a · 
successor elected after a vacancy is 
filled shall be elected for a full term, 
rather than for the remainder of the term 
in which the vacancy was created. 
.. 
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PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 16. Qualifications of district 
~.--No person shall be eligible to the 
office of district judge unless he be lea~ned 
in the law. be at least thirty years old, and 
a citizen of the United States, nor unless he 
shall have resided in the state or territory 
at least two years next preceding his election, 
nor unless he shall, at the time of his elec-
tion. be an elector within the judicial district 
for which he is elected; provided, that at the 
first election, any person of the requisite 
age and learning. and who is an elector of the 
territory of Colorado, under the laws thereof, 
at the time of the adoption of this consti-
tution. shall be eligible to the office of 
judge of the district court of the judicial 
district within which he is an elector. 
Section 17. Terms of court.--The time 
of holding courts withinthe said district 
shall be as provided by law, but at least 
one term of the district court shall be held 
' annually in each county, except in such 
~ counties as may be attached. for judicial 
, purposes. to another county wherein such 
courts are so held, This shall not be 
construed to prevent the holding of special 
terms under such regulations as may be pro-
vided by law. 
Section 18. Compensation ,!!lg_ services 
of ~.--Judges of courts of record shall 
receive such compensation as may be provided 
by law. w~ich may be increased or decreased 
during their terms of office, and shall also 
receive such-pension or retirement benefits 
as may be provided by law. The supreme 
court shall be open except on Sundays and 
holidays during customary hours of court. 
No judge of the district court or supreme 
court shall accept nomination for any public 
office other than judicial, the term of which 
shall begin more than JO days before the end 
of his term of office, without first resigning 
from his judicial office, nor shall he engage 
in the practice of law, nor shall he bold 
office in a political party organization, 
When called upon to act any county judge 
admitted to the practice of law in the 
state of Colorado may serve as district judge 
in any district with full authority therein as 
the judge of the district wherein he serves. 
• 
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 11. Qualifications of district 
judges. No person shall be eligibie to the 
office of district judge unless he shall be 
a qualified elector of the judicial district 
at the time of his election or selection and 
shall have been licensed to practice law in 
this state for five years. Each judge of the 
district court shall be a resident of his 
district during his term of office. 
Section 12. Terms 2.f court. The time 
of holding courts within the judicial districts 
shall be as provided by rule of court, but at 
least one term of the district court shall be 
held annually in each county, 
, 
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COflJ.IENT.S 
Section 11 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 16 of the present judicial 
article. This section changes present 
qualifications for the office of district 
judge by eliminating the JO-year age minimum 
and requiring admittance to the practice of 
law in Colorado instead of being learned in 
the law. Section 16 requires two-year 
residence in Colorado. The proposed section 
does not contain this provision; however, a 
clause has been added requiring a district 
judge to have been licensed to practice law 
in Colora~o for five years--similar to the 
qualifications for supreme court justice. 
Section 12 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 17 of the present judicial 
article and provides that terms of court 
shall be established by court rule instead 
of by statute. 
Section 18 of the present judicial 
article is replaced by Section 18 of the 
proposed amendment. 
PR~SENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 19. Clerk of district court.--
There shall be a clerk orthe districtcourt 
in each county wherein a term-is held, who 
shall be appointed by the judge of .the 
district. to hold his ofHce d~ing the 
pleasure of the judge. His duties and com-
pensation shall be as provided by law, arid 
regulated by the rules of the.court. . 
Section 20. Jud~ '!!!Y ill!!!!!!!, when • .-
Until the general assem ly shall provide7i'ylaw 
for fixino the terms of the courts aforesaid, 
the judges of the sup%eme and district courts, 
respectively. shall fix the terms thereof. 
Section 21. ~lection--term--sala~y--
gualifications. --There shall"""""E>"eelecte by the 
qualified electors of each judicial district, 
at the general election in the year nineteen 
hundred and four, and every four years there-
afte~. a district attorney.for such district, 
whose term of office shall be four years, and 
whose duties and salary or compensation, 
, either from the fees or emoluments of his 
~ office or from the general county fund, as 
;::! shall be provided by law. . 
No person shall be eligible to the office 
' of district attorney who shall not, at the 
time of his election. be at least twenty-
five years of age and possess all the 
qualifications of judges of the district· 
courts. as provided in this article. The 
tenn of office of the district attorneys 
serving in the sever·a1 districts, at tt:ie 
time of the adoption of this amendment, is 
hereby ~tended to the second Tuesday of 
January, in the year A.O. 1905. 
• 
Section 22. ~--jlect~on-~..!&l.!!!--
~.--There shallbe e ecte at tnegeneral 
election in each organized county in the year 
nineteen hundred and four, and every four years 
thereafter, a county judge, who shall be judge 
of the county court of said county, whose term 
of office shall be four years, itnd who shall be 
paid such salary or compensat"ion, either from the 
fees and emoluments of hls office Ol' from the 
general county fund, as shall be p~ovided by law, 
The term of office of the county judges 
serving at the time of the adoption of this 
am&ndment is hereby extended to the second 
Tuesday of January in the year A.D. 1905. 
" ,,, ,,. 
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 13. District attorneys--e\ection--
term--salahy--guali£ications. In each Judicial 
district t ere sfiiH be a district attorney 
elected by the electors thereof. whose term of 
office shall be four years. District attorneys 
shall receive such salaries and perform such 
duties as provided by law. No person shall be 
eligible to the office of district attorney who 
shall not, at the time of his election possess 
all the qualifications of district court judges 
as provided in this article. All district 
attorneys holding office on the effective date 
of this amendment shall continue in office for 
the remainder of the respective terms for which 
they were elected or appointed. 
J • ,,. 
COMMENTS 
These two sections are repealed in the 
proposed amendment. Section 19 is eliminated 
as the office of district court clerk is 
provided by statute. Section 20 is elimi-
nated as no longer being applicable. as it 
is covered by Section 12 of the proposed 
amendment. 
Section 13 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 21 of the present judicial 
article. The proposed section eliminates 
reference to compensation from fees. as 
this practice has not been followed for 
several years. The language of the section 
has also been simplified in its reference to 
the selection and qualifications of district 
attorneys and provides that district attorneys 
must meet the same qualifications as district 
judges. • 
Sections 22 and 23 of the present 
judicial article, which pertain to county 
courts, would be repealed as of the second 
Tuesday in January, 1965--tl\e time when 
county courts would no longer have their 
present jurisdiction. N- constitutional 
provisions for county courts will be found 
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PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Sectio~ 23, CoYft of. record--lrfisdictioo--
aeeeals--!!r!ll af m.--County CINr s shall be 
courts of record and.shall have original juris-
diction in all matters af probate, settleinent of 
estates of deceased persons. appointment of 
gua-rdiam;.. conservrtor-s and a<tministtators, and 
settlement of their a1:counts, and such other 
eivil and criminal jurisdiction as may be con-
ferred by law: provided, such courts $hall not 
have jurisdiction in any case wtU!re the debt, 
da1nage. or claim or value of property involved 
shall exceed two thousand dollars, except in 
cases relating to the estate of deceased persons. 
Appeals may·be taken from county to disttict 
courts. o-r to the supreme court, in such cases 
and in such manner as may be prescribed by law. 
Writs of error shall lie from the supreme court 
to every final judgment of the county court. No 
appeal shall lie to the district court from any 
judg,nent given upon an appeal from a justice of 
the peac-e. 
• 
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Section 14. Probate court--iurisdiction--
judges--election--term--gualifications. The 
probate court of the city and county of Denver 
shall have such jurisdiction as provided by 
Section 9. Subsection (3) of this article. The 
judge of the probate court of the city and county 
of Denver shall have the same qualifications and 
term of office as provided in this article for 
district judges and shall be elected initially 
by the qualified electors of the city and county 
of Denver at the general election in the year 
1964. Vacancies shall be filled as provided in 
Section 20 of this article. The number of 
judges of the probate court of the city and 
county of Denver may be increased as provided 
by law. 





Section 14 of the proposed amendment 
takes effect at the time present county 
court jurisdiction is changed (although a 
probate judge would be elected in 1%4) 
and refers to the probate court of the 
city and county of Denver. This court 
is established as a constitutional court 
by Section 1 of the proposed amendment. 
and the probate court's jurisdiction is 
covered by Section 9 (3) of the proposed 
amendment. This section of the proposed 
amendment pertains to the election, term, 
and qualifications of the probate judge. 
The provisions which apply to district 
judges as to election. term, and quali-
fications are similar for probate judges. 
In addition, proposed Section 14 makes 
it possible to increase the number of 
judges of the Denver Probate Court by 
statute. 
' • 
PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTIClE 
Section 24. In what. coun.ties--juris-
diction.--The general assembly shall have 
power to create and establish a criminal 
court in each county having a population 
exceeding fifteeri thousand. which court 
, may have concurrent jurisdiction with the 
disttiet courts in all criminal cases not 
~o capital! the tei'nis of such courts to be as 
provided by law, 
I 
Section a;, Jutj $dicHon.--Justices 
of the peac• shall have such jurisdiction as 
may be confttfed by law, but they shall not 
have jurisdiction of any tase wherein the 
value of the property dt the ameurit in con-
troversy exceeds the •uffi df thtee hundred 
dollars. nor where the boundaries dt title 
to real property shall be called in question. 
Section 26. How creat~d••iw;:iJdictiqg,•• 
The general assemb!yshallave power to pro• 
vide for creating such police magistrates for 
cities and towns as may be deemed from time to 
time necessary or expedient, who shall have 
jurisdiction of all cases arising under the 
ordinances of such cities and towns respec-
tively. 
• •J• 
" • II 
PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 15, Juvenile court--iurisdiction--
~--election--term--guaII1Tcations. The 
juvenile court of the city and county of Denver 
shall have such jurisdiction as shall be pro-
vided by law, The judge of the juvenile court 
of the city and county of Denver shall have the 
same qualifications and term of office as 
provided in this article for district judges 
and shall be elected initially by the quali-
fied electors of the city and county of Denver 
at the general election in the year 1964. 
Vacancies shall be filled as provided in 
Section 20 of this article. The number of 
judges of the juvenile court of the city 
and county of Denver may be increased as 
provided by law. 
., .,, ... ·• ... 
COMMENTS 
Section 15 of the proposed amendment 
pertains to the selection, term. and 
qualifications of the judge of the Denver 
Juvenile Court {which is established as a 
constitutional court in Section 1 of the 
proposed amendment). This section also 
does not take effect until the second 
Tuesday in January, 1965, but a juvenile 
judge will be elected in 1964. Election, 
term, and qualifications for the juvenile 
judge are the same as for the district and 
probate judges. Proposed Section 15 makes 
it possible to increase the number of 
judges of the Denver Juvenile Court by 
statute. 
This section is repealed, because 
separate criminal courts in counties over 
15,000 population are not needed and would 
be contrary to the court consolidation 
embodied in the proposed amendment. 
This section is repealed, because it 
refers to justice of the peace courts, which 
are abolished by the proposed amendment. 
This section is repealed as of the effective 
date of the amendment rather than as of the 
second Tuesday in January, 1965, when justice 
of the peace courts are abolished, because 
there is sufficient legislation to cover 
these courts and their jurisdi_Etion. 
ThTs section is repealed because the 
authority to create such courts is contained 
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PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
... 
Section 27. Judges to Tepo1t defects in 
laws--governor !.2 tfansmit.-- he Judges of 
courts of record in erior to the supreme court 
shall on or before the first day in July, in 
each year. report in writing to the judges of 
the supreme court such defects and omissions 
in the laws as their knowledge and experience 
may suggest. and the judges of.the supreme 
court shall, on or before the first day of 
December of each year report in writing to 
the governor. to be by him transmitted to the 
general assembly, together with his message, 
such defects and omissions in the constitution 
and laws as they may find to exist, together 
with appropriate bills for curing the same. 
* 
" • 
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 16. County judghs--election--
term--qualifications.--In eac county there 
shall be elected by the electors thereof in 
• 
the year 1964, and every four years there-
after, one or more judges of the county court 
as may be provided by law, whose term .of office 
shall be four years, and whose qualifications 
shall be prescribed by law. Such judges shall 
be qualified electors of their counties at the 
time of their election or appointment. 
Section 17. County courts--iurisdiction--
appeals,--County courts shall have such civil, 
criminal, and appellate jurisdiction as may be 
provided by law, provided such courts shall not 
have jurisdiction of felonies or in civil cases 
where the boundaries or title to real property 
shall be in question. Appellate review by the 
supreme court or the district courts of every 
final judgment of the county courts shall be 
as provided by law. 
,. i i ' • i ' ' • t 
CO,.•J.\ENTS 
This section is repealed as its 
purpose can be accomplished by statute. 
if desired. 
' 
Section 16 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 22 of the present judicial 
article and applies to the election, term, 
and qualifications of county judges. Under 
this section it will be possible for counties 
to have more than one county judge as pro-
vided by law. Additional county judges will 
be necessary in several counties because of 
the volume of justice court cases and/or 
convenience to litigants and defendants. 
This section also provides that county 
judges' qualifications shall be set by 
statute, which would make it possible to 
have lawyer judges in the larger counties. 
Section 17 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 23 of the present judicial 
article and applies to county court juris-
diction. Such jurisdiction would be limited 
to misdemeanors and civil cases not involving 
title to or boundaries of real property. This 
jurisdiction is similar to that of present 
justice courts, except that no constitutional 
monetary limit is set in civil actions. Such 
monetary limits would be set by statute and 
could be varied according to economic con-
ditions without constitutional change. This 
section also provides for appellate juris-
diction as set by statute. This provision 
would make it possible for municipal court 
cases to be reviewed by the county courts. 
Appeals from the county court may lie to 
either the district court or the supreme 
court as provided by law. 
PRES~NT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 28. Laws relating to courts--
uniform.--All laws relating to courts shall 
be general and of uniform operation throughout 
the state: and t:1e organization, jurisdiction, 
powers, proceedings and practice of all the 
courts of the same class or grade, so far as 
regulated by law, and the force and effect of 
the proceedings. judgements and decrees of 
such courts severally shall be uniform. 
• .... • ,.,,j 
PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 18. Compensation and services. 
Justices of the supreme court, d!strict judges, 
probate judges, juvenile judges, and county 
judges shall receive such compensation as may 
be provided by law, which may be increased 
during their terms of office, and shal.l receive 
such pension or retirement benefits as may be 
provided by law. No supreme court justice, 
district court judge, probate judge, juvenile 
judge, or county court judge shall accept 
nomination for .any public office other than 
judicial, the term of which shall begin more 
than thirty days before the end of his term 
of office, without first resigning from his 
judicial office, nor shall he hold at any 
other time any other public office during 
his term of office, nor· hold office· in any 
political party organization, No supreme 
court justice, district court judge, 
probate judge, or juvenile judge shall 
engage in the practice of law. District 
judges, probate judges, juvenile judges, 
and county judges possessing the quali-
fications of district judges, when called 
upon to do so, may serve in any state court 
with full authority as provided by law. Any 
county judge may serve in any county court 
or as a municipal judge or police magistrate 
as provided by law, 
Section 19. Laws relating to courts--
uniform. All lawsreTating to state courts 
shall be general and of uniform operation 
throughout the state, and the organization, 
jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and 
practice of all courts of the same class, 
and the force· and effect of the proceedings, 
judgments and decrees of such courts 
severally shall ·be uniform. County courts 
may be classified or graded as may be pro-
vided by law, and the organization, juris-
diction, powers, proceedings., and practice 
of county courts within the same class or 
grade, and the force and effect of the pro-
ceedings, judgments and decrees of county 
courts in the same class or grade shall be 
uniform. 
J 
, .. ... ... 
COMMENTS 
Section 18 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 18 of the present judicial 
article. The present section provides that 
salaries may be increased or decreased 
during judges' terms of office. The pro-
posed section provides only for increases 
during judges' terms of office. 
Judges of all state courts are pro-
hibited from holding or running for a non-
judicial public office without resigning 
their judicial positions. Judges of all 
courts except the county court are pro-
hibited from practicing law. District, 
probate, juvenile, and qualified county 
judges are permitted to sit for each other. 
County judges may serve in other county 
courts or as municipal judges or police 
magistrates as provided by law. 
Section 19 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 28 of the present judicial 
article. This section also specifies that 
county courts may be classified by group 
and that as long as organization. juris-
diction, and procedures are the same within 
each class there is rib violation of uni-
formity. 
! 
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Section 29. ~here officers must reside--
vacancies.--All officers provided"'"1or in this 
article, excepting judges of the supreme court, 
shall respectively reside in the district,· 
county, precinct. city or town for which they 
may be elected or 3ppointed. Vacancies occur-
ring in any of the offices provided for in 
this 3rticle shall be filled by appointment as 
follows: Of judges of the supreme and district 
courts. by the governor: of district attorneys. 
by the judge of the court of the district for 
which such attorney was elected: and of all 
other judicial officers, by the board of county 
corrn:1issioners of the county wherein the vacan-
cy occurs. Judges of the supreme, district and 
county courts appointed under the provisions 
of this section shall hold office until next 
gener3l election and until their successors 
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PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 20. Vacancies. (1) Vacancies 
occurring in any of the elective judicial 
offices of the supreme court, district courts, 
probate court of the city and county of Denver, 
and the juvenile court of the city and county 
of Denver shall be filled by appointment of the 
governor. Judges appointed under the provisions 
of this section to elective judicial offices 
shall hold office until the next general 
election and until their successors elected 
thereat shall be duly qualified. Such 
successors shall be elected for a full term 
to their respective offices. 
(2) Vacancies occurring in the office 
of county judge of any county shall be filled 
by appointment of th~ county commissioners of 
such county. County judges appointed under 
the provisions of this section shall hold 
office until the next general election and 
until their successors elected thereat shall 
be duly qualified. Such successors shall be 
elected for a full term to their respective 
offices. 
(3) Other vacancies occurring in judicial 
offices shall be filled as now or hereafter 
provided by law. 
(4) Vacancies occurring in the office of 
district attorney shall be filled by appoint-
ment of the governor. District attorneys 
appointed under the provisions of this section 
shall hold office until the next general elec-
tion and until their successors elected thereat 
shall .be·duly·qualified. Such successors shall 
be elected for the remainder of the unexpired 
term in which the vacancy was created. 
r,, 
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CO!RI.ENTS 
Section 20 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 29 of the present judicial 
article with some significant changes: 
1) The Denver Probate Court and the Denver 
Juvenile Court have been added to the list 
of judicial vacancies to be filled by the 
governor. 2) Judges appointed to fill 
vacancies would hold office only until the 
first general election as at present, but 
their successors would be elected for a 
full term rather than for the expiration 
of the term in which the vacancy is created. 
3) The provision as to residency has been 
eliminated as it is covered in other sections 
of the proposed amendment. 4) Vacancies in 
the office of district attorney .->uld be 
filled by the governor rather than by the 
judges of the district courts in which such 
vacancies were created. Vacancies in the 
office of county judge would be filled by 
county connnissioners' appointments as at 
present, but the duly elected successor would 
be elected for a full term rather than for 
the unexpired term as at prese'l'lt. 
The provision allowing a successor to 
be elect~d for a full term rather than for 
the remainder of the unexpired term was 
included for two reasons. First, it would 
have the effect ultimately of staggering 
judicial terms so that it would not be 
necessary to elect a large number of judges 
at one time. Second, it might encourage 
qualified men to accept appointment if they 
know they can run for a full term rather 
than for two to four years and then be faced 
with another election. The change in filling 
vacancies in the office of district attorney 
was also motivated by two factors: first, 
the difficulty of filling such vacancy in 
two-judge districts where the judges are of 
opposite political parties; and second, the 
questionable desirability of having district 
attorneys appointed by judges before whom 
they will appear. 
' 
PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Section 30. Process--run in name of 
oeople.~-All process shall run in the name 
of "The People of the State of Colorado;" 
all prosecutions shall be carried on in 
the name and by the authority of "The 
~ People of the State of Colorado." and 
~ conclude, "against the peace and dignity 
of the same." 
Section 31. Retirement of judges.--Any 
judge of any court now existing in the state 
of Colorado. or hereafter created, shall be 
retired from office if found permanently 
disabled, by reason of mental or physical 
infirmities. from performing the duties of 
his of:ice. Issues c0~cerning retirement 
for disability shall be initiated by motion 
of the attorney general to the supreme court 
for investigation concerning the permanent 
disability of such j1Jdge, whereupon said 
court may appoint a referee who shall have 
authority to subpoena witnesses and make 
full investigation and submit his report 
thereon to the court. In the event the 
court shall determine such judge to be so 
permanently disabled. he shall be retired 
with such pension or retirement benefits as 
he would have re~eived had he fully completed 
his then term of office. Upon such retire-
ment his office shall be deemed vacant and 
be filled as provided by law. 
ii - J, ... .. 
PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
Section 21. Rule makidg power. The 
supreme court shalr"'iiiake an promulgate rules 
governing the administration of all courts and 
shall make and promulgate rules governing 
practice and procedure in civil and criminal 
cases. except that the general assembly shall 
have the power to provide simplified pro-
cedures in county courts for claims not 
exceeding $500 and for the trial of 
misdemeanors. 
Section 22. Process--prosecution--in 
~ .2f. ~- In all prosecutions for 
violations of the laws of Colorado, process 
shall run in the name of "The People of the 
State of Colorado;" all prosecutions shall 
be carried on in the name and by the authority 
of "The People of the State of Colorado,• and 
conclude, "against the peace and dignity of 
the same." 
Section 23. Retirement of judges. Any 
judge of any court now existing in the state 
of Colorado, or hereafter created, shall be 
retired from office if found permanently dis-
abled, by reason of mental or physical in-
firmities, from performing the duties of his 
office. Issues concerning retirement for 
disability shall be initiated by motion of 
the attorney general to the supreme court for 
investigation concerning the permanent dis-
ability of such· judge, whereupon said court 
may appoint a referee who shall have authority 
to subpoena witnesses and make full investi-
gation and submit his report thereon to the 
the court. In proceedings against a justice 
of the supreme court under this section, such 
justice shall be disqualified from sitting as 
~ judge. In tne event the court shall deter-
mine such judge to be so permanently disabled, 
he shall be retired •ith such pension or re-
tirement bene-fits as he would have received 
had he fully completed his then term of office. 
Upon such reti~ament his office shall be deemed 
vacant and be filled as provided by law. 
J ',. 
COMMENTS 
Section 21 of the proposed amendment 
is not in the present judicial article 
except for the provision in Section 2 that 
the supreme court has general superintending 
control over all courts. (This provision 
is also incorporated in Section 2 of the 
proposed amendment.) This proposed section 
gives the supreme court authority to pro-
mulgate rules governing administration of 
all courts and for civil and criminal 
practice and procedure with one exception. 
The general assembly is given the authority 
to provide simplified procedures in county 
courts for small civil cases and minor 
misdemeanors. This provision makes it 
possible to provide simplified procedures 
for cases fonnerly within the jurisdiction 
of justice courts. 
Section 22 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 30 of the present judicial 
article. This section has been limited to 
violations of state law, so that it is clear 
that in violations of ordinances tried in 
municipal courts, process shall run in the 
name of the people of the respective city 
or town. • 
Section 23 of the proposed amendment 
replaces Section 31 of the present judicial 
article with the restriction added that in 
proceedings against a justice of the supreme 
court under this section. such justice shall 
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PRESENT JUDICIAL ARTICLE 
Article XIV. Section 11. Justices of the 
peace--con~tables.--There shall oe elected at"'" 
the same time at which members of the general 
assembly are elected, beginning with the year 
nineteen hundred and four. two justices of the 
peace and two constables in each precinct in 
each county. who shall hold their office for a 
term of two years: provided, that in precincts 
containing fifty thousand (50,000) or more in-
habitants, the number of justices and constables 
may be increased as provided by law. The term 
of offices of all justices of the peace that 
expires in January. 1904, is hereby extended 
to the second Tuesday in January, 1905, This 
section shall govern, except as hereafter 
otherwise expressly directed. or permitted 
by constitutional enactment • 
.t I 7 t ,c 
, 
'.~ 
PROPOSED JUDICIAL AMENDMENT 
, 
Section 24. Justices of 1ll!. ~--
constables, Effective on the s,econa Tuesday 
in January, 1965, all justice of the peace 
courts shall cease to exist, and as of said 
date, Section 11 of Article XIV of the 
constitution of the state of Colorado shall 
be repealed, and no justices of the peace or 
constables shall be elected at the general 
election held in 1964. 
) 
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COMMENTS 
The proposed amendment also includes 
repeal of Article XIV, Section 11 of the 
constitution. This section refers to 
justices of the peace and constables and 
would be repealed effective the second 
Tuesday of January, 1965, when justice of 
the peace courts would be terminated. 
APPENDIX E 
BY 
A BILL FOR AN ACT 
CONCERNING PUBLIC DEFENDERS. 
BILL NO. 
Be It Enacted e:t. the General As$embly Q.f. the State Qi Colorado: 
SECTION 1. Definitions. As used in this act, unless the 
context clearly indicates otherwises 
(1) The term ~governing authority" shall mean the board of 
county commissioner& in the case of a county, and the city council 
in the oase of a city and county. 
(2) The term "county" shall include a city and county. 
SECTION 2. Permissive authority to establish office of 
public defender. In any county the governing authority may establish 
the office of public defender. A county may join with one or more 
other counties to establish one office of public defender to serve 
those counties. 
Comment* 
Provision for securing counsel for indigents charged with 
criminal offenses has been accomplished in various patterns: 
1. By statute setting up the office 
a. as mandatory for every county; 
b. as permissive for every county; 
c. as mandatory in counties of a stated population 
and permissive for others. 
*Comments are those of the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws to the equivalent sections of the Model Defender 
Act approved by the Conference in 1959. The Colorado Defender Act 






















2. Appointment by the court in individual cases with 
compensation 
a. under legislative scale; 
b. fixed by the appointing court. 
3. By le9al aid and defender organizations in certain 
~unicipalities supported by public funds, private 
philanthropy,.or both. 
It seems wise, therefore, to create the office by an enabling 
act with the county as the appropriate unit, so that local require-
ments and wishes can be carried out. 
Throughout the act• the county is made the governmental unit. 
In some jurisdictions this will necessarily require changes. 
SECTION 3. S~lection ~nd qualification of public defender -
represent intjig!nt,eersons. (1) The public defender shall be a 
qualified attorn~y licensed to practice law in this state, selected 
by the governing authority in the case of a county, or by the mayor 
in the case of a city and county. The public defender shall repre-
sent, without charge, each indigent person who is under arrest or 
charged with a crime, including such offenses under municipal codes 
as he may, in his discretion, determine, if: 
a. The defendant requests it; or 
b. The court, on its own motion or otherwise, so orders and 
the defendant does not affirmatively reject of record the 
opportunity to be so represe~ted • 
(2) The determination of indigency shall be made by the 
public defender, s~bject to review by the court. 
Comment 
, It is r~cognized that the criminal codes of the several states 
vary widely with respect to what specific acts constitute offenses 
against the state. Therefore, it should be left to each jurisdiction 
to determine what crimes are to be covered in this act. 
Careful thought should be given to the method of selecting the 
public defender. A ~ethbd oth~t th~n by electi~n will shield the 
- 187 -
public defender from the hazards and expense of campaigning for 
office. In some jurisdictions, a judicial selection is made; in 
others, the public defender is chosen by the legislative division. 
Sometimes he is under civil service. 
If local conditions are such that election of the public 
defender must be the method of selection in order to get the bill 
passed, additional safeguards may be set up. 
Many lawyers who have studied the various defender systems 
feel tnat the method of selecting the official is the key to the 
success of the plan. The objective, whatever the method, is to 
make certain that 11ot only a qualified lawyer holds the position 
but that he will also have the independence to serve his clients 
with complete professional loyalty. 
Former drafts embodied the thinking that it was appropriate 
to pattern the office after its so-called counterpart, the office 
of the prosecuting attorney, and subject to the sa$e restrictions 
respecting salary, private practice, etc. Debate has shown this 
provision to be inelastic, difficult to create, and provacative of 
.controversy. 
SECTION 4. Term of public defenge; - assistant attorneys and 
employees - compensation. (1) The term and compensation of the 
public defender shall be fixed by the governing authority. 
(2) The public defender may appoint as many assistant 
attorneys, clerks, investigators, stenographers, and, other 
employees as the governing authority considers necessary to enable 
him to carry out his responsibilities. Appointments under this 
section shall be made in the manner prescribed by the governing 
' 
.,;, 
authority. An assistant attorney must be· a qualified attorney licensed ~ 
to practice law in this state. 
(3) The compensation of persons appointed under subs~ction 
(2) of this section shall be fixed by the governing authority. 
Comment 
This section should be flexible enough to cover jurisdictions 
of varying size and population, as some counties may need only a 
part-time defender while others may require more than one lawyer and 
additional clerks, etc., on the staff. In the more populous counties, 
the effectiveness of the office will be greatly reduced unless there 
















SECTION 5. Dpties of public defender. When representing an 
indigent person, the public defender shall (1) counsel and defend 
him, whether he is held in custody or charged with a criminal 
offense, at every stijge of the proceedings following atTest; and 
(2) prosecute any appeals or other remedies before or after con-
viction that he considers \o be in the interest of justice • 
~gmrnent 
Thi$ wide authority is given to permit the defender to repre-
sent indigent clients at every stage of the proceedings and to 
appear for those charged with felonies and misdemeanors. One of 
the chief criticisms of the assigned counsel system is that the 
defendant's lawyer is selected too late in the proceedings to 
render the most effective $ervice. Too, there are many situations 
where indigent defendants with misdemeanor charges need a lawyer 
as much as thoae facing more $erious offenses. This is particularly 
true where the defendant is young or is a first offender, and in 
jurisdictions where misdemeanors carry a heavy penalty • 
SECTION 6. Appointment of other attorney in place of public 
defender. For cause, the court may, on its own motion or upon the 
application of the public defender or the indigent person, appoint 
an attorney other than the public defender to represent him at any 
stage of the proceedings or on appeal. The attorney shall be 
awarded reasonable compensation and reimbursement for expenses 
necessarily incurred, to be fixed by the court and paid by the county. 
Comment 
It seems d,e·sirable to provide a pl.an for handling those cases 
where· a conflict of interest or other legitimate reason makes 1 t 
desirable to appoint counsel other than the public defender • 
SECTION 7. Report of public defender. The public defender 
~hall make an annual report to the governi~g authority covering 
all cases handled by his offlce during the preceding year. 
- lB9 -
Comment 
This requirement is self-explanatory, Th~ justification of 
the office as well as a history of its efficiency makes this regulation 
a requisite. 
SECTION 8, Office space. equipment. etc, - expenses - sharing 
by counties. The governing authority in the case of a county, and 
the mayor in the case of a city and county, shall provide office 
space, furniture, equipment, and supplies for the use of the public 
defender suit~ble fot the conduct of the business of his office. 
However, the governing authority in any case may provide for an 
allowance in place of facilities, Each such item is a -charge 
against ~he county in which the services were rendered. If the 
public defender serves more than one county, e~penses that are 
properly allocable to the business of more than one of those counties 
shall be prorated among the counties concerned, as shell be agreed 
upon by the governing authorities of the counties concerned. 
Comment 
If the defender serves more than one county, the last two 
sentences are desirable to clarify the division of cost and expense. 
SECTION 9. Absence of office of public defender. If the 
governing authority does not create the office of public defender 
then, at county expense, either 
(1) The services prescribed by this act shall be provided by 
a qualified attorney appointed by the court in each case and awarded 
reasonable compensation and expenses by the court; or 
(2) The servi~es prescribed by this act shall be provided 
through nonprofit legal aid or defender organizations designed 
by the governing authbrity, which organizations may be awarded 
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